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Introduction
We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and the in-
teraction among those heterogeneous agents. [...] (W)e need to better
integrate the crucial role played by the financial system into our macroe-
conomic models. [...] In particular, dealing with the non-linear behavior
of the financial system will be important, so as to account for the pro-
cyclical build-up of leverage and vulnerabilities.
Jean-Paul Trichet,
Speech at the ECB Central Banking Conference
Frankfurt, 18 November 2010
The ’Great Recession’ has put the interaction between the real economy and the financial
system at the forefront of both economic research and policymakers. On the one hand
the economics profession quickly realized that the workhorse approach to macroeconomic
modeling was missing a crucial feature of modern advanced economies: The financial
system. On the other hand, policymakers became increasingly aware of the importance
of a well functioning financial system and realized quickly that the available models and
empirical approaches where of limited help. As Jean Paul Trichet put it at the 2010 ECB
Central Banking Conference ”As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available
models of limited help. I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned
by conventional tools.”
Since then, enormous efforts have been made to overcome the shortcomings for which
the models and methods were blamed. The workhorse quantitative models nowadays
used in central banks routinely feature some form of financial market imperfections,
and attempts are being made to represent the financial system, and its macroeconomic
consequences, in a more realistic way. However, a long way is still to go to build models
which incorporate the most relevant features of the financial sector for the macroeconomy
in a satisfactory manner. Especially issues of heterogeneity in financial markets and the
non-linear and asymmetric behavior of the financial system are still under research,
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both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. The aim of the present thesis is to
contribute to the empirical literature trying to fill these gaps.
The present thesis can be separated into two parts, each consisting of two chapters.
The first part, consisting of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, deals with the behavior of the
banking system over the business cycle. Special focus lies in the modeling of the het-
erogeneity of the banking system and the transmission of macroeconomic shocks via the
banking system. The second part of the thesis (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) deals with
the asymmetric behavior of the financial system over the business cycle and the time
variation in the mutual interaction between the financial sector and the real economy.
The remainder of the introduction gives a more detailed exposition of each chapter.
Chapter 1.1 The exposure of banks to macroeconomic shocks features prominently
in recent proposals for regulatory reforms (Basel Committee 2009). Rochet (2004) shows
theoretically that banks should face a capital requirement that increases with their expo-
sure to macroeconomic factors. Farhi and Tirole (2012) analyze the incentives of banks to
coordinate their exposure to macroeconomic shocks. They argue that banks which react
more to macroeconomic shocks should be regulated more tightly. Gersbach and Hahn
(2010) propose a regulatory framework under which a banks’ required level of equity
capital depends on the equity capital of its peers and, in this sense, on the macroeco-
nomic environment. Implementing these proposals however requires information about
individual banks’ exposures to macroeconomic factors.
With the analysis in this chapter we attempt to inform this debate. Specifically, we
provide answers to the following two questions: How are macroeconomic shocks trans-
mitted to individual banks and, in particular, to bank risk? What are the sources of bank
heterogeneity, and what explains differences in individual banks’ responses to macroe-
conomic shocks? The analysis in this chapter is based on a factor-augmented vector
autoregressive model (FAVAR) as proposed by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
Our model extends a standard macroeconomic VAR comprising GDP growth, inflation,
house price inflation, and the monetary policy interest rate with a set of factors sum-
marizing conditions in about 1,500 commercial banks. We find that backward-looking
risk tends to decline after expansionary macroeconomic shocks while forward-looking
bank risk increases after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, there is a
substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks both in terms of idiosyncratic shocks
1This chapter is based on the paper ”Macroeconomic Factors and Micro-Level Bank Behavior” writ-
ten jointly with Claudia Buch and Sandra Eickmeier (Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto forth.b).
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and the asymmetric transmission of common shocks. Bank size, capitalization, liquidity,
risk, and the exposure to real estate and consumer loans matter for risk and lending
responses of individual banks to monetary policy and house price shocks.
Our findings are interesting from a banking regulation perspective. Our results lend
support to proposals that higher capital and higher liquidity requirements can enhance
the resilience of the banking sector to macroeconomic shocks. Also, smaller banks are
more exposed to macroeconomic risk but, at the same time, the systemic impact of
these banks on the macroeconomy is rather small. Accordingly, regulatory policy needs
to balance different criteria such as the relevance of an institution for systemic risk
and its exposure to macroeconomic shocks when deciding upon new capital or liquidity
requirements.
Chapter 2.2 In this chapter we provide an in depth analysis of the ’risk-taking
channel of monetary policy’. The risk-taking channel of monetary policy refers to the
behavior of banks to engage in ex ante riskier projects following expansionary monetary
policy shocks. To identify the risk-taking channel of monetary policy we exploit infor-
mation provided by the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL).
The information available in the STBL allows modeling the behavior of banks’ new lend-
ing, the corresponding interest rates as well as other important loan characteristics for
different loan risk categories and different banking groups. Our metric for risk-taking
refers to changes in the composition of new lending which reflect shifts in the distribution
of new lending towards borrowers of lower quality.
Our results suggest that, on average over the sample period, small domestic banks
significantly increase new loans to high risk borrowers after expansionary monetary policy
shocks. The composition of loan supply of small banks shifts towards riskier loans.
Although large domestic banks give out more new high risk loans we cannot detect
any significant shift in the composition of their loan portfolio. On average over the
sample foreign banks lower their exposure to risk. This however mask that especially
foreign banks shift their loan supply towards riskier borrowers during the mid-2000s,
when interest rates were particularly low for a prolonged period of time (’too-low-for-
too-long’). Changes in the risk composition of loan portfolios are not compensated by
higher risk premia. Banks rather shift their (new) loan portfolios towards higher risk
loans and charge a lower risk premium. This is how the risk-taking channel is defined in
2This chapter is based on the paper ”In search for yield? Survey based evidence on bank risk-taking”
written jointly with Claudia Buch and Sandra Eickmeier (Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto forth.a).
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Borio and Zhu (2012): banks are willing to take on more risk, and this is not compensated
by an increase in the risk premium.
The findings of this chapter have some important policy implications. According
to the full sample estimation results, concerns about the effect of monetary policy on
financial stability might be overstated. Indeed, under normal circumstances it seems
that only small banks tend to shift their loan supply towards riskier borrowers. Inso-
far as small banks are less important in terms of the systemic stability of the financial
system our results suggest that central banks should not give too much weigh on poten-
tial financial stability issues when conducting monetary policy. By contrast, during a
prolonged period of low interest rates also foreign banks, which are known to be larger
and potentially systemically important, actively engage in risk taking behavior. Hence,
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy might become a serious issue for financial
stability and as such a concern also for monetary authorities.
Chapter 3.3 With this chapter we abandon the assumption of a time-constant
relation between the financial sector and the real economy and allow for time variation
among these sectors of the economy. Using a Bayesian VAR with time-varying parame-
ters and stochastic volatilities along the lines of Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri
(2005) we address the following fundamental issues: How important is the financial sec-
tor as a source of shocks for economic activity? Can we detect changes over time? If,
yes, has the propagation of financial shocks to economic activity changed or is it only
the size of the shocks which changed? Is the Global Financial Crisis different compared
to previous crises? Is the recovery from the Great Recession so weak and slow because
of distress in the financial sector?
We find that over the Great Recession period the explanatory power of financial
shocks for GDP growth rose to roughly 50 percent, compared to 20 percent in normal
times. Among the financial shocks considered, shocks to housing prices were particularly
important in explaining the Great Recession, accounting for about 2/3 of the overall con-
tribution of the financial sector to GDP growth. House price and credit spread shocks
have been larger and the transmission to growth stronger than previously. The slow
and weak recovery from the Global Financial Crisis is mainly because of negative de-
velopments in the housing market. A potential reason is that households are still credit
constraint. In general, the housing sector affects the macroeconomy asymmetrically:
3This chapter is based on the paper ”Time-variation in macro-financial linkages” written jointly with
Sandra Eickmeier and Massimiliano Marcellino (Prieto, Eickmeier, and Marcellino 2013).
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Negative shocks are more important for the macroeconomy than positive shocks. More-
over, we find a trend increase in the transmission and in the size of housing shocks since
the early-2000s, probably due to a rise in housing wealth and the boom in mortgage
lending.
Concerning the pre-Global Financial Crisis period, we detect significantly positive
contributions of credit spread shocks to GDP growth in the mid-1980s, potentially re-
flecting the process of financial deregulation. Moreover, we find significantly negative
financial shock contributions around the banking crises in the early-1970s (the Bank
Capital Squeeze) and in the late-1980s/early-1990s (the Savings and Loan crisis), due
to particularly large credit spread shocks and housing shocks. Interestingly the stock
market crashes in 1987 and 2001, did not have significantly negative real effects.
Chapter 4. Induced by financial innovations and deregulation the past decades have
witnessed revolutionary changes in the functioning of the financial system. Until recently
there was a strong believe that these changes reduced financial frictions and thereby
contributed to a more stable economy. In 2005, Alan Greenspan made this conjecture
clear at the Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure ”[...]the growing array of
derivatives and the related application of more sophisticated methods for measuring and
managing risks had been key factors underlying the remarkable resilience of the banking
system, which had recently shrugged off severe shocks to the economy and the financial
system”. With the Global Financial Crisis however the common belief on the merits of a
deregulated and complex financial industry was shaken to the very foundations. Instead,
today it seems that most of us would agree that the deregulation and all the financial
innovations were bad moves.
In this chapter I attempt to uncover the effects of the changes in financial markets on
the dynamics of the macroeconomy. In a first step, I estimate a Bayesian VAR with time-
varying parameters and stochastic volatilities featuring a standard set of macroeconomic
variables and two financial market variables. The time-varying parameter VAR allows to
examine potential time-variation in the interaction of the real economy and the financial
system. The results from the estimation of the VAR reveal a strong reduction in the
correlation of GDP growth with lending. The bulk of this reduction takes place in the
early 1980s. In a second step, I estimate key parameters of a DSGE model with financial
friction via an impulse response matching procedure at different points in time. The
results from the structural estimation show that the time variation uncovered in the
VAR is mapped into a reduction in the degree of financial frictions over the last decades.
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The results summarized above provide strong evidence in support of a reduction in
financial friction over the past decades. A careful investigation of the timing of the
changes in the dynamic interrelation between real activity and the financial system sug-
gests that the regulatory changes of the early 1980s are likely to be the reason for these
changes. By contrast, market driven innovations, such as securitization, and regulatory
changes during the 1990s did - if at all - only marginally contribute to the increased
stability of the US economy observed in the 1980 and 1990. These results bear im-
portant implications for current regulatory proposals as they imply that changes to the
regulatory environment as well as most of the new financial product developed over the
decade preceding the Great Recession might be much less valuable for the stability of
the economy as previously thought and still often claimed.
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Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Factors and
Micro-Level Bank Behavior
1.1 Motivation
How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to individual banks and, in particular, to
bank risk? What are the sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences
in individual banks’ responses to macroeconomic shocks? We provide answers to these
questions by analyzing the exposure of banks to macroeconomic developments in the
U.S. over the period 1985-2008.
Our analysis is based on a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR)
as proposed by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). This model extends a standard
macroeconomic VAR comprising GDP growth, inflation, house price inflation, and the
monetary policy interest rate with a set of factors summarizing a large amount of in-
formation from bank-level data. Our bank-level dataset contains two measures of bank
risk. The first is the share of non-performing loans in total assets. This ratio informs
about changes in the overall quality of the stock of credit and is thus a backward-looking
measure of risk. The second is the share of non-interest income in total income, i.e. a
flow variable, which is used as a more forward-looking measure of risk (Brunnermeier,
This chapter is based on joint work with Claudia Buch and Sandra Eickmeier entitled ”Macroeco-
nomic Faactors and Micro-Level Bank Behavior” which is forthcoming in the Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking.
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Dong, and Palia 2012, DeYoung and Roland 2001). The higher the share of non-interest
income, the higher the volatility of returns, and thus the higher risk.
We also include bank capitalization, profitability, and bank loans as bank-level vari-
ables which affect the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic shocks on risk. Data for
a balanced panel of about 1,500 banks are taken from the U.S. Call Reports. We decom-
pose the banking data into common and idiosyncratic components. A set of macroeco-
nomic (supply, demand, monetary policy and house price) shocks is identified, and their
transmission through the banking system is assessed. We look at the effects of the shocks
on a representative (median) bank and on individual banks. Using cross-sectional re-
gressions, we study which bank-level features can explain differences in banks’ responses
to macroeconomic shocks.
Our main findings are as follows: (i) Lending by a representative, median bank
increases following expansionary shocks. Backward-looking risk tends to decline af-
ter expansionary macroeconomic shocks; house price shocks are particularly important.
Forward-looking median bank risk increases after expansionary monetary policy shocks.
(ii) There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks both in terms of idiosyn-
cratic shocks and the asymmetric transmission of common banking and macroeconomic
shocks. Bank size, capitalization, liquidity, risk, and the exposure to real estate and
consumer loans matter for risk and lending responses of individual banks to monetary
policy and house price shocks.
Our study is related to theoretical and empirical work on the effects of macroeconomic
developments on bank risk, which typically focuses on monetary policy shocks. Financial
accelerator models imply that changes in interest rates may have countervailing effects
on bank risk. On the one hand, lower interest rates might lower risk because the interest
rate burden for firms declines and because the value of the underlying collateral increases.
Hence, the probability of repayment increases as well. On the other hand, risk might
increase because the borrowing capacity of high-risk firms increases with the value of
pledgeable assets. Also, banks might engage in riskier, higher yield, projects to offset the
negative effects of lower interest rates on profits. Conversely, higher interest rates increase
the agency costs of lending, banks reduce the amount of credit to monitoring-intensive
firms, and they invest more in safe assets (”flight-to-quality”) (Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist 1996, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006, Matsuyama 2007).
While the original financial accelerator models do not assign a specific role to banks,
recent macroeconomic models explicitly analyze the feedback between banks and the
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macroeconomy in the context of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
(Angeloni and Faia 2009, Dib 2010, Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti 2010, Meh and
Moran 2010, Zhang 2009). In these models, the impact of expansionary shocks on
bank lending is unequivocally positive, but the impact on bank risk is less clear cut.
In Angeloni and Faia (2009), a declining interest rate following a positive supply or
an expansionary monetary policy shock, reduces banks’ funding costs and increases the
probability to repay depositors. To maximize profits, banks optimally choose to increase
leverage. But the decline in interest rates also lowers banks’ return on assets. This,
together with higher leverage, increases bank risk.
In Zhang (2009), to the contrary, expectations of future outcomes play a central role.
A positive technology shock, for instance, increases the return on capital over and above
its expected value which, in turn, corresponds to a lower than expected loan default
rate. The bank thus realizes unexpected profits on its loan portfolio. Bank capital is
accumulated through these earnings, strengthening banks’ balance sheet positions and
reducing risk. A few recent papers also analyze the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy and investigate whether low policy interest rates encourage lending to high-risk
borrowers due to a ”search for yield” (Borio and Zhu 2012, Dell’Ariccia, Marquez, and
Laeven 2010, Rajan 2005).
A small set of empirical papers looks at the impact of monetary policy shocks on
bank risk. Some studies find evidence that lower interest rates increase bank risk. Ioan-
nidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (forth.)
identify a risk-taking channel for new loans based on loan-level data; Altunbas, Gam-
bacorta, and Ibanez (2009) and Gambacorta (2009) use expected default frequencies for
individual banks. Based on time series evidence for the U.S., Angeloni, Faia, and Duca
(2010) and Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) find a decline of various credit risk spreads
and an increase of bank balance sheet risk, respectively, following a positive monetary
policy shock. Based on data from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending for the
US, Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (forth.) find that commercial banks shift their lending
from low-risk to high-risk borrowers after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Using
a model that captures the feedback between bank-level distress and the macroeconomy,
De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008), in contrast, find a decline in German banks’ prob-
ability of distress after a monetary policy loosening. The impact of other shocks has,
to the best of our knowledge, not yet been subject to careful empirical investigation, an
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exception being Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2011) who find also additional risk-taking
by commercial banks after expansionary house price shocks.1
From a theoretical point of view, the response of bank risk to expansionary shocks
differs: the riskiness of new loans and thus risk-taking can be expected to increase
while the riskiness of outstanding loans can move either way. The overview of empirical
studies confirms that backward-looking risk, which is generally measured using data on
outstanding loans, tends to decline after expansionary shocks. By contrast, forward-
looking risk measures tend to rise, which is in line with the risk-taking channel.
Our main research question, the exposure of banks to macroeconomic factors, also
features prominently in recent proposals for regulatory reforms (Basel Committee 2009).
Rochet (2004) shows theoretically that banks should face a capital requirement and a
deposit insurance premium that increases with their exposure to macroeconomic factors.
Farhi and Tirole (2012) analyze the incentives of banks to coordinate their exposure
to macroeconomic shocks. They argue that banks which react more to macroeconomic
factors should be regulated more tightly. Gersbach and Hahn (2010) propose a regu-
latory framework under which a banks’ required level of equity capital depends on the
equity capital of its peers and, in this sense, on the macroeconomic environment. Im-
plementing these proposals requires information about individual banks’ exposures to
macroeconomic factors. Our results inform this debate.
We make several contributions. First, the FAVAR model allows analyzing the dy-
namic interaction between bank-specific and macroeconomic developments in a flexible
way. Several VAR-studies allow for the interaction between credit and macroeconomic
factors (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro 2010, Eickmeier 2009), but these studies do
not focus on bank risk or bank-specific effects. Bank-level studies on the risk-taking or
bank lending channel, in contrast, allow macroeconomic factors to affect bank risk, but
macroeconomic factors are not modeled as a function of banking variables. Our setup
accounts for the endogeneity of both, macroeconomic and banking factors.
Second, the FAVAR allows including a large number of bank-level time series. The
model exploits the comovement between individual banks, and it allows us to model
linkages between individual banks, running through the interbank market or through
the exposure to common shocks. The need to account for linkages between financial
1Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Ibanez (2009) find that higher GDP growth lowers bank risk but changes
in asset prices have no clear-cut impact on risk. The analysis of these factors on risk is, however, not
the focus of their paper. Moreover, the authors do not identify structural (real or asset price) shocks.
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institutions is one key lesson of the recent crisis (Brunnermeier 2009). Moreover, we
model the interaction between different banking variables, including risk and returns
of banks. Because we use a large number of bank-level time series, we can assess the
exposure of each individual bank to macroeconomic shocks.
Third, previous papers analyzing the bank lending channel or the risk-taking channel
regress micro-level variables on the monetary policy interest rate, GDP growth, or asset
prices (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Ibanez 2009, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012, Ioannidou,
Ongena, and Peydro 2009, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina forth., Kashyap and
Stein 2000). These papers address the issue that monetary policy is endogenous by either
approximating monetary policy by foreign policy rates (Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and
Saurina forth.) or by Taylor rule gaps (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Ibanez 2009). The
macroeconomic indicators are thus reduced-form constructs, and their developments
may reflect the pass-through of different types of shocks. Instead, we consider identified
orthogonal macroeconomic shocks which allow us to better disentangle the common
drivers of banking sector developments.
Fourth, FAVAR models have previously been fitted to large macroeconomic datasets
(Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 2005, Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 2008) or aggregate
financial datasets (Nicolo and Lucchetta 2011, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013). The
methodology, however, allows exploiting even richer information, and its application
to micro-level data is the natural next step. We will show that omitting bank-level
information leads to different estimates of impulse responses and shocks series. Our
study is one of the first using a FAVAR model linked to a micro-level dataset. It is
closely related to Dave, Dressler, and Zhang (2009) who use a similar modeling approach
for U.S. data but focus on the bank lending channel while our focus is on risk. Other
papers combining factor models and micro-level data are den Reijer (2011) and Otrok
and Pourpourides (2011).
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, we present the data and the FAVAR methodology, respec-
tively. In Section 1.4, we provide and discuss the empirical results. In Section 1.5, we
carry out robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 The Data
The key feature of our empirical model is the joint analysis of macroeconomic data and
bank-level data, which we describe in this section. We also address potential concerns
regarding the presence of a factor structure in the data.
1.2.1 Macroeconomic Data
Our set of macroeconomic variables comprises log differences of real GDP, the GDP
deflator, real house prices, and the level of the effective Federal Funds rate. Real house
prices are measured as the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage house price, divided by
the GDP deflator. The data are retrieved from FreeLunch.com, a free internet service
provided by Moody’s Economy.com.
1.2.2 Bank-level Data
Our source for bank-level data is the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call
Reports) that all insured commercial banks in the United States submit to the Federal
Reserve in each quarter. A complete description of all variables is provided in Table 1.7
in the Appendix. From the Call Reports, we compile a dataset consisting of quarterly
income statements and balance sheet data.
Given the turbulences on financial markets in recent years, the choice of the length of
the sample is an important issue. We choose a sample which covers the period 1985Q1-
2008Q2 and which does not include the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. This choice of the pre-crisis sample period is similar to previous work (e.g.
Frankel and Saravelos 2012). Using information up to the beginning of the Great Re-
cession in the fourth quarter of 2007 does not qualitatively change our main results.
We choose a pre-crisis sample for two reasons. First, this avoids having to deal with
possible structural breaks associated with the global financial crisis in a longer sample.
Such structural breaks could occur because the magnitude of shocks changes due to
multiple credit defaults or multiple financial market segments being hit simultaneously.
Structural changes may also occur because of changes in the transmission of shocks. In
particular, agency problems between borrowers and lenders tend to be larger in crises
than in normal periods. Second, we identify conventional monetary policy shocks to
policy interest rates. However, at the end of 2008 monetary policy in the US basically
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hit the zero lower bound of interest rates, and the Federal Reserve conducted uncon-
ventional monetary policy. Shocks to unconventional monetary policy would be hard to
identify, and this would be beyond the scope of our paper.
In terms of bank-level variables, our dataset includes two measures of risk as well as
banks’ capital ratio, return on assets, and growth of total bank loans. The first measure
of risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.2 It captures the asset risk of
banks and thus the share of outstanding bank loans that are past due. One advantage
of this measure is that it is not much affected by changes in accounting standards. Also,
it matches up with theoretical models that describe banks as intermediaries between
depositor and lenders and that consider loan defaults as the main source of instabilities
in banking (Boyd and Nicolo 2005, Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2010, Zhang 2009).
While the non-performing loans ratio is a backward-looking measure of bank risk,
we also use the non-interest income ratio as a more forward-looking measure of bank
risk. Existing empirical work suggests that non-interest income generating activities are
substantially riskier than traditional credit business (DeYoung and Roland 2001, Stiroh
2006). Furthermore, Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) provide evidence that banks
with higher shares of non-interest income contribute more to systemic risk than banks
with a more traditional business model. Assuming that banks were aware of the risks
associated with these investments, we interpret an increase in the non-interest income
ratio as evidence of risk-taking by the bank (see also DeYoung, Peng, and Yan 2013).
Preparing the Bank-Level Data for the Factor Analysis
Following previous micro banking studies, we apply a number of screens to exclude
implausible and unreliable observations. We exclude observations with (i) negative or
missing values for total assets, (ii) negative total loans, (iii) loan-to-assets ratios larger
than one, or (iv) capital-to-asset ratios larger than one. Banks with gross total assets
below $25 million are dropped from the sample because they are unlikely to be viable
banks (Berger and Bouwman 2009). Also, banks engaged in a merger are omitted.
Finally, if one of the three ratios (non-performing loans-to-total loans, capital-to-assets,
and net income-to-assets) of an individual bank falls into the bottom or into the top
percentile at any point in time, the entire bank is dropped.
2A comparison of the non-performing loans ratio with other measures of (balance sheet and market-
based) bank risk used in the literature is provided in the working paper version of this paper (Buch,
Eickmeier, and Prieto 2010).
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Overall, 13,375 banks have submitted data to the Call Reports at some point in time.
After removing implausible values and outliers, 11,466 banks remain in the dataset.
Generally, our empirical model requires data from banks operating for a reasonably long
time span. For our baseline model, we create a balanced sample of 1,471 banks that are
active over the entire sample period. We also analyze the effects of balancing the data
by removing banks which operated less than 40 quarters and creating an unbalanced
panel of 3,755 banks. Robustness tests presented in Section 1.5 show that results for the
balanced and the unbalanced panel are very similar.
The bank-level data are treated in the usual manner for factor analysis. All series are
seasonally adjusted, and they enter the dataset as stationary variables. Because loans
are assumed to be integrated of order 1, we include them as log differences in our model.
The balance sheet ratios can be considered stationary, hence there is no need to difference
them. The stationary series are then demeaned, and structural breaks in the means are
accounted for.3 Moreover, the series are standardized to have unit variance, and outliers
are removed. Outliers are defined as observations with absolute median deviations larger
than six times the interquartile range. They are replaced by the median value of the
preceding five observations (Stock and Watson 2005).
Is There a Factor Structure in the Data?
Exploiting a rich amount of (bank-level) information can be beneficial in a factor anal-
ysis. At the same time, there must be a sufficient degree of co-movement between the
individual time series for the factor model to provide a good description of the data. For
this to be the case, there needs to be a factor structure among the series included, or,
put differently, factors can be accurately estimated only if the series strongly co-move
(Boivin and Ng 2006). This issue is particularly relevant for microeconomic data as op-
posed to (aggregate) macroeconomic data to which factor models have been previously
employed and which tend to exhibit a greater comovement.
3Some ratios do not seem to revert to a constant mean. This is possibly due to regulatory changes
which led to an adjustment in capital ratios and in other banking variables. To account for these
changes, we detect breakpoints by applying the sequential multiple breakpoint test of Bai and Perron
(2003) (and the Gauss routines provided by Pierre Perron on his webpage) to all series of our (stationary)
dataset, and we subtract the (possibly shifted) means from the series. (See Eickmeier 2009 for a similar
treatment of (macroeconomic) data in a factor modelling setup.) When we, instead, linearly detrend
the series, the results are basically unaffected.
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We first assess to what extent the different banking variables are correlated. Table
1.1 shows that the medians are highly correlated. The non-performing loans ratio and
capitalization are strongly (negatively) correlated (0.89) because a decline in asset quality
forces banks to write down assets. The correlation is, however, not perfect. Unlike the
non-performing loans ratio, capitalization is determined also by regulatory requirements.
Moreover, banks use it as a signaling devise and might avoid adjustments in response
to negative shocks. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between the
non-performing loans ratio and the non-interest income ratio. This suggests a possible
tradeoff between overall credit risk and risk-taking via non-traditional banking activities.
We, next, examine the co-movement of different banking variables across banks. Ta-
ble 1.2 shows the variance shares explained by the first 15 principal components extracted
separately from bank-level datasets associated with each of the five variables. There is
reasonably strong comovement among banks for the non-performing loans ratio, capital-
ization and the non-interest income ratio with 4 factors explaining at least 30 percent
and 6 factors explaining at least 40 percent of the variation in these ratios. The comove-
ment is lower for return on assets and loan growth where 7 and 12 factors are needed to
explain 30 percent, respectively.
We have carried out four robustness tests to check the reliability of our banking
factors. First, we have removed cross-sectional outliers from the dataset, i.e. we have
dropped banks from the sample with absolute median deviations larger than six times
the interquartile range (on average over the sample period). This procedure identifies
about 300 series as outliers.
Second, using weighted principal components (Boivin and Ng 2006), we have down-
weighted each bank-level series by the inverse of the standard deviation of its idiosyn-
cratic component.
Third, we have aggregated the balance sheets of all banks that belong to the same
bank holding company. This alternative dataset contains 556 bank holding companies,
and we have extracted factors from this dataset. The reason is that bank holding com-
panies may be able to shift resources among the banks they control (Kashyap and Stein
2000), and we would expect the comovement between bank holding companies to be
larger than that between individual banks. The factors extracted from our original
dataset and the factors estimated in these robustness checks are very highly correlated.
The trace R2 from a regression of the principal components extracted from the original
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dataset on the principal components estimated from the modified datasets lie between
0.97 and 0.99.4
Fourth, we have assessed whether omitting state-level banking factors affect our esti-
mation of the national factors. We have separately extracted factors from the bank-level
data state-by-state using principal components. We have then pooled the state-level
factors and estimated national factors from the pooled dataset. (See Beck, Hubrich,
and Marcellino 2009, Del Negro and Otrok 2007, Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003,
or Mo¨nch, Ng, and Potter forth. for alternative approaches).5 The trace R2 from a
regression of the principal components extracted from the entire dataset on the princi-
pal components extracted from the set of state-level factors is, again, very high (0.99).
Hence, neglecting regional factors at a first estimation stage does not seem to affect our
nation-wide factor estimates. We note that this does not mean that regional banking
factors are not important. If regional banking developments have nation-wide macroe-
conomic effects the contributions of shocks to the (nation-wide) banking factors to the
macroeconomic variables that we will examine below will give us an estimate of the lower
bound of the overall influence of the banking sector on the macroeconomy.
1.3 The FAVAR Methodology
With the bank-level variables at hand, we next describe how we use this information
to model the dynamic feedback effects between individual U.S. banks and the macroe-
conomy. We start from a small-scale macroeconomic VAR model which includes GDP
growth (∆yt), GDP deflator inflation (∆pt), the Federal Funds rate (ffrt), and real
house price inflation (∆hpt) as endogenous variables. These variable are summarized in
an M(= 4)-dimensional vector Gt = [∆yt ∆pt ∆hpt ffrt]. GDP growth, inflation, and
interest rates represent the standard block of variables included in macroeconomic VARs
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1996, Peersman 2005); fewer studies also include
house prices (Bjørnland and Jacobsen forthcoming, Jarocinski and Smets 2008).
4The comparison is based on the first 6 principal components because 6 latent factors are also used
in our analysis below. Below, we will explain this choice of the number of factors.
5More precisely, out of the 50 states in the U.S. we consider only the states with at least 10 banks
(which would result in at least 40 series per state). This leaves us with 40 states. We estimate the
state-level factors as the first 6 principal components from bank-level data for each of the 40 states. We
pool the estimated state-level factors, extract the first 6 principal components from the 240 (= 6×40)
state-level factors, and compare them with the first 6 principal components estimated from the entire
dataset.
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We augment the vector Gt with a set of ”banking factors” Bt which yields the (r+
M)×1-dimensional vector Ft = [G′t H ′t]. The vector of banking factors Bt = [b1t . . . brt] is
unobserved and needs to be estimated.
We model the joint dynamics of macroeconomic variables and banking factors as a
V AR(p) process:
A(L)Ft = c+Pwt, (1.3.1)
where A(L) = I−A1L− . . .ApLp is a lag polynomial of finite order p, c comprises con-
stants, and wt is a vector of structural shocks which can be recovered by imposing
restrictions on P .
Let the elements of Ft be the common factors driving the (N × 1) vector Xt which
summarize our five banking variables of 1,471 individual banks. To assess the impact of
macroeconomic shocks on the ”average” bank, we also include in Xt the medians of the
five banking variables.6 Hence, the cross-section dimension is N = 7,360(= 1,471×5+5).
It is assumed that Xt follows an approximate dynamic factor model (Bai and Ng
2002, Stock and Watson 2002):
Xt = Λ′Ft+ Ξ (1.3.2)
where Ξ = [ξ1t . . . ξNt] denotes a (N×1) vector of idiosyncratic components.7 The matrix
of factor loadings Λ = [λ1 . . .λN ] has dimension (r+M)×N , λi i= 1 . . .N is of dimension
(r+M ×1), and r+M N holds. Common and idiosyncratic components are orthog-
onal, the common factors are mutually orthogonal, and idiosyncratic components can
be weakly mutually and serially correlated in the sense of Chamberlain and Rothschild
(1983). Equations (1) and (2) represent a FAVAR model as has been introduced by
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).8
The model is estimated in five steps.
First, the dimension of Ft, i.e. the overall number of common factors (r+M), is
determined to be 10. These include the 4 observable macroeconomic factors and the
6To save time and capacity, we will compute confidence bands only for these median variables but
we will focus on point estimates for individual banks’ responses. Point estimates of median impulse
response functions are very similar to point estimates of impulse response functions of the median bank.
7Note that Ft can contain dynamic factors and lags of dynamic factors. Insofar, equation (2) is not
restrictive.
8Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) are interested in a monetary policy shock and include the
Federal Funds rate as the only observable in the FAVAR. Our model most closely resembles the one
used in Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) which models a set of latent factors estimated from non-financial
sector balance sheet items and other financial variables.
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r = 6 latent banking factors. We make this choice because our main results change
when the number of factors is lowered, but are barely affected when it is increased, and
because we prefer a sparse parametrization. This approach has been applied also by
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon (2008).
Second, we estimateBt by removing the observed factors from the overall factor space.
We do this using the iterative procedure proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2007). We
obtain an initial estimate of Bt, Bˆ0t , as the first r= 6 principal components of Xt. Then,
we regress Xt on Bˆ0t and Gt, ending up with Λˆ0G, the coefficients (or factor loadings)
that belong to Gt. We calculate Xˆ0t =Xt− Λˆ0GGt and estimate Bˆ1t as the first r principal
components of Xˆ0t . This procedure is repeated until convergence, and we end up with
the estimator of Bt, Bˆt.9 The latent banking factors, together with the observable
macroeconomic factors, explain 46 percent of the variation in the bank-level dataset
which represents a reasonable degree of comovement between the banking variables.
Third, a V AR(1) model is fitted to [G′t Bˆ′t]′. The lag order of 1 is suggested by the
Bayes Schwarz information criterion (BIC).
Fourth, we identify macroeconomic shocks combining sign restrictions and zero con-
temporaneous restrictions, as will be explained shortly. In the fifth and final step, con-
fidence bands of the impulse response functions are constructed using the bootstrap-
after-bootstrap technique proposed by Kilian (1998). This technique allows removing
a possible bias in the VAR coefficients which can arise due to the small sample size.
The number of bootstrap replications equals 500. Notice that, since N  T , we neglect
the uncertainty involved with the factor estimation (and hence, the estimation of the
idiosyncratic components), as suggested by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
As regards the identification of macroeconomic shocks in step four, we apply sign
restrictions on short-run impulse response functions (Canova and de Nicolo 2003, Faust
1998, Peersman 2005, Uhlig 2005) and contemporaneous zero restrictions. The iden-
tification scheme is implemented in two steps. The first step involves carrying out a
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR residuals.
We impose the following ordering: ∆yt → ∆pt → ∆hpt → Bˆt → ffrt. We label the
Cholesky residuals associated with the equations explaining house price inflation, the r
latent banking factors’ and the Federal Funds rate ”house price shock”, ”shocks to the
9We define the procedure as having converged if the sum of squared residual from a regression of
xit i = 1, ...,N on Bˆ(tj) and G has hardly changed compared to the sum of squared residual from a
regression of xit on Bˆ(tj−1) and G (by no more than a small value which we shall set at 0.000001).
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banking factors” (or ”banking shocks”), and ”monetary policy shocks”, respectively. We
cannot be sure that the shocks to the banking factors truly represent shocks that occur
in the banking sector or ”banking shocks”. They may instead also contain shocks that
are not modeled explicitly, such as shocks to balance sheets of the non-financial private
sector (which may, however, also be propagated through the banking system).
The second step aims at disentangling ”aggregate supply shocks” and ”aggregate
demand shocks”. It involves rotating the Cholesky residuals associated with the equations
for GDP growth and GDP deflator inflation and imposing theoretically motivated sign
restrictions. After an aggregate supply shock, GDP and the GDP deflator move in
opposite directions. After an aggregate demand shock, these two variables as well as
the Federal Funds rate move in the same direction. The sign restrictions are imposed
contemporaneously and on the first four lags after the shock. Results are robust with
respect to the restricted number of lags. The identifying restrictions are summarized in
Table 1.3. In the Appendix, we explain how we identify the shocks in more detail.
The sign restrictions are consistent with standard theoretical models (Peersman
2005). The ordering implies that GDP as well as aggregate and house prices do not
react contemporaneously to banking and monetary shocks, which is fairly standard in
SVAR studies (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1996, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and
Peydro 2010, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013, Nason and Tallman 2012, Peersman 2012).
GDP and the overall price level react with a delay to house price movements (Jarocin-
ski and Smets 2008). While it is relatively common to use a Cholesky decomposition
to identify housing shocks (Giuliodori 2005, Iacoviello 2005), alternative identification
schemes for the house price shock such as sign restrictions (Jarocinski and Smets 2008)
or a combination of zero contemporaneous and long-run restrictions (Bjørnland and Ja-
cobsen forthcoming) have also been used in the literature. As we discuss below, they
yield similar results. Moreover, we allow the monetary policy instrument to respond
contemporaneously to all shocks.
Ordering the monetary policy rate below the banking factors is somewhat contro-
versial. We follow most of the SVAR literature which jointly models macroeconomic
and banking variables (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro 2010). Reasons for sluggish
adjustment of the banking sector to monetary policy could be the need to renegotiate
existing contracts or close customer relationships that banks do not want to interrupt.
Consistent with this assumption, the empirical banking literature finds that interest rate
spells of banks are sticky and do not react quickly to market interest rates (Berger and
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Hannan 1991). We emphasize that, although the banking factors are restricted to re-
spond to the monetary policy shocks with a delay, individual banks’ variables can react
immediately to the monetary policy shocks. Insofar, ordering the banking factors above
the monetary policy rate is not very restrictive. We will show below that shapes and signs
of the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables after the monetary policy shocks
are very plausible, lending further support to our identification approach. Moreover, we
will assess robustness regarding the ordering of banking factors and the monetary policy
rate.10
1.4 Empirical Results
We organize the presentation of our empirical results around our two main research
questions. We begin with the question how macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to
the banking sector, and we subsequently explore heterogeneity across banks.
1.4.1 How are Macroeconomic Shocks Transmitted to the Banking Sector?
Impulse Response Functions of Macroeconomic Variables
Before exploring how macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to banks, we need to analyze
whether our model generates plausible adjustment patterns for the macroeconomic time
series. Figure 1.1 thus plots the impulse response functions of (the levels of) GDP, the
GDP deflator, house prices, and the Federal Funds rate to aggregate supply, aggregate
demand, monetary policy, and house price shocks. We show median responses together
with 90% confidence bands to shocks of the size of one standard deviation.
Supply and demand shocks have the expected effects. After a supply shock, GDP
rises and the GDP deflator falls permanently. The demand shock triggers a temporary
increase in GDP, and the general price level rises permanently. The monetary policy
rate does not change significantly after the supply shock, but it rises temporarily after
the demand shock.
Expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to a temporary rise in economic activity
(consistent with long-run real neutrality of monetary policy) and to a permanent rise in
the GDP deflator. We do not observe a price puzzle, i.e. a decline of the price level after
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check.
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an expansionary monetary policy shock. This is reassuring because it suggests that we
have accurately identified monetary policy shocks.
House price shocks trigger responses which are reminiscent of demand shocks: Eco-
nomic activity, the general price level, and the monetary policy rate rise. The increase
in GDP shortly after the house price shock is, however, not statistically significant. The
(temporary) decline in GDP can be explained by its reaction to the monetary policy
tightening observed after the house price shock. House prices rise more than the general
price level. This overall pattern for the house price shock confirms that house price
shocks are well identified (sign restrictions would essentially deliver the same results).11
House prices react sluggishly to macroeconomic shocks. Their reaction roughly mirrors
the reaction of the GDP deflator.
Impulse Response Functions of Banking Variables
To assess the dynamic transmission of macroeconomic shocks to the banking sector, we
look at impulse response functions for the median bank (Figure 1.2). In line with the-
ory, bank loans increase after all expansionary shocks, including expansionary monetary
policy shocks. This is in line with the credit channel of monetary policy.
The response of bank risk to expansionary shocks depends on the risk measure
used and the type of shock considered. Our backward-looking risk measure (the non-
performing loans ratio) declines following monetary policy, demand, and house price
shocks. The effects last between two quarters (after the demand shock) and about four
years (after the monetary policy shock). In terms of magnitudes, the economic effect
of the monetary policy shock on the non-performing loans ratio is quite small though:
a decline in the Federal Funds rate by 15 basis points lowers the ratio by about 0.008
percentage points. This corresponds to a 0.9 percent reduction relative to the average
non-performing loans ratio, which is around 1 percent.
11We formally test this by rotating the orthogonalized (Cholesky) residuals associated with the GDP
growth, inflation and house price inflation equations (and not only, as before, the residuals associated
with the GDP growth and inflation equations). We then impose the same restrictions for the aggregate
supply and demand shocks and some additional restrictions to identify the house price shock (which we
interpret as a housing demand shock) and to separate it from an aggregate demand shock, as follows.
After the housing demand shock, GDP increases, house prices increase, and house prices relative to the
general price level increase. After the aggregate demand shock, house prices now increase by less than
the general price level. Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables and median banking variables
after the identified housing demand shock are almost identical to corresponding impulse responses after
the house price shock identified in our baseline specification.
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The decline in non-performing loans in response to a monetary policy shocks is in line
with the prediction in Zhang (2009) who argues that an expansionary monetary policy
shock increases credit supply by reducing funding costs. Ex post loan default rates
go down, which feeds back into better capitalization. The decline in non-performing
loans following a demand shock can be explained by the fact that the increase in GDP
strengthens borrowers’ balance sheets. Monetary policy reacts to the demand shock by
raising interest rates, which can explain the subsequent increase in the share of non-
performing loans. As credit risk increases, the response of loans starts to decline and
becomes insignificant after about six quarters. In contrast, the non-performing loans
ratio increases in response to supply shocks. Following a positive supply shock, the
balance sheet composition of banks tilts towards higher leverage (a lower capital-to-asset
ratio) and higher credit risk, which is consistent with Angeloni and Faia (2009). Turning
to our second risk measure, the non-interest income ratio, gives results which differ from
those for the non-performing loans ratio. After expansionary monetary policy shocks, the
non-interest income ratio increases by a small amount (0.01 percentage points). Because
the non-interest income ratio is a flow measure of risk and thus more forward looking,
this suggest that banks take on additional risk after a decline in the monetary policy
rate. The non-interest income ratio of the median bank does not change significantly
after the house price shocks, and it declines after the other two macroeconomic shocks.
Our result of a decline in the share of non-performing loans after expansionary mon-
etary policy shocks is similar to the findings by De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008).
Our finding of a rise in forward-looking risk is consistent with the risk-taking channel
literature.
The impulse response analysis also reveals that the negative correlation between the
non-performing loans ratio and the non-interest income ratio observed in the raw data
is mainly driven by monetary policy shocks (and to a lesser extent by supply shocks).
Furthermore, the correlation between bank returns and the non-interest income ratio is
negative for all shocks but house price shocks. This pattern is in line with the search for
yield hypothesis that banks try to generate higher profits by increasing their exposure
to riskier non-traditional banking activities when interest rates (and thus returns) and
credit risk are low.
23
Variance Decompositions
In order to answer the question how relevant the macroeconomic shocks are for banking
sector developments, Table 1.4 shows the forecast error variance decomposition.12 We
distinguish the short run (the one-year forecast horizon) from the medium run (the five-
year horizon). In the short run, all macroeconomic shocks together explain more than
20 percent of bank risk and of the capital ratio and 16 and 9 percent of returns on
assets and loans, respectively, of the median bank. These numbers increase by up to
6 percentage points in the medium run. The numbers for loans seem relatively small,
but are consistent with the variance decomposition findings by Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2010) for US real credit.
Looking at individual macroeconomic shocks, demand and house price shocks are
most important for the non-performing loans ratio and thus for backward looking bank
risk. Because real estate serves as collateral for loans, movements in house prices affect
the quality of collateral and thus the strength of borrowers’ balance sheets. Moreover,
the exceptional housing boom in the 2000s, which was associated with an increase in
(subprime) lending, falls into our sample.
Monetary policy shocks also explain a non-negligible fraction of variation in non-
performing loans (5 percent) in the medium run. For the non-interest income ratio,
supply and demand shocks are the most important macro shocks. Although we find
an increase of risk-taking after an expansionary monetary policy shock, the overall role
played by monetary policy shocks seems to be small. Aggregate supply shocks account
for the greatest share of the variation in loans at short and medium horizons. Moreover,
the idiosyncratic (variable-specific) components are at least as important as common
banking shocks.
Table 1.4 also reveals that shocks to the latent banking factors (or ”banking shocks”)
are quite important for macroeconomic variables. This holds especially for the Federal
Funds rate, indicating that monetary policy, directly or indirectly, via the impact of
banking shocks on output growth and inflation, reacts to banking shocks. The banking
shocks also account for more than 20 percent of the variance of GDP and house prices
in the medium run.
12The full variance decomposition has been carried out based on an AR(1) model which we fit to the
idiosyncratic components.
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The Role of Bank-Level Information
The empirical results presented so far assume that bank-level information is important
for modeling macroeconomic dynamics. But how important is the micro-level banking
information for our results? To answer this question, Figure 1.3 compares the impulse
responses of the observable macroeconomic factors derived from our benchmark FAVAR
model with impulse responses obtained from a VAR in which we replace the banking
factors by the median values of our banking variables. The responses of GDP, the GDP
deflator, and house prices following macroeconomic shocks are very similar in magni-
tude and shape. There are, however, some differences in the responses of the Federal
Funds rate after all four shocks: The VAR model without micro-level information pre-
dicts larger and more persistent responses of the interest rate relative to our benchmark
FAVAR model. The reason could be that the banking sector cushions the effects of
macroeconomic shocks and that, in this case, monetary policy needs to react less to
shocks to stabilize the economy than if an active banking sector was not fully captured.
It is therefore not surprising that the model which omits relevant information contained
in the micro banking data suggests a stronger monetary policy reaction than our baseline
model.
In addition, monetary policy shocks identified from the VAR model with the median
banking variables are larger than the shocks extracted from the benchmark FAVAR
(Figure 1.4). This suggests that the VAR model assigns shocks originating in the banking
market to monetary policy.13 We have also compared a VAR with the five median
banking variables with a VAR which includes only the four macroeconomic variables.
Findings are almost identical, and we do not show results from the pure macroeconomic
VAR here. Hence, information contained in the micro bank-level data seems to matter.
1.4.2 What are the Sources of Heterogeneity across Banks?
So far, we have focused on adjustments of the ”median” bank following macroeconomic
shocks. However, the rich structure of our dataset also allows analyzing bank hetero-
geneity. Bank heterogeneity has two dimensions: There are idiosyncratic components in
bank-level developments, and heterogeneity may also reflect different responses of banks
to the common shocks. Next, we analyze the importance of these sources of hetero-
13We omit the identified supply, demand and house price shock series because they are very similar
in both models.
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geneity by looking at the dispersion of the common and the idiosyncratic components of
bank-level developments. In a final step, we will use information on bank characteristics
to explain different adjustments to macroeconomic shocks.
Idiosyncratic Shocks versus Asymmetric Transmission of Common Shocks
Table 1.5 shows the dispersion of idiosyncratic and common components of individual
banks’ variables. Comparing the rows of this table shows that bank heterogeneity is not
only due to idiosyncratic shocks but also due to the asymmetric transmission of common
shocks. For all variables but the capital and non-interest income ratios, asymmetric
transmission of common shocks is more important.
To visualize the transmission of common macroeconomic shocks to individual banks,
Figure 1.5 shows the 5th to 95th quantiles of impulse response functions of individual
banks. The graph reveals substantial heterogeneity after all macroeconomic shocks,
in line with results by Dave, Dressler, and Zhang (2009) for the development of loans
after monetary policy shocks. Although the non-performing loans ratio (the non-interest
income ratio) has been shown to decline (increase) for the median bank in response to
an expansionary monetary policy shock, Figure 1.5 shows that this does not hold for
a large fraction of banks: the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans increase for
about 1/3 of banks in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock; the ratio of
non-interest income falls for about 2/5 of all banks.
Which Bank-Level Features Affect the Exposure of Banks to Monetary Policy
and House Price Shocks?
In a next step, we analyze whether the impact of monetary policy and house price shocks
differs across individual banks in any systematic way. We regress individual banks’
impulse response functions of our two risk measures and lending on several variables
capturing long-run structural differences across banks. We also distinguish the responses
after two and four quarters.
We focus on monetary policy and house price shocks for three main reasons: First,
house price shocks play a prominent role in theoretical studies featuring financial accel-
erator mechanisms (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Changes in house prices affect collateral
values, hence banks which are more affected by information asymmetries or which have
a business model geared towards retail lending should be affected more. Second, we have
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shown that house price shocks are important for bank risk. Third, the reaction of banks
to changes in monetary policy has been the subject of many empirical studies allowing
us to compare our results (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004,
Kashyap and Stein 2000, Kishan and Opiela 2000).
Our explanatory variables are size, internationalization, liquidity, connectedness with
other banks via the interbank market, riskiness, capitalization, and differences in banks’
loan portfolio structure. (See the Appendix for details.) To account for the skewed size
distribution in the banking sector and possible non-linearities in the response to shocks,
we also square the size variable. In addition, we add a full set of state dummies (unre-
ported). Because the bank-level features capture structural differences across different
types of banks, they are averaged over the sample period. We check the robustness of
our results by dropping individual regressors. In unreported regressions, we find that
the main results are not affected.
We estimate the model with OLS and apply heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
All explanatory variables (except for the dummy variables) are demeaned. The constant
can therefore roughly be interpreted as the average effect, and the coefficient estimates
should be interpreted relative to the constant. The regression results are presented in
Table 1.6, and we emphasize only results which are robust in the sense that they hold
for both the two- and the four-quarter horizons.
We expect that small banks are more affected by macroeconomic shocks than large
banks because of lower net worth, lack of diversification, and less diversified funding
(Diamond and Rajan 2006, Kashyap and Stein 2000). In line with this, lending by small
banks increases by more than lending by large banks after expansionary monetary policy
and house price shocks. The impact of size levels off as banks grow larger. Size has no
significant impact on the response of non-performing loans to monetary policy shocks.
However, larger banks react relatively less strongly in terms of their non-interest income
generating activities.
Better access to liquidity should reduce banks’ exposure to shocks affecting funding
conditions (Diamond and Rajan 2006). Liquidity has a robust effect only in the non-
interest income equation after house price shocks: more liquid banks reduce their non-
traditional banking activity by less than less liquid banks.
Internationalization of banks could affect their exposure to shocks. If shocks at home
and abroad are imperfectly correlated, the presence of foreign affiliates might activate a
channel of diversification, thereby reducing the response to domestic shocks. Cetorelli
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and Goldberg (2012) show that internationally oriented banks have the potential to
lay off domestic macroeconomic shocks through an internal capital market. Yet, we do
not find a robust effect of internationalization on the reaction of banks to the shocks
examined. Also, banks’ exposure to the interbank market (Allen and Gale 2001) has no
robust impact on their response to macroeconomic shocks.
Risk, measured as the non-performing loans ratio averaged over the sample period,
and capitalization do not affect the lending responses of banks.14 But better capitalized
banks and banks with higher average level of credit risk increase their share of non-
interest income and thus new risk less after monetary policy shocks. This corresponds
well with the negative correlation between the impulse responses of these two risk mea-
sures to monetary policy shocks. Similarly, better capitalization dampens the response
of the non-interest income ratio after house price shocks. Moreover, the riskier banks
are, the stronger the effect of house price shocks on the non-performing loans ratio.
Finally, bank lending increases more in response to an expansionary house price shock
if banks are highly exposed to real estate and consumer loans. One explanation is that,
after negative house price and monetary tightening shocks, a decline in (house price)
inflation increases the real value of debt obligations by borrowers, reduces collateral
value, and limits resources available to borrowers (Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti
2010). Furthermore and quite intuitively, banks with a business model geared towards
real estate lending have lower exposure to non-traditional banking activity following
monetary easing.
1.5 Robustness Analysis
1.5.1 The Effects of Balancing the Panel
Results presented so far are based on a balanced panel which contains only banks with
a full string of time series information.15 Balancing the panel involves a trade off. On
the one hand, balancing the panel might induce a selection bias which can occur if we
systematically drop banks with specific characteristics and behaviors. On the other hand,
it would also be problematic to include banks in our sample which are systematically
14This is in contrast to Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) who find
that capitalization is an important determinant of banks ability to shield their loan portfolio from a
tightening of monetary policy.
15We are grateful to our anonymous referees for suggesting this robustness analysis to us.
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different and to apply the same model to all banks. Because there is no optimal approach
to cope with this problem, we now compare the results for the balanced and for the
unbalanced panel.
This comparison begins with the unconditional distributions of the time series obser-
vations of banks across the different samples (Figure 1.6). We compare the full sample
(11,466 banks), the unbalanced sample (3,755 banks), and the balanced panel used for
our baseline results (1,471 banks) (see Section 1.2.2). Figure 1.6 shows that general
patterns of the data are similar in all three panels. The main difference between the bal-
anced panel and the unbalanced panel is that the former does not include banks which
defaulted before the end of the sample period and banks that started operating after
1985. Even if these two groups were very different, the group of all banks together that
were dropped seems to have characteristics comparable to those of the group of banks
that we kept in our balanced sample. The distributions of variables in the balanced and
unbalanced panels are also similar to those in the full panel.
Yet, even if unconditional distributions are similar, the distributions of impulse re-
sponses to the macroeconomic shocks might differ. There are methods to deal with
unbalanced panels in factor models. It is important to note, however, that these meth-
ods rely on the assumption that observations are ”missing at random”. One approach
has been suggested by Connor and Korajczyk (1987) (see also Korajczyk and Sadka 2008
for a discussion). It involves applying principal components to a covariance matrix of
which element i, j is the covariance between series i and series j over the period in which
they overlap. We repeat our FAVAR analysis applying that approach to the unbalanced
panel.16 We look at the distribution of the banks’ impulse responses to the macroe-
conomic shocks, and we also regress impulse responses of individual banks on banks’
characteristics. To save space, we provide only the median bank’s impulse responses to
the macroeconomic shocks (Figure 1.7), but we make the other results available upon
request.
The factor space estimated from the unbalanced panel is very similar to the one
estimated from the balanced panel (trace R2: 0.90). Also, the median banks’ responses
are very similar to those in our baseline. Except for some impact effects, confidence bands
overlap. From the second quarter onwards, impulse responses are almost identical. In
16Another method is the expectations maximization (EM) algorithm suggested by Stock and Watson
(1998) and Stock and Watson (2002) which involves interpolating the missing data exploiting the factor
model iteratively. We use the Connor and Korajczyk (1987) method which is faster than the iterative
EM algorithm, and because we had problems reaching convergence with the EM algorithm.
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addition, the entire distribution of individual banks’ responses to the macroeconomic
shocks is very similar in both models. We only note that the reactions of banks from the
unbalanced panel to the shocks are somewhat more heterogeneous than the reactions of
banks from the balanced panel. Regression results are very robust as well, except that for
impulse response after four quarters some explanatory variables become less significant.
This is not because of different factor estimates but because of less precisely estimated
coefficients. Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that sample selection issues
do not invalidate our main results.
1.5.2 Sensitivity with Respect to the Identification Scheme
The banking factors have so far been identified pooling all banking variables. But it
could be argued that bank risk is, compared to the other banking variables, rather fast
moving. Hence, it might be inappropriate to restrict all common banking factors to
respond with a delay to changes in the monetary policy rate. We therefore extract
a separate factor from both bank risk variables and order the ”risk factor” below the
monetary policy rate which allows it to react immediately to interest rate movements.
The other banking factors are ordered, as before, above the policy rate.
Impulse response functions of the median bank to the macroeconomic shocks are
shown in Figure 1.8. The short-term reaction of the non-interest income ratio is larger
than in the baseline (the signs are the same) which can possibly be explained by the fact
that the risk factor can now respond on impact to the monetary policy (which makes
it more likely that median bank’s risk also reacts instantaneously). Otherwise, results
are very similar. We also extract, alternatively, a separate risk factor only from our
forward-looking risk measure (the non-interest income ratios), proceed as just described
and reach identical conclusions.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use a FAVAR model to analyze feedback effects between banks and the
macroeconomy. We focus on the heterogeneous exposure of U.S. banks to macroeconomic
factors, and we make several contributions to the literature. First, we model the dynamic
interaction of macroeconomic and banking factors. Second, we allow for and exploit the
linkages between individual banks and between different banking variables such as bank
lending, risk, and return. Third, we identify orthogonal macroeconomic shocks to cleanly
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decompose banks’ common risk into its different sources, and we isolate these shocks from
idiosyncratic risk at the bank level.
We are now in the position to answer the questions raised at the beginning of the
paper.
(i) How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to bank risk and other banking vari-
ables?
Macroeconomic shocks have an important impact on bank risk and on other bank-
level variables. Bank lending of a representative (median) bank increases following ex-
pansionary shocks, consistent with an increased demand for investment and working
capital loans during boom periods or an increased credit supply. The response of bank
risk depends on the measure of risk used. Non-performing loans of the median bank
and thus backward-looking risk decline after expansionary macroeconomic shocks with
the exception of supply shocks. The median bank increases forward-looking risk, mea-
sured through the share of non-interest income, following expansionary monetary policy
shocks.
Shocks to the banking factors also matter for the macroeconomy. In the medium
term, these shocks explain more than 15 percent of macroeconomic volatility. Their
explanatory power is highest for the monetary policy interest rate and for house prices.
Omitting bank-level information can yield misleading estimates of impulse responses and
monetary policy shocks.
(ii) What are the sources of bank heterogeneity, and what explains differences in
individual banks’ responses to macroeconomic shocks?
There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks both in terms of idiosyn-
cratic shocks and the asymmetric transmission of common (banking and macroeconomic)
shocks. While the share of non-performing loans declines for the median bank, risk of
about 1/3 of all banks rises in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The
share of non-interest income increases for the median bank, but it declines for about 2/5
of the banks. We have also studied which bank-level features can explain differences in
banks’ exposure to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Size, the degree of capitaliza-
tion, liquidity, riskiness and the exposure to real estate and consumer loans were found
to matter for risk and lending responses of banks to monetary policy and house price
shocks.
Our findings are interesting from a banking regulation perspective. Our results lend
support to proposals that higher capital and higher liquidity requirements can enhance
31
the resilience of the banking sector to macroeconomic shocks. Also, smaller banks are
more exposed to macroeconomic risk but, at the same time, the systemic impact of these
banks on the macroeconomy is rather small. Regulatory policy thus needs to balance
different criteria such as the relevance of an institution for systemic risk and its exposure
to macroeconomic shocks when deciding upon new capital or liquidity requirements.
Overall, our analysis can be seen as a first step into the direction of jointly modeling
dynamics of the banking sector and the macroeconomy. It suggests that these feed-
back effects are relevant for both, understanding macroeconomic dynamics as well as
the behavior of banks. Research of this type would certainly benefit from high-quality
microeconomic panel data.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Correlation between Median Banking Variables
Non-performing Equity capital/ Return Change Non-interest income/
loans/total loans assets on assets in loans net operating income
Non-performing loans/loans 1
Equity capital/assets -0.89 1
Return on assets -0.41 0.46 1
Change in loans -0.33 0.29 0.46 1
Non-interest income -0.64 0.67 -0.081 -0.23 1/net operating income
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Table 1.2: Cumulated Variance Shares Explained by the First 15 Principal Components
Calculated from Datasets Associated with Individual Banking Variables
Non-performing Equity capital/ Return Change Non-interest income/
loans/total loans assets on assets in loans net operating income
1 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.13
2 0.21 0.36 0.12 0.08 0.22
3 0.28 0.47 0.16 0.12 0.3
4 0.34 0.54 0.2 0.14 0.38
5 0.39 0.61 0.23 0.17 0.44
6 0.43 0.66 0.27 0.19 0.48
7 0.47 0.7 0.3 0.21 0.52
8 0.5 0.73 0.32 0.23 0.56
9 0.52 0.75 0.35 0.25 0.59
10 0.55 0.78 0.37 0.27 0.62
11 0.58 0.79 0.39 0.29 0.64
12 0.6 0.81 0.42 0.31 0.67
13 0.62 0.82 0.44 0.33 0.69
14 0.63 0.83 0.45 0.34 0.71
15 0.65 0.84 0.47 0.36 0.73
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Table 1.3: Identifying Restrictions
Supply Demand House price Monetary policy Shocks to latent
shocks shocks shocks shocks (banking) factors
GDP + + 0 0 0
GDP deflator - + 0 0 0
House price 0 0
Federal Funds rate +
Banking factors 0
41
Table 1.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Supply Demand House price Monetary policy Shocks to latent Idiosyncratic
shocks shocks shocks shocks (banking) factors shocks
1-year horizon
GDP 0.55 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.08
GDP deflator 0.55 0.33 0.03 0.01 0.03
House price 0.03 0.02 0.82 0 0.08
Federal Funds rate 0.02 0.38 0.13 0.07 0.34
Non-performing loans / loans 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.26 0.47
Equity capital / assets 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.45
Return on assets 0.11 0.04 0.01 0 0.07 0.76
Loans 0.05 0.02 0.02 0 0.06 0.84
Non-interest income ratio 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.38
5-year horizon
GDP 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.24
GDP deflator 0.49 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.13
House price 0.03 0.04 0.5 0.01 0.28
Federal Funds rate 0.03 0.31 0.13 0.07 0.38
Non-performing loans / loans 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.35 0.3
Equity capital / assets 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.34 0.29
Return on assets 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.67
Loans 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.58
Non-interest income ratio 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.43 0.27
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Table 1.5: Dispersion of Common and Idiosyncratic Components
Non-performing Equity capital/ Return Change Non-interest income/
loans/total loans assets on assets in loans net operating income
Common component 0.7 0.53 0.8 0.87 0.66
Idiosyncratic component 0.64 0.77 0.52 0.45 0.7
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Table 1.6: Regression Results
Notes: The dependent variables are the impulse response functions for the non-performing loans ratio, non-interest income ratio and loans to expansionary
monetary policy and house price shocks. Explanatory variables are demeaned bank characteristics as defined in Section 4.2.2 and the Appendix. A full set
of state dummies is included. ***, **, * = significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. NPL stands
for the non-performing loans ratio, non-interest for the non-interest income ratio.
Monetary policy shock House price shock
Loans Non-performing loans Non-interest income Loans Non-performing loans Non-interest income
1
2 year 1 year
1
2 year 1 year
1
2 year 1 year
1
2 year 1 year
1
2 year 1 year
1
2 year 1 year
Size -0.524** -0.693** -0.004 -0.004 -0.193** -0.189** -2.047*** -2.431*** 0.07 0.074 -0.039 0.094
-0.237 -0.327 -0.021 -0.016 -0.087 -0.076 -0.567 -0.714 -0.081 -0.058 -0.112 -0.141
Squared size 0.023** 0.030** 0.000 0.000 0.008** 0.008** 0.088*** 0.103*** -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.004
-0.01 -0.014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.024 -0.03 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
Connectedness -0.056 0.035 -0.003 -0.019 0.041 -0.006 -1.117 -1.244 0.027 0.021 -0.574** -0.261
-0.531 -0.727 -0.043 -0.035 -0.144 -0.106 -1.193 -1.352 -0.066 -0.049 -0.281 -0.255
Liquidity -0.08 -0.074 0.007 0.001 -0.034 -0.009 0.3 0.535** -0.006 -0.015 0.170*** 0.173***
-0.106 -0.149 -0.012 -0.01 -0.03 -0.021 -0.231 -0.27 -0.016 -0.012 -0.048 -0.044
Capitalization 0.199 0.351 0.025 0.045 -0.227** -0.125** -0.491 -0.39 0.055 0.005 0.403*** 0.467***
-0.301 -0.415 -0.035 -0.027 -0.089 -0.062 -0.777 -0.895 -0.057 -0.039 -0.155 -0.135
Risk -0.952 -1.514 0.047 -0.086 -0.545* -0.434** -0.713 -0.251 -0.962*** -0.519*** -0.01 0.796*
-0.99 -1.377 -0.144 -0.113 -0.286 -0.215 -2.348 -2.655 -0.244 -0.15 -0.52 -0.445
Cons. loans/loans -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.001 -0.031 -0.008 0.017 -0.002 0.042*** 0.020* 0.190*** 0.232***
-0.115 -0.162 -0.011 -0.008 -0.036 -0.026 -0.249 -0.287 -0.016 -0.012 -0.048 -0.052
RE loans/loans 0.058 0.046 -0.014* -0.007 -0.059*** -0.038** 0.443*** 0.472** 0.003 0.024*** 0.033 0.049
-0.071 -0.1 -0.008 -0.006 -0.02 -0.015 -0.163 -0.185 -0.012 -0.008 -0.036 -0.033
Global bank -0.036 -0.072 -0.005 0.000 0.026 0.016 -0.151 -0.145 0.01 -0.005 -0.017 -0.059**
-0.05 -0.071 -0.007 -0.005 -0.016 -0.013 -0.154 -0.171 -0.006 -0.005 -0.032 -0.029
Constant 0.122*** 0.182*** -0.008** -0.009*** 0.012 0.015* 0.130* 0.164* -0.016*** -0.001 -0.057** -0.019
-0.035 -0.049 -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.078 -0.093 -0.005 -0.004 -0.024 -0.018
# of banks 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471
R2 0.096 0.101 0.073 0.09 0.074 0.063 0.074 0.069 0.096 0.078 0.107 0.127
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Response Functions of Macroeconomic Factors
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Notes: We show the median and the 90 percent confidence bands. In percent (GDP, the GDP deflator and house prices)
and in percentage points (FFR = Federal Funds rate)
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions of Median Banking Variables
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Notes: We show the median and 90 percent confidence bands. In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios).
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Response Functions of Macroeconomic Factors from the Baseline
FAVAR and a VAR without Micro-Level Information
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Notes: We show the median and 90 percent confidence bands of the benchmark FAVAR model (black) and a standard
VAR with the five median banking variables (red). In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios). The size of
the shocks (i.e. the contemporaneous impact of supply and demand shocks on GDP, of house price shocks on house prices
and of monetary policy shocks on the Federal Funds rate) obtained from the VAR was standardized to be the same as the
size of the shocks obtained from the FAVAR.
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Figure 1.4: Monetary Policy Shock Series
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Notes: Shocks estimated based on the benchmark FAVAR, i.e. the model including bank-level information, (solid black)
and the VAR with the median banking variables (dashed red). The size of the shocks is one standard deviation.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Functions of Individual Banks
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Notes: Point estimates of impulse response functions to one standard deviation shock. In percent (loans) and in percentage
points (the ratios). We show the 5th to 95th quantiles instead of all impulse response functions for better visibility.
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Densities of Banking Variables - Balanced versus Unbalanced Data
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Notes: Dashed red, dashed black and solid black lines show kernel density estimates of full, unbalanced and balanced
dataset respectively. The full sample is obtained after removing implausible values and outliers (11,466 banks). The
balanced sample contains which operate over the entire sample period (1,471 banks). The unbalanced panel contains
banks which operated at least 40 quarters (3,755 banks). The support used to estimate the kernel densities is given by
the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of the full dataset.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Response Functions of Median Bank Variables from Baseline FAVAR
and a FAVAR Estimated based on Unbalanced Panel of Banks
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Notes: We show the median and 90 percent confidence bands. In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios).
Black: baseline model; Red: alternative model
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Figure 1.8: Impulse Response Functions of Median Bank Variables from Baseline FAVAR
and a FAVAR with Risk Factor Ordered below the Monetary Policy Rate
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Notes: We show the median and 90 percent confidence bands. In percent (loans) and in percentage points (the ratios).
Black: baseline model; Red: alternative model
52
1.9 Appendix to Chapter 1
Table 1.7: Definition of Bank Level Variables
Variable Definition Call Report Item
Consumer loans Loans to individuals for households,
family, and other personal expendi-
tures
rcfd1975
Equity capital/assets (CAP) Ratio of equity capital to total assets rcfd3210 / rcfd2170
Interconnectedness The share of federal funds purchased
in total assets as a proxy for the ex-
posure to the interbank market (King
2008). Interbank borrowing is mea-
sured through the average quarterly of
federal funds purchased and securities
sold under agreements to repurchase.
rcfd3353
International bank We label a bank ”international” if it
is affiliated with a global bank hold-
ing company (Cetorelli and Goldberg
2012), and we construct a dummy vari-
able which is 1 if a bank is international
and 0 otherwise. This procedure re-
sults in 36 international active banks.
Global bank holding companies’ for-
eign affiliates are identified through a
positive entry in any of the Call Re-
port entries due to foreign affiliates
(rcon2941), due from foreign affiliates
(rcon2163), total loans of foreign affil-
iates (rcfn2122) or C&I loans of for-
eign affiliates (rcfn1766) in one or more
banks controlled by the bank holding
company.
Liquidity Liquidity is measured through the ra-
tio of cash holdings and total securities
relative to the balance sheet total.
Prior to 1994Q1: sum of the Call Re-
port entries rcfd0390 (total investment
securities – book value), rcfd2146 (to-
tal assets held in trading accounts) and
rcfd1350 (federal funds sold and secu-
rities purchased under agreements to
resell). After 1994Q1: sum of the
Call Report entry lines rcfd1754 (held
to maturity securities, total) rcfd1773
(available for sale securities, total)
rcfd3545 (trading assets, total) and
rcfd1350 (federal funds sold and secu-
rities purchased under agreements to
resell).
Non-interest income/net operating in-
come
Share of non-interest income in net op-
erating income. Net operating income
is defined as total interest and non-
interest income less interest expenses.
Non-interest income (riad4079);
Total interest and non-interest in-
come (riad4000); Interest expenses
(riad4073)
Non-performing loans/total loans
(NPL)
Share of total non-performing loans in
total loans.
Sum of Call Report item rcfd1403
(total loans and lease finance receiv-
ables: nonaccrual) and Call Report
item rcfd1407 (total loans and lease fi-
nance receivables: past due 90 days or
more and still accruing).
Real estate loans Loans secured by real estate rcfd1410
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets riad4340/rcfd2170
Size Log of banks’ real gross total assets,
i.e. assets divided by the GDP defla-
tor.
rcfd2170
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Identification of Shocks
Suppose that uˆt is the r+M vector of reduced-form VAR residuals where the la-
tent and observable factors are the endogenous variables. The (r+M)× 1 vector of
(orthogonalized) Cholesky residuals vt is estimated as
vˆt = Aˆuˆt
where Aˆ is the lower triangular Cholesky matrix of cov(ut). We partition vˆt in two parts,
the 2× 1 vector of Cholesky residuals associated with GDP growth and GDP deflator
inflation vˆt1...2 and the (r+M − 2)× 1 vector of Cholesky residuals associated with
house price inflation, the Federal Funds rate and the latent banking factors vˆt3...r+M ,
and vˆt = [vˆt1...2
′
vˆt
3...r+M ′ ]′ . The estimated vector of structural shocks wˆt is related to vˆt
as follows. Let wˆt1...2 =Rvˆt1...2 and wˆt3...r+M = vˆt3...r+M where R is the rotation matrix
and R′R = I2 and, by construction, cov(wˆt)= Ir+M .
The rotation matrix R is chosen such that the identifying restrictions specified in the
main text are satisfied. We follow Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner and Zha (2010) and let Ω
be an 2× 2 random matrix with each element having an independent standard normal
distribution and Ω =QR be the QR decomposition of Ω.
It turns out that more than one R satisfies the sign restrictions. We draw until we
retain K rotation matrices which satisfy all restrictions. Following Fry and Pagan (2007)
we choose out of K Rs that satisfy the sign restrictions, the R that leads to impulse
response functions which are as close as possible to their median values; for details see
Fry and Pagan (2007). K is set at 100 to keep it computationally tractable.
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Chapter 2
In Search for Yield? Survey Based
Evidence on Bank Risk-Taking
2.1 Motivation
Monetary policy decisions might affect risk taking of banks (Borio and Zhu 2012, Rajan
2005)1. A reduction in the policy rate reduces returns especially on low risk investments.
To keep the average return on assets constant, bank managers have incentives to shift
into riskier credit market segments. Expansionary monetary policy might thus induce a
”search for yield” by banks and impair financial stability.
We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US to an-
alyze the reaction of banks to monetary policy shocks. Our empirical model comprises
GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation, the monetary policy interest rate, and banking
This chapter is based on joint work with Claudia Buch and Sandra Eickmeier entitled ”In search
for yield? Survey based evidence on bank risk-taking” which is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control.
1The link between low policy rates, risk taking, and ”search for yield” has been described as follows:
”[. . . ] These behaviors can be compounded in an environment of low interest rates. Some investment
managers have fixed rate obligations which force them to take on more risk as rates fall. Others like
hedge funds have compensation structures that offer them a fraction of the returns generated, and in
an atmosphere of low returns, the desire to goose them up increases. Thus not only do the incentives
of some participants to ”search for yield” increase in a low rate environment, but also asset prices can
spiral upwards, creating the conditions for a sharp and messy realignment.” (Raghuram G. Rajan, The
Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future, Saturday, August 27, 2005, Jackson Hole, Wyoming).
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factors. The banking factors summarize information on business lending provided in
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). The STBL ques-
tionnaire asks banks to rate the risk of new loans based on a borrower’s credit history,
cash flow, credit rating, access to alternative sources of finance, management quality,
collateral, and quality of the guarantor. This information is used to classify loans into
different risk categories ex ante. Shifts across categories thus reflect changes in bank risk
taking. The survey also distinguishes small domestic, large domestic, and foreign banks.
We identify risk-taking effects following monetary policy shocks by exploiting het-
erogeneity across different banks and loan market segments. We distinguish responses
of new loans and loan spreads across different types of banks and different loan risk
categories. Our results suggest that, on average over the sample period, small domestic
banks significantly increase new loans to high risk borrowers after expansionary mone-
tary policy shocks. The composition of loan supply of small banks shifts towards riskier
loans. Large domestic banks give out more new high risk loans, but the composition
of their loan portfolio does not change significantly. Foreign banks increase risk only
during the mid-2000s, when interest rates were particularly low for a prolonged period
of time (’too-low-for-too-long’). Changes in the risk composition of loan portfolios are
not compensated by higher risk premia. Banks rather shift their (new) loan portfolios
towards higher risk loans and charge a lower risk premium. This is how the risk-taking
channel is defined in Borio and Zhu (2012): banks are willing to take on more risk, and
this is not compensated by an increase in the risk premium.
Our empirical research is motivated by theoretical work modeling the link between
low policy interest rates and risks in banking. This research shows that, in the presence
of asymmetries in information and agency problems, bank-specific features affect bank
risk taking. Risk may increase as a consequence of additional availability of liquidity
which lowers the risk aversion of banks (Diamond and Rajan 2009, Acharya and Naqvi
2012), because value-at-risk constraints are weakened (Adrian and Song Shin 2010), or
because adverse selection problems in the credit market are mitigated, thereby reducing
banks’ screening incentives (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and
Marquez 2014). From a theoretical point of view, lower policy rates should thus increase
new loans to riskier borrowers. Moreover, banks which are prone to agency problems are
affected more.
Our data allow modeling heterogeneity across banks and loan categories. In addition,
our paper contains five features which we consider crucial for the identification of risk-
56
taking effects. First, the STBL provides information on new loans, not on outstanding
loans. We can thus take account of the fact that the risk-taking channel as advanced
by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Rajan (2005) describes the incentives to engage in ex
ante riskier projects. Most previous studies do not distinguish between realized risk
(on existing loans) and new risk (on new loans). Exceptions are the panel regressions
by Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina
(forth.), who use (confidential) credit register data at the bank-borrower level. These
studies tend to find evidence in favor of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
Second, the STBL provides information on volumes and prices of new loans by type
of risk. This allows assessing whether loan supply or loan demand effects dominate in
the transmission of monetary policy shocks: if loan volumes and lending rates increase,
demand effects dominate; if loan volumes increase and lending rates fall, supply effects
are more important. Ignoring systematic changes in the quality of borrowers following
monetary policy shocks would flaw any separation of supply and demand effects. Our
data allow ”holding constant” the quality of borrowers.
Third, our data contain information on how banks perceive the risk of new loans. We
consider this to be a crucial ingredient to cleanly identify the effects of monetary policy
shocks on the attitudes of banks towards risk taking. Studies like Ioannidou, Ongena,
and Peydro (2009) or Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (forth.) work under the
implicit assumption that the ex post risk of borrowers, or observable risk characteristics
of borrowers, are fully aligned with ex ante risk perceptions of banks. Our data allows
us to side step such assumptions using information on ex ante risk taking from the point
of view of the bank manager.
Fourth, the FAVAR model includes a large amount of information on banks and thus
allows modeling mutual feedback between the banking sector and the macroeconomy.
Previous papers using panel models allow modeling bank heterogeneity, but they are
more restrictive in terms of the modeling of macroeconomic shocks (Altunbas, Gamba-
corta, and Marques-Ibanez 2012, Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro 2009, Jimenez, On-
gena, Peydro, and Saurina forth.). By contrast, work using time series (VAR or FAVAR)
models which do not exploit highly disaggregated banking information (Angeloni, Faia,
and Duca 2010, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013, or Lang and Nakamura 1995) or uni-
variate regressions (Nicolo, Dell’Ariccia, , Laeven, and Valencia 2010) cannot assess
heterogeneity or at least not to the same degree.
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Fifth, like other multivariate time series analyses, the FAVAR model captures inter-
actions between macroeconomic factors and the banking system and looks at the impact
of identified, mutually orthogonal, macroeconomic shocks. By contrast, panel studies
typically regress risk measures on monetary policy interest rates and additional explana-
tory variables. These studies allow interest rates and other macroeconomic factors to
affect banks, but they do not take into account feedback from banks to the macroe-
conomy. Yet, macroeconomic indicators are reduced-form constructs and a convolution
of different types of shocks. The transmission may be different for different types of
shocks, which we can account for. We also account for the fact that policy interest rates
might have been ”too low for too long” by allowing parameters to change across different
regimes.
In Section 2.2, we describe our data. In Section 2.3, we explain the FAVAR method-
ology. In Section 2.4 we present and discuss our empirical results. In Section 2.5, we
conclude.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Macroeconomic Data
Our set of macroeconomic variables is largely in line with typical small-scale macroe-
conomic VARs. The data comprise differences of the logarithms of GDP, of the GDP
deflator, and the level of the effective Federal Funds rate. Data on the Federal Funds
rate are retrieved from freelunch.com, a free Internet service provided by Moody’s Econ-
omy.com. Data on GDP and the GDP deflator are taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The macroeconomic series from 1997Q2 to 2008Q2 are plotted in Figure 2.1(a).
To check the robustness of our results, we include, alternatively, real residential
property price inflation, real commercial property price inflation, and real private fixed
investment as additional control variables in our baseline model. One could argue that
these variables capture collateral which has been shown to be an important determinant
of bank lending (Guerrieri and Iacoviello 2012). Our main results are not materially
affected. The reason might be that collateral is already sufficiently covered in our large
dataset as we will explain in the next subsection. We therefore proceed in what follows
with three macroeconomic variables.
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2.2.2 Banking Data
Our source for banking data is the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Survey of Terms of Busi-
ness Lending (STBL)2. This survey collects data on gross new loans (in US dollars) made
during the first full business week in the mid-month of each quarter. Our sample period
is 1997Q2 to 2008Q2. The beginning of the sample is restricted by the availability of the
information on loan risk, which starts with the May 1997 survey. We exclude the pe-
riod after the second quarter of 2008 because unconventional monetary policy measures
weaken the usefulness of the Federal Funds rate to identify monetary policy shocks. We
check robustness with respect to the end date of the sample period and stop before the
onset of the financial crisis in 2006Q4. Our main results (available upon request) are
unaffected.
The panel for the survey is a stratified sample of more than 400 banks. The STBL
contains information on loan volumes and on loan contract terms. This information is
available for all commercial banks and for three banking groups: large domestic banks,
small domestic banks, and US branches and agencies of foreign banks. The data do not
distinguish between large and small foreign banks. However, it is well known that inter-
nationally active firms and banks are larger than their domestic counterparts (Cetorelli
and Goldberg 2012).
In Figure 2.2 we plot new loans from the STBL alongside a comparable new loan
series compiled from the DealScan database on loan origination.3 We also compare the
evolution of those two new loan series with the change of total (outstanding) commercial
and industrial loans on the balance sheet of the US banking sector from the Federal Re-
serve Statistical Release Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States
- H8.4 Over the last decade both series on new loans track the large swings, especially
the decline starting in 2000 and the subsequent increase, in changes in aggregate bank
2See Brady, English, and Nelson (1998) for a detailed discussion of the structure of the STBL. We
choose not to combine the STBL data with information from other sources on US banks such as the
Call Reports. We do not know the identities of the banks responding to the STBL survey, and we want
to avoid introducing additional measurement or aggregation errors.
3We are grateful to Victoria Ivashina for kindly sharing the aggregate new loan data from the
DealScan Database (starting in 2000) with us. The DealScan data is provided by Reuters and covers
large bank loans. These loans are mostly originated by a group of two or more banks. See Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010) for a detailed discussion of this data and differences to aggregate bank credit data.
4All three credit series are seasonally adjusted and expressed in real term. The series are indexed to
1 in 2000Q1.
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credit reasonably well. However, each of the databases has a different coverage5, which
limits direct comparability of the data and explains differences in the series.6
2.2.3 Measuring Loan Risk
The STBL provides information on the riskiness of new loans. Banks are asked to
classify new business loans extended during the survey week into one of the following
four categories of increasing risk: ”minimal risk” loans (which account for a share of
8% on average over the sample for all banks), ”low risk” (23%), ”moderate risk” (41%),
and ”acceptable risk” (28%). ”Minimal risk” loans are virtually safe loans.7 Note that
”acceptable risk” is somewhat of an euphemism since it reflects the highest risk category.
In order to stick to the original labeling, we use these terms throughout the paper. The
classification of loans is based on a large number of indicators, which are condensed into
a risk rating. The classification takes into account hard information (cash flow, credit
history, credit ratings, quality of collateral) as well as soft information (management
quality).
Our identification of risk taking is based on different responses across loan risk cate-
gories. If a worsening of one aspect of loan quality is fully compensated by an improve-
ment along another dimension, the overall classification of the loan would not change.
A shift in the composition of bank loans across different risk categories thus reflects
changes in the overall credit standards for new loans. When presenting our results, we
focus on differences in adjustment between loans which are categorized as most risky
5DealScan data covers mostly large, syndicated loans to large borrowers. In contrast, the STBL
contains estimates of all new loans issued by the banking system. Moreover, the differences between
the new loan series (from DealScan and the STBL) and bank credit emerge because changes in the
volume of outstanding credit are not only the result of new loan origination, but also because of early
repayment of existing debt by borrowers and the termination of nonperforming loans (see Bassett,
Gilchrist, Weinbach, and Zakrajsek 2011 for a thorough discussion of this issue).
6While the STBL shows a rather strong reduction in new bank lending over 2000-2004, new lending
from the DealScan database declines more moderately. Given that the DealScan data contain new loan
origination to large borrowers only, this suggests that the reduction in bank lending during this period
is largely attributable to reduced lending to smaller borrowers. We also observe that the increase in new
lending over the 2004-2008 period is much more pronounced in the DealScan data than in the STBL
data, indicating that lending to larger borrowers contributed most to the increase in total bank credit
on the balance sheet. Finally, at the end of the sample we observe a large drop in new loans from the
DealScan database, which is not visible in the STBL or the aggregate credit data. This is due to credit
line drawdowns, which the STBL data contain but not the DealScan data (Ivashina and Scharfstein
2010).
7The survey defines the ”minimal risk” category as follows: ”Loans in this category have virtually
no chance of resulting in a loss.” See Data Appendix.
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(”acceptable risk” loans) and as safe (”minimal risk” loans). Our main messages are,
however, not much changed when we compare low and moderate risk with safe loans.
In Table 2.1, we show descriptive statistics on loan growth and loan spreads. Over the
full time period, there has been a contraction in new loans across all loan categories with
the contraction being strongest in the minimal risk category. The patterns differ across
the types of banks though: the shift from low to high risk lending has been strongest
for the foreign banks. Small domestic banks, in contrast, have increased low risk loans,
while the adjustment for the large domestic banks has been fairly balanced. If anything,
these patterns in the data would suggest that small banks have become safer while larger
banks have become more risky. To what extent these adjustments reflect the response
to expansionary monetary policy is an issue which we address below. Loan spreads are
increasing in loan risk, as expected. They are higher for the small than for the large
domestic and the foreign banks.
Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) show the evolution of the share of ”acceptable” (high) risk
loans in total loans and the interest rate spread charged on high risk loans (black lines)
together with the Federal Funds rate (blue dotted lines). It is apparent that high risk
lending was particularly elevated and that risk spreads were particularly low when the
Federal Funds rate was at low levels in the mid-2000s. While the share of high risk
lending by foreign banks reached its peak around 2003, small and large domestic banks
were most risky around 2005. In Section 2.4.5, we will test whether risk taking is specific
to the period 2003-2005.
When interpreting our results, it should be borne in mind that we focus on (new)
business loans and on risk perceptions of bank managers. This has four implications for
the interpretation of our results.
First, we have no information on real estate or consumer loans. This limits the gen-
eral applicability of our results. At the same time, it may be advantageous to focus on
a loan market segment that has not been much under the influence of government poli-
cies to promote risk taking, unlike in the subprime residential mortgages loan segment.
Calomiris (2009) provides an overview of government measures encouraging risk taking
in the mortgage market.
Second, off-balance sheet activities and other credit substitutes are not covered.
These activities might be particularly important for foreign and large banks.
61
Third, we have information about banks’ lending decisions based on their current
perceptions about future loan performance. But we do not know the extent to which
this perception is matched by the performance of loans ex post.
Finally, we will show below that loan supply effects dominate loan demand effects
after monetary policy shocks for small banks. Yet, we cannot fully exclude that the
composition of loan demand might shift as well, i.e. that more or less risky borrowers
demand loans after the shocks.
2.2.4 Additional Information on Loan Terms
In response to macroeconomic shocks, banks can adjust both, loan volumes and inter-
est rates. Therefore, our analysis is not based only on loan volumes but also on loan
spreads. Loan spreads are measured as difference between the risky lending rate and the
corresponding riskless rate. We use the one-year Treasury bill rate because this maturity
corresponds roughly to the average maturity of business loans in the STBL.
The STBL additionally contains information on the shares of loans made under com-
mitment, secured by collateral, subject to prepayment penalty, on loan size, and on loan
maturity. Including these variables when estimating banking factors minimizes omitted
variables problems. Moreover, collateralization and loan maturity may not just represent
control variables but also choice variables, which contain information on risk taking by
banks.
2.2.5 Data Transformation
We include the banking variables for the entire banking sector, for the subgroups of
banks, and for the four different risk categories. We divide loan volumes by the GDP
deflator. Hence, loans enter in real terms. Moreover, we subtract from the risky lending
rate the corresponding riskless rate of the same maturity, i.e. the 1-year Treasury bill
rate, and we include this spread in the empirical model. We use the 1-year Treasury bill
rate since one year roughly corresponds to the average maturity of business loans in the
STBL over our sample. Our panel of banking data thus contains 140 variables.8
We treat the banking data as usual for factor analysis. All series are seasonally ad-
justed. Stationarity of the 20 loan series in the dataset is ensured by taking differences of
8Two of the 140 series have missing values in one quarter each. We use the EM algorithm to
interpolate these series. See for details Stock and Watson (2002)
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their logarithms. The time series on loan rates, the percentage share of loans made under
commitment, and the percentage share of loans secured by collateral can be considered
to be stationary in levels. Hence, we do not (log) difference them. The stationary series
are then demeaned and standardized to have unit variance.
Finally, we remove outliers, which are defined as observations with absolute median
deviations larger than three times the interquartile range. These are replaced by the
median value of the preceding five observations (Stock and Watson 2005). All series
from the survey are then summarized in a N(= 140)× 1 vector Xt = [x1t . . .xNt]′, and
Xt enters the FAVAR model.
2.3 Methodology
Our empirical FAVAR model integrates the banking and the macroeconomic data in
a consistent framework. The model combines advantages of bank-level panel studies,
which allow exploiting a large set of information on bank heterogeneity, with advantages
of macroeconomic VAR models, which allow modeling the dynamic interaction between
different variables.
2.3.1 The FAVAR Model
We assume that our vector of banking variables collected from the STBL (Xt) follows an
approximate dynamic factor model (Stock and Watson 2002, Bai and Ng 2002) where
each series xjt is driven by the r× 1 vector of common factors Ft and an idiosyncratic
(series-specific) component ejt:9
xjt = λ′jFt+ ejt (2.3.1)
where λj is a r× 1 vector of factor loadings. The number of common factors is typ-
ically much smaller than the number of variables in Xt, hence r N . Common and
series-specific components are orthogonal, the common factors are mutually orthogonal;
idiosyncratic components can be weakly mutually and serially correlated in the sense of
Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983).
9For a more thorough discussion of the empirical framework, see Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005)
and Buch et al. (forth.).
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Ft can be decomposed into two parts: a set of observable factors Gt and a set of
latent (or unobservable) factors Ht which both drive Xt: Ft = [G′t H ′t]′. We assume that
Gt comprises the differences of the logarithms of GDP (∆yt) and of the GDP deflator
(∆pt) as well as the level of the effective Federal Funds rate (ffrt). The unobserved
”banking” factors (Ht) need to be estimated. They summarize the banking variables
and are orthogonal to the observable macroeconomic factors. Banking factors are thus
included in the policy reaction function. The factors are assumed to follow a V AR(p)
model: 
∆yt
∆pt
Ht
ffrt
= z+ Θ(L)

∆yt−1
∆pt−1
Ht−1
ffrt−1
+vt (2.3.2)
where z comprises constants, Θ(L) is a lag polynomial of finite order p, and vt is an error
term which is i.i.d. with zero mean and covariance matrix Q.
2.3.2 Shock Identification
We identify monetary policy shocks recursively. We carry out a Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance of vt and we order the Federal Funds rate last. The orthogonal resid-
uals associated with the equation explaining the Federal Funds rate are interpreted as
monetary policy shocks.
Our identification scheme for the monetary policy shocks implies that GDP, aggregate
prices and the latent banking factors do not react contemporaneously to monetary policy
shocks. By contrast, the monetary policy instrument can respond instantaneously to
all macroeconomic shocks. These are standard assumptions in the SVAR literature
(Iacoviello 2005, Jarocinski and Smets 2008).
A crucial part of our analysis is the ordering of banking and macroeconomic factors.
By ordering the policy instrument below the factors summarizing the banking variables,
we follow most of the SVAR literature which jointly models macroeconomic and credit
variables (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro 2010). The identification scheme implies
that monetary policy can react instantaneously to banking shocks, but not vice versa.
The STBL is collected in order to inform the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decisions.
Insofar, the information in the survey should be part of the information set of the Fed,
which supports our identification assumption.
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It is somewhat more questionable whether banks react with a lag to unexpected
movements in the policy rate. Berrospide and Edge (2010), for instance, assume that
banking variables can react contemporaneously to innovations in the Federal Funds rate.
Yet, there are good reasons to believe that banks adjust sluggishly to monetary policy:
existing contracts need to be renegotiated; banks do not want to interrupt close customer
relationships; lending rates of banks are sticky and do not react quickly to market interest
rates (Berger and Hannan 1991). This supports our choice to order banking factors
before the Federal Funds rate. We also note that we restrict, in our baseline model,
banking factors not to react instantaneously to movements in the monetary policy rate.
However, individual banking variables included in the large banking dataset can still
respond immediately to policy shocks. Nevertheless, we re-estimate the model with the
ordering of the banking factors and the policy rate reversed. Our main results remain
the same. How to best identify banking shocks or financial shocks more generally in a
time series context and how to disentangle them from monetary policy shocks remains
an unresolved issue, and further work on this issue is certainly needed.
2.3.3 Estimation and Specification
The model is estimated in four steps. First, we regress each of the banking series xit
on Gt. Second, we estimate the ”banking factors” Ht as the first m = r− 3 principal
components (PCs) from the residuals, following Boivin and Ng (2006). Those are shown
in Figure 2.1(c). Third, we model the joint dynamics of Gt and the estimate of Ht in a
VAR model which we estimate equation-wise with OLS. Fourth, we identify monetary
policy shocks as described above.
The first two estimation steps allow removing the observables from the space spanned
by the latent factors and to estimate, later on, a more sparsely parameterized VAR model
on our relatively short sample. To formally assess how useful the regression step is, we
apply the information criterion ICp1 suggested by Bai and Ng (2002), which has been
shown to perform well in small samples, to determine the number of common factors
driving the raw dataset and the dataset after removal of the observables. The ICp1
suggests that 5 factors drive the raw dataset whereas only m = 3 factors are needed to
explain the set of residuals obtained in the first step. This indicates that the observables
lie in the factor space spanned by the raw (or unpurged) PCs (shown in Figure 2.1(b))
and that we may want to take this into account.
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From Table 2.2 it is indeed apparent that the unpurged PCs tend to be highly corre-
lated with the observables. The first factor is correlated with all three observables, the
second and fourth factors are mainly correlated with the Federal Funds rate, the third
factor with growth and inflation, while the last factor is only marginally correlated with
the observables. Because the individual factors are not identified, we also compute the
R2 from a regression of each of the 3 observables on the set of 5 unpurged PCs and find
that they are high: 0.35 for GDP growth, 0.45 for inflation and 0.73 for the Federal
Funds rate. Hence, overall, the regression step allows us to include only 6 instead of 8
(observable and latent) factors in the VAR.
We nevertheless, as a check, re-estimate the model without the regression step, and
included 5 unpurged PCs together with the 3 observables in the VAR. Results (available
upon request) are very similar, but confidence bands tend to be slightly wider. This
supports our strategy of estimating a VAR which is as sparsely parameterized as possible.
Beside the number of factors, the lag order p needs to be selected. We set it to 1,
as suggested by the BIC. We experiment with a larger number of factors and with a lag
order of p= 2, but results remain basically unaffected. Given the short sample, we adopt
the sparser parametrization.
2.3.4 Commonality Among the Banking Variables
Factor models can be reliably estimated only if there is a reasonably high degree of co-
movement between the individual (banking) series. Table 2.3 shows the variance share on
average over all variables in the large banking dataset explained by the first 6 unpurged
PCs and by the 6 (observable and latent, i.e. purged) factors. The first 5 unpurged
PCs explain 48% of the overall variation in the banking dataset, and the share is similar
for the 3 observed and 3 latent purged PCs. This degree of comovement is not much
smaller than shares of 60% or more usually found in macroeconomic datasets for the
US (e.g. Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov 2009, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013). This high
number is comforting given that, in survey data, reporting errors add to measurement
error inherent in any dataset. The STBL data are based on the reported answers of
the surveyed banks. The Federal Reserves’ staff then generates estimates for the entire
banking sector, which adds an additional estimation error.
Table 2.4 shows variance shares for loan growth and interest rate spreads explained
by all (latent banking and observed macroeconomic) factors. The factors explain 27%
of the variation in the growth of loans. Commonality tends to be higher for large than
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for small banks. One explanation is that local conditions unrelated to macroeconomic
developments play a more important role for smaller banks. Alternatively, this result
could reflect that shocks underlying Ht first hit large (systemically relevant) banks and
are then transmitted to the macroeconomy and/or to other banks in the system. For loan
spreads, commonality is, with an average of 88%, much higher than for loan volumes.
Commonality is again (slightly) lower for small than for large banks.
2.4 Empirical Results
With the data and empirical methodology at hand, we are now in the position to answer
the question how monetary policy shocks affect bank behaviour. For each shock, we
first look at the adjustment of loan volumes and loan spreads. In a second step, we
investigate the adjustment across loan risk categories in order to analyze the effects of
monetary policy shocks on bank risk taking.
2.4.1 Reaction of Macroeconomic Variables
We begin with an analysis of the macroeconomic adjustment processes. Figure 2.4
presents impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to one standard deviation
monetary policy shocks. The black lines represent the median impulse responses while
the dark (light) blue shaded areas correspond to the confidence bands at the 68 (90)%
significance level. These are constructed based on the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method
proposed by Kilian (1998) which is based on 500 draws.10
Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, the adjustment of macroeconomic
indicators is roughly in line with expectations. The Federal Funds rate drops on im-
pact by about 20 basis points before gradually returning to zero after one year. The
(marginally significant) increase in GDP is temporary, consistent with long-run real
neutrality of monetary policy. The GDP deflator rises persistently, with a maximum
effect reached after about two years.
10Following Bernanke et al. (2005), we do not take into account the uncertainty involved with the
factor estimation, given that our cross section is very large.
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2.4.2 Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Bank Lending and Loan Spreads
Before looking at changes in the composition of new bank loans, we study the response
of total new banks loans (Figure 2.5(a)) and the interest rates charged (Figure 2.5(b))
to monetary policy shocks. Row 1 shows responses for all banks; Rows 2-4 show results
for the banking groups. In the first column of each figure, we show the response of total
new loans (of the entire banking system and the individual banking groups); Columns
2-5 present the responses across risk categories. Table 2.5 shows results of tests whether
differences in the reactions between loans to high risk and to minimal-risk borrowers
within the same banking group (Table 2.5(a)) and differences across banking groups
(Table 2.5(b)) are significant. Numbers in bold indicate significance at the 90% level. We
show the impact effects and the responses after one year. The impact effects reflect direct
effects while those after one year include effects of movements in other (macroeconomic)
variables induced by the original shocks.
Total new loans of the entire banking system increase by about 2% following a one
standard deviation expansionary monetary policy shock (Figure 2.5(a)). The response
of new loans is sluggish: the maximum effect is reached after almost two years. The
response is also quite persistent.
The adjustment across banks differs. New loans of large domestic banks and of foreign
banks do not react significantly to monetary policy shocks (Column 1, Rows 2-4). Small
domestic banks, by contrast, contemporaneously and significantly increase new loans
following the expansionary monetary policy shock. At the same time, average lending
spreads on all new business loans drop (although the impact for small banks is barely
significant) (Figure 2.5(b)).11 Hence, for the group of small banks, the combination of
an increase in lending volume and a reduction in the loan rate suggests that loan supply
effects dominate loan demand effects. For large and foreign banks, loan supply effects
are not a relevant feature of the monetary transmission mechanism or at least do not
dominate demand effects.12 Our finding that monetary policy initiates loan supply effects
11Changes in the risk spreads may also reflect changes in banks’ market power and sluggishness in
the adjustment of lending rates to movements in the policy rate. Note that we focus on adjustment at
business cycle or shorter frequencies for which market power can reasonably be assumed not to change
much. Sluggish adjustment of lending rates to the policy rate would, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase
in the spread after an expansionary monetary policy shock. Hence, we can interpret the decline of the
spread as a decline in the risk premium.
12To test whether those loan and spread reactions are driven by the specificities of the STBL dataset,
we include, as a check, 6 series capturing loan supply and demand from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion
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only among small banks is in line with a large literature documenting the existence of
the bank lending channel of monetary policy for small banks. In contrast, large banks
(Kashyap and Stein 2000) and foreign banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012) are able to
isolate their lending activity from monetary policy shocks.
2.4.3 The Effects of Monetary Policy on Bank Risk Taking
We now turn to our main question of interest: changes in the composition of new loans
in response to monetary policy shocks. These are given in Columns 2-5 of Figure 2.5(a)
and 2.5(b). The definition of loan risk categories ensures that the quality of borrowers
is held constant in response to macroeconomic shocks. Hence, shifts across loan risk
categories that we observe should be driven by changes in loan supply of banks.
In the aggregate, the banking system significantly increases lending to the highest risk
borrowers: aggregate new loans increase across all borrower groups with the exception
of low risk borrowers. The increase in high risk loans is coupled with a strong reduction
in the lending spread to these borrowers, suggesting that supply effects are the driving
force.
We next compare the response of new loans to high risk borrowers with the response
of new loans to minimal risk borrowers for all banks (Column 1 in Table 2.5(a)). There
is no significant shift in the composition of loan supply from safe to risky loans after
expansionary monetary shocks. The difference between new loans by all banks to high
risk borrowers and new loans to low risk borrowers is even significantly negative. Hence,
for the entire banking system, we do not find convincing evidence in favor of the hy-
pothesis that the banking system engages in additional or excessive risk taking following
expansionary monetary policy shocks. Our results instead suggest that, in the aggregate,
there is a shift towards less risky borrowers.
Turning to the responses of the individual banking groups reveals some novel findings.
First, for the group of large domestic banks, only new loans to high risk borrowers
increase in response to monetary policy shocks. The decline in the loan spread charged
to high risk borrowers indicates the presence of loan supply effects for new loans to
Survey on Bank Lending Practices in the large dataset and re-estimate the model based on that dataset.
We find both supply and demand effects after the expansionary monetary policy shocks: banks report
a significant loosening of standards of lending to large/medium and small firms, and they report a
stronger demand for C&I loans by large/medium and small firms. Moreover, loan spreads decline after
the monetary policy shocks which is in line with our results for the STBL data and suggests that supply
effects are relatively important.
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high risk borrowers. This finding suggests that large banks shield their lending to lower
risk borrowers at the expense of their lending to high risk borrowers. However, the
difference between lending to minimal and high risk borrowers is virtually zero and not
economically relevant (Table 2.5(a)). Hence, there is no additional risk taking by large
banks.
Second, foreign banks reduce new loans to the group of high risk borrowers contempo-
raneously and significantly after the monetary policy shock. The composition of foreign
banks’ loan portfolio shifts significantly towards less risky borrowers (Table 2.5(a)).
Third, the story for small banks is very different from those for large and foreign
banks. Small banks significantly increase lending to all borrower groups, except of lend-
ing to minimal risk borrowers (Table 2.5(a)). The increase in lending to high risk bor-
rowers is very persistent. The lending response of small banks is significantly stronger
than the responses of large and foreign banks for all but the lowest risk category (Table
2.5(b)). Loan spreads charged on high risk borrowers drop significantly on impact. Both,
the lending response and the spread responses for small banks are significant. Hence,
following expansionary monetary policy shocks, small banks tilt their credit portfolio
from low risk to high risk borrowers and charge a lower risk spread. Accordingly, a
risk-taking channel of monetary policy is operative for the group of small banks.
Our finding that monetary policy shocks initiate risk taking only for the smaller banks
is consistent with the view that banks which are opaque and which are most prone to
agency problems react most strongly to monetary policy shocks. Due to fixed costs of
monitoring and weaker disclosure requirements, smaller banks tend to face more severe
agency problems. This, inter alia, affect their access to external funding. This is also
indirectly documented by the balance sheet composition of small banks versus large and
foreign banks. Bank level data from the US Call Report show that, small banks have,
on average, higher capital and liquidity shares than large and global banks: over our
sample period, small banks had a median capitalization ratio (liquidity ratio) of 9.5%
(24.6%). Large and global banks had lower median capitalization ratios (liquidity ratios)
of 8.6% (21.4%) and 8.4% (21.9%), respectively. (Unreported) cross-sectional regressions
of bank size on capitalization ratios and on liquidity ratios confirm the negative relation
between size and measures of agency problems.
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2.4.4 Adjustment of Additional Loan Contract Terms
So far, our focus has been on changes in lending across risk categories and on the risk
spread. Our dataset provides us with two additional variables which can be used to
assess changing risk patterns. These variables are the degree of collateralization and the
maturity structure of new loans. The classification of loans into different risk categories
used so far is based on the quality, not the quantity, of collateral. Also, the maturity of
loans is not reflected in the risk rating. Increased collateralization or shorter maturities
would make loan portfolios less risky, and banks could use these contract terms in order
to - subsequently - take on more risk (Strahan 1999).
We focus on lending to high risk borrowers by small banks for which the risk-taking
channel was found to be active.13 Our results show that small banks lower the maturity of
and increase the collateral for high risk loans following monetary policy shocks, possibly
as a pre-requisite for risk taking (Figure 2.6). This interpretation is supported by the
timing of the effects: the effect on loans builds up only gradually but the reactions of
collateral and maturity are more frontloaded.
In response to lower policy rates, banks may also change the riskiness of their ac-
tivities by changes the composition of their funding sources. Ceteris paribus, increased
leverage tends to increase bank risk. Yet, the STBL survey does not provide information
on bank leverage. Merging data from other sources of information would add measure-
ment error to our data. To nevertheless control for banks’ liabilities, we have added, as
a robustness check, capital ratios for the entire banking system and the three banking
groups taken from the US Call Reports. Our main results (available on request) do not
change.
2.4.5 Testing the ”Too-Low-For-Too-Long” Hypothesis
Our analysis so far has assumed that the monetary policy regime has remained fairly
constant during the sample period. According to Taylor (2008) and Taylor (2013),
monetary policy interest rates deviated importantly from the usual policy rule between
2003-2005 in the US (possibly because the Federal Reserve aimed at avoiding deflation
after the burst of the dotcom bubble).14 This has led researchers to assess whether
13Results for other banking groups and risk categories are available upon request.
14Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) use a linear model and look at the impact of a monetary policy
loosening on credit risk spreads and mostly focus on the pre-crisis boom period in the US. Bogdanova
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risk taking is particularly pronounced when interest rates are at low levels for extended
periods of time, i.e. when they are ’too low for too long’. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and
Marques-Ibanez (2012), for example, find various measures of the Taylor-rule gap, i.e.
the deviations of the monetary policy rate from the rate implied by various Taylor rules
or from the natural interest rates, to explain banks’ risk taking.15
To test the hypothesis whether risk taking takes place primarily or exclusively in
prolonged periods of too low interest rates, we extend our model (1) to allow the banking
variables included in Xt to react differently to movements in the policy rate in the ’too-
low-for-too-long’ period compared to the rest of the sample period:
xjt = [λF−MP
′
j λ
(1)MP ′
j ]′Ft+ ejt for t < τ1
xjt = [λF−MP
′
j λ
(2)MP ′
j ]′Ft+ ejt for τ1 ≤ t≤ τ2 (2.4.3)
xjt = [λF−MP
′
j λ
(1)MP ′
j ]′Ft+ ejt for t > τ2.
λF−MP
′
j represents the (r− 1)× 1 vector of loadings for variable j associated with all
(observable and latent) factors with the exception of the monetary policy rate. Those
loadings are still constant over time. λ(k)MP
′
j is the scalar loading of the jth variable
associated with the policy rate, which differs across regimes k = 1,2. Hence, the banking
variables’ reactions to movements in the policy rate are regime dependent, and the
’too-low-for-too-long’ period is taken as given as the period when monetary policy was
excessively accommodative according to Taylor (2013): τ1 =2003Q1 to τ2=2005Q4.16
We first estimate the factors with PCs applied to the whole sample. This is a valid ap-
proach given the results by Bates, Plagborg-Møller, Stock, and Watson (2013) who show
that factors can be estimated consistently with PCs even in the presence of structural
breaks in the loadings.17
To estimate the loadings, we then regress each of the banking variables on the latent
and observable factors as well as on the Federal Funds rate interacted with a dummy
variable which equals 1 in the 2003-2005 period and 0 otherwise. The remaining steps
and Hofmann (2012) look at the ’Great Deviation’, i.e. deviations of policy rates from rates implied by
the Taylor rule at the global level.
15Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (forth.) also
find that risk taking is particularly large when the level of the Federal Funds rate is low.
16Results are not very sensitive to the exact dating of the ’too-loo-for-too-long’ period.
17See Bates, Plagborg-Møller, Stock, and Watson (2013) for details on the conditions for consistent
factor estimation in the presence of breaks in the loadings and Monte Carlo simulation results.
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are the same as before. We generate two sets of impulse response functions, conditional
on the two regimes characterizing the stance of monetary policy.18,19 Figure 2.7 shows
impulse responses for the ’too-low-for-too-long’ period (in red) and the ’normal’ period
(in blue), and Table 2.6 computes our relevant measures for risk taking for different
groups of banks for the two regimes.
Results for the normal regime are quite similar to the results for the constant pa-
rameter model presented above. Loan impulse responses to a (same-sized) monetary
policy shock, however, notably differ over the 2003-2005 period compared to the normal
period. Differences in spread responses between the two periods are barely visible. Table
2.6 reveals that, in the 2003-2005 period, additional risk taking is now not only found
for small, but also for foreign banks. Spreads charged on high risk loans decline for small
and foreign banks, indicating that these banks do not compensate additional risk taking
in new loans by charging higher risk premia. As for the entire sample period, we do not
find evidence for risk taking by large domestic banks.
The result of additional risk taking by foreign banks in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock over the ’too-low-for-too-long’ period supports results by Bruno
and Shin (2012) and Shin (2012). Those authors emphasize the role of large European
banks in fueling the lending boom in the mid-2000s. They argue that easy monetary
policy in the US and a regulatory structure in Europe that allowed high leverage enabled
European banks to take on excessive risk in the US. The anecdotic evidence provided in
Shin (2012) shows that foreign banks used cheap short term US-Dollar funding to invest
into toxic assets generated by the shadow banking system. Our finding complements
these results by showing that risk taking by those banks was not only confined to the
security markets segment but took also place in the traditional business lending segment.
2.5 Conclusion
Expansionary monetary policy is one main culprit for the excessive build-up of risk in
the US banking industry in the run up to the global financial crisis. This observation
has led to the recommendation that monetary authorities should explicitly consider as-
18Hence, unlike in some of the related threshold-VAR literature (which relies on generalized impulse
response functions) we assume that shocks cannot caused regimes changes.
19There are certainly other ways to test the hypothesis of risk taking being particularly pronounced
in periods of very loose monetary policy. We decided to use a parsimonious model, given our short
sample period.
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pects of financial, and in particular banking sector, stability when deciding on monetary
policy actions. Yet, previous literature has not given a clear answer to the question
whether expansionary monetary policy increases or decreases the risk of banks. Differ-
ences across studies partly owe to the level of aggregation of the data and partly owe to
the measurement of risk.
With this paper, we inform the debate about the effects of monetary policy on the
risk-taking decisions of commercial banks. Using a factor-augmented vector-autoregressive
model (FAVAR), we exploit information on the riskiness of banks’ new loan origination
provided by the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. These data
allow analyzing new loans and thus risk-taking behavior of banks. In this sense, we
realign previous micro-level studies, which allow measuring risk taking of banks, with
macro studies, which identify monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks. In addi-
tion, we analyze heterogeneity in the response to monetary policy shocks across different
banking groups.
Our strategy to identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy exploits hetero-
geneity in the responses of new loans and loan spreads. We compare adjustments across
different types of banks and different loan risk categories within the same banking group.
We show that loan supply effects dominate loan demand effects after monetary policy
shocks for small banks. Yet, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that the composition
of loan demand might shift as well, i.e. that more or less risky borrowers demand loans
after the shocks. Insofar, our estimates should be seen as an upper bound of the supply
driven risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
Our research has three main findings.
First, on average over the sample period, we do not find evidence supporting the
risk-taking channel hypothesis for the groups of large and foreign banks. By contrast,
our analysis reveals an active risk-taking channel of monetary policy among the group
of small banks. Small banks significantly increase new loans to high risk borrowers after
expansionary monetary policy shock. The composition of loan supply of small banks
shifts towards more risk taking. Furthermore, this shift in the risk composition of the
portfolio of new loans is not compensated by an increase in the risk premia. Small banks
rather shift their (new) loan portfolios towards higher risk loans and charge a lower risk
premium.
Second, in order to dig deeper into the risk-taking behavior of small banks, we also
investigate the behavior of non-price and non-quantity features of the loan contract
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terms. We show that small banks tend to lower the maturity of high-risk loans following
monetary policy shocks. These new loans are more likely backed by collateral. This
suggests that small banks take into account the additional risk of new loans by adjusting
other loan contract terms, possibly as a pre-requisite for risk taking.
As a final, third, contribution to the literature, we test the hypothesis that risk taking
in banking is particularly pronounced when interest rates are ’too-low-for-too-long’. Our
findings reveal that, in the ’too-low-for-too-long’ period, additional risk taking is now not
only found for small, but also for foreign banks. The result of additional risk taking by
foreign banks in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock over the ’too-low-
for-too-long’ period supports results by Shin (2012), who argues that especially foreign
banks used excess liquidity in the mid-2000s to take on excessive risk.
Overall, the FAVAR methodology used in this paper provides a powerful tool for ana-
lyzing heterogeneity with regard to banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks. Ignoring
heterogeneous responses or the feedback between the banking sector and the macroecon-
omy may lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the link between risks in banking and
the macroeconomy. Applying this methodology to questions of systemic risk in banking
or for the analysis of changed capital requirements would be an important step for future
research.
2.6 References
Acharya, V. V. and H. Naqvi (2012): “The Seeds of a Crisis: A Theory of Bank
Liquidity and Risk-Taking over the Business Cycle,” CEPR Discussion Papers 8851,
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Adrian, T. and H. Song Shin (2010): “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Eco-
nomics,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, ed. by B. M. Friedman and M. Wood-
ford, Elsevier, vol. 3 of Handbook of Monetary Economics, chap. 12, 601–650.
Altunbas, Y., L. Gambacorta, and D. Marques-Ibanez (2012): “Does monetary
policy affect bank risk?” Working Papers 12002, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol
Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
Angeloni, I., E. Faia, and M. L. Duca (2010): “Monetary Policy and Risk Taking,”
Mimeo, University of Frankfurt.
75
Bai, J. and S. Ng (2002): “Determining the Number of Factors in Approximate Factor
Models,” Econometrica, 70, 191–221.
Bassett, W. F., S. Gilchrist, G. C. Weinbach, and E. Zakrajsek (2011):
“Improving Our Ability to Monitor Bank Lending,” in Risk Topography: Systemic Risk
and Macro Modeling, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters.
Bates, B. J., M. Plagborg-Møller, J. H. Stock, and M. W. Watson (2013):
“Consistent factor estimation in dynamic factor models with structural instability,”
Journal of Econometrics, 177, 289–304.
Berger, A. N. and T. H. Hannan (1991): “The Rigidity of Prices: Evidence from
the Banking Industry,” American Economic Review, 81, 938–45.
Bernanke, B., J. Boivin, and P. S. Eliasz (2005): “Measuring the effects of
monetary policy: a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 387–422.
Berrospide, J. M. and R. M. Edge (2010): “The Effects of Bank Capital on Lend-
ing: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?” International Journal of Central
Banking, 6, 1–50.
Bogdanova, B. and B. Hofmann (2012): “Taylor rules and monetary policy: a
global &quot;Great Deviation&quot;?” BIS Quarterly Review.
Boivin, J., M. P. Giannoni, and I. Mihov (2009): “Sticky Prices and Monetary
Policy: Evidence from Disaggregated US Data,” American Economic Review, 99, 350–
84.
Boivin, J. and S. Ng (2006): “Are more data always better for factor analysis,”
Journal of Econometrics, 132, 169–194.
Borio, C. and H. Zhu (2012): “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy:
A missing link in the transmission mechanism? ,” Journal of Financial Stability, 8,
236 – 251.
Brady, T. F., W. B. English, and W. R. Nelson (1998): “Recent changes to
the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending,” Federal Reserve Bulletin,
604–615.
76
Bruno, V. and H. S. Shin (2012): “Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of
Monetary Policy,” BIS Working Papers 400, Bank for International Settlements.
Buch, C., S. Eickmeier, and E. Prieto (forth.): “Macroeconomic Factors and
Micro-Level Bank Behavior,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Calomiris, C. W. (2009): “Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform,” Cato Jour-
nal, 29, 65–91.
Cetorelli, N. and L. S. Goldberg (2012): “Banking Globalization and Monetary
Transmission, and the Lending Channe,” Journal of Finance, 67, 1811–1843.
Chamberlain, G. and M. Rothschild (1983): “Arbitrage, Factor Structure, and
Mean-Variance Analysis on Large Asset Markets,” Econometrica, 51, 1281–304.
Ciccarelli, M., A. Maddaloni, and J.-L. Peydro (2010): “Trusting the bankers:
a new look at the credit channel of monetary policy,” Working Paper Series 1228,
European Central Bank.
Dell’Ariccia, G., L. Laeven, and R. Marquez (2014): “Real interest rates, lever-
age, and bank risk-taking,” Journal of Economic Theory, 149, 65–99.
Dell’Ariccia, G. and R. Marquez (2006): “Lending Booms and Lending Stan-
dards,” Journal of Finance, 61, 2511–2546.
Diamond, D. W. and R. G. Rajan (2009): “Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy,”
NBER Working Papers 15197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Eickmeier, S. and B. Hofmann (2013): “Monetary Policy, Housing Booms, and
Financial (Im)Balances,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, FirstView, 1–31.
Guerrieri, L. and M. Iacoviello (2012): “Collateral Constraints and Macroeco-
nomic Asymmetries,” Tech. rep.
Iacoviello, M. (2005): “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, 95, 739–764.
Ioannidou, V., S. Ongena, and J. Peydro (2009): “Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking,
and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment,” Discussion Paper 2009-31
S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
77
Ivashina, V. and D. Scharfstein (2010): “Bank lending during the financial crisis
of 2008,” Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 319–338.
Jarocinski, M. and F. Smets (2008): “House prices and the stance of monetary
policy,” Working Paper Series 891, European Central Bank.
Jimenez, G., S. Ongena, J. L. Peydro, and J. Saurina (forth.): “Hazardous
Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About
the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?” Econometrica.
Kashyap, A. K. and J. C. Stein (2000): “What Do a Million Observations on Banks
Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?” American Economic Review, 90,
407–428.
Kilian, L. (1998): “Small-Sample Confidence Intervals For Impulse Response Func-
tions,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 218–230.
Lang, W. W. and L. I. Nakamura (1995): “’Flight to quality’ in banking and
economic activity,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 145–164.
Nicolo, G. D., G. Dell’Ariccia, , L. Laeven, and F. Valencia (2010): “Mone-
tary Policy and Bank Risk-Taking,” IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/09, International
Monetary Fund.
Rajan, R. G. (2005): “Has financial development made the world riskier?” Proceedings,
313–369.
Shin, H. S. (2012): “Global banking glut and loan risk premium,” Mimeo, Princeton
University.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002): “Macroeconomic Forecasting Using Diffu-
sion Indexes,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20, 147–62.
——— (2005): “Implications of Dynamic Factor Models for VAR Analysis,” NBER
Working Papers 11467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Strahan, P. E. (1999): “Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank
loans,” Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
78
Taylor, J. B. (2008): “The Financial crisis and the policy responses: an empirical
analysis of what went wrong,” A festschrift in honour of david dodge’s contributions
to canadian public policy, Bank of Canada.
——— (2013): “A review of recent monetary policy,” Testimony before the subcom-
mittee on monetary policy and trade, committee on financial services, us house of
representatives.
79
2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This Table shows summary statistics for the different types of banks. The interest rate spread refers to the differ-
ence of the banking group’s lending rate in the respective risk category with the 1-year constant maturity Treasury bill rate.
(a) Log Changes in Volume of New Loans
All Banks Large Domestic Banks Small Domestic Banks Foreign Banks
median s.d. median s.d. median s.d. median s.d.
All Loans 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.19
Minimal Risk -0.04 0.60 0.01 0.72 0.06 0.55 -0.09 0.87
Low Risk -0.02 0.24 0.04 0.32 -0.00 0.41 -0.02 0.41
Moderate Risk -0.01 0.19 -0.00 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.29
High Risk -0.00 0.20 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.35 0.05 0.26
(b) Interest Rate Spread on New Loans
All Banks Large Domestic Banks Small Domestic Banks Foreign Banks
median s.d. median s.d. median s.d. median s.d.
All Loans 1.66 0.79 1.76 0.82 3.21 0.83 1.07 0.82
Minimal Risk 0.69 0.85 0.7 0.95 2.48 1.02 0.56 0.8
Low Risk 1.15 0.82 0.87 0.88 2.74 1.04 0.87 0.84
Moderate Risk 1.76 0.83 1.83 0.81 3.45 0.9 1.18 0.89
High Risk 2.31 0.86 2.7 0.84 3.64 0.84 1.56 0.96
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Table 2.2: Correlation of the First 5 Unpurged Latent Banking Factors with Macroeco-
nomic Variables
This table shows the correlation of the first 5 raw (or unpurged) principal components extracted from the banking data
set with the observable macroeconomic variables. See Section 3.2 for details.
PC 1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
GDP growth 0.42 -0.21 0.26 -0.18 -0.16
GDP deflator inflation -0.52 -0.17 0.33 -0.16 0.14
Federal funds rate 0.56 0.47 -0.01 -0.45 -0.01
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Table 2.3: Cumulated Variance Shares Explained by the Common Factors
This table shows the cumulated variance shares explained by first r* unpurged latent factors extracted from the banking
dataset and the cumulated variance shares explained by the first r* purged latent factors and observables. See Section
3.2 for the details.
Unpurged Factors Purged Latent Factors + Observables
r*
1 0.17 0.29
2 0.31 0.4
3 0.42 0.47
4 0.48 0.53
5 0.54 0.57
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Table 2.4: Variance Explained by the Common Factors
This table shows the fraction of variance of new loan growth and loan spreads explained by the observed and latent
purged factors.
All Loans Minimal Risk Low Risk Moderate Risk Acceptable Risk
New Loan Growth
All Banks 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.09
Large Banks 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.09
Small Banks 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.27 0.09
Foreign Banks 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.08
Loan Spreads
All Banks 0.88 0.73 0.72 0.88 0.73
Large Banks 0.86 0.61 0.75 0.82 0.77
Small Banks 0.84 0.37 0.67 0.82 0.79
Foreign Banks 0.79 0.62 0.47 0.84 0.58
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Table 2.5: Difference between Impulse Responses of Loans After Monetary Policy Shocks
The table displays differences in impulse responses after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Entries in bold indicate
that the differences are significant at the 90% level.
(a) Differences between Acceptable and Minimum Risk Categories
All Banks Small Banks Large Banks Foreign Banks
New loans
Monetary Policy Shock
Impact effect -0.006 0.007 0.000 -0.003
Four quarters -0.035 0.037 -0.019 -0.014
Loan spreads
Monetary Policy Shock
Impact effect -0.003 -0.015 0.011 -0.005
Four quarters 0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.000
(b) Differences between Acceptable and Minimum Risk Categories
Minimum Risk Low Risk Moderate Risk Acceptable Risk
New loans
Impact effect
Small – Large -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Small – Foreign -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.009
Large – Foreign 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.006
Four quarters
Small – Large -0.04 0.031 0.006 0.016
Small – Foreign -0.006 0.047 -0.016 0.045
Large – Foreign 0.032 0.016 -0.023 0.028
Loan spreads
Impact effect
Small – Large 0.026 0.03 0.015 0.000
Small – Foreign 0.022 0.026 0.033 0.011
Large – Foreign -0.004 -0.004 0.018 0.012
Four quarters
Small – Large 0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.005
Small – Foreign 0.003 -0.002 0.012 0.000
Large – Foreign -0.003 -0.003 0.011 0.006
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Table 2.6: Difference between Impulse Responses of Loans After Monetary Policy Shocks
Using a FAVAR with Time-varying Loadings
The table displays differences in impulse responses after expansionary monetary policy shocks. Entries in bold indicate
that the differences are significant at the 90% level. T-L-T-L = too-low-for-too-long regime.
(a) Differences between Acceptable and Minimum Risk Categories (Normal Regime)
All Banks Small Banks Large Banks Foreign Banks
New Loans
Monetary policy shock
Impact effect -0.009 0.007 -0.007 0.000
Four quarters -0.055 0.033 -0.068 0.008
Loan spreads
Monetary policy shock
Impact effect 0.000 -0.012 0.016 -0.003
Four quarters 0.011 -0.002 0.012 0.002
(a) Differences between Acceptable and Minimum Risk Categories (T-L-T-L Regime)
All Banks Small Banks Large Banks Foreign Banks
New Loans
Monetary policy shock
Impact effect -0.021 0.001 -0.04 0.019
Four quarters -0.097 0.017 -0.179 0.072
Loan spreads
Monetary policy shock
Impact effect 0.021 0.008 0.034 0.009
Four quarters 0.016 0.004 0.017 0.005
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Figure 2.1: Macroeconomic Variables and Latent ”Banking” Factors
(a) Macroeconomic Variables
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Figure 2.2: New Loans from the STBL in Comparison with Loans from Other Sources
The red dotted line shows the change in outstanding commercial and industrial loans from the Federal Reserve Statistical
Release H8 (right scale). The black solid line shows new loans from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending (left scale).
The blue dashed line shows new loans from the DealScan database taken from Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) which
starts in 2000 (left scale). All series are seasonally adjusted and expressed in real terms (new loans are indexed, 2000Q1:1)
(a) Reaction of New Lending
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Figure 2.3: High Risk Lending and the Federal Funds rate
(a) Share of High Risk Loans and the Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Macroeconomic Variables
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area)
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock.
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Figure 5: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Macroeconomic Variables 
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue 
shaded area) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) to a one standard deviation monetary 
policy shock. 
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area)
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan rates (panel (b)) to a one standard
deviation monetary policy shock.
(a) Reaction of New Loans
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i re 6: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lendi g and Loan Spreads  
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue 
shaded area) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan rates 
(panel (b)) to a one tandard devi tion monetary policy shock. 
(a) Reaction of New Loans 
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Figure 6: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads  
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue 
shaded area) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan rates 
(panel (b)) to a one standard deviation monetar  policy shock. 
(a) Reaction of New Loans 
 
(b) Reaction of Loan Spreads 
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Collateralization and Loan Maturity of
New High Risk Lending by Small Banks
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area)
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of collateral (panel (a)) and maturity (panel (b)) to a one standard
deviation monetary policy shock.
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Figure 7: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Collateralization and Loan Maturity 
of New High Risk Lending by Small Banks 
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue 
shaded area) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of collateral (panel (a)) and maturity 
(panel (b)) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. 
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Figure 2.7: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads -
Baseline vs. FAVAR with Time-varying Loadings
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area, red
dashed lines) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area, red dashed lines) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan
rates (panel (b)) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. Blue shaded correspond to the ‘normal monetary
policy regime’, while the red lines correspond to ‘too-low-for-too- long monetary policy regimes’
(a) Reaction of New Loans
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Figure 8: Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads 
Estimated Using a FAVAR with Time-Varying Loadings 
This figure shows median impulse responses (bla k lines) together with 68% confide ce bands (da k blue 
shaded area, red dashed lines) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area, red dashed lines) of new 
lending (panel (a)) and loan rates (panel (b)) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. Blue 
shaded correspond to the ‘normal monetary policy regime’, while the red lines correspond to ‘too-low-for-
too-long monetary policy regim s’ 
(a) Reaction of New Loans 
 
(b) Reaction of Loan Spreads 
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Figure 8: Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads 
Estimated Using a FAVAR with Time-Varying Loadings 
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue 
shaded area, red dashed lines) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area, red dashed lines) of new 
lending (panel (a)) and loan rates (panel (b)) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. Blue 
shaded correspond to the ‘normal monetary policy regime’, while the red lines correspond to ‘too-low-for-
too-long monetary policy regime ’ 
(a) Re ction of New Loans 
 
(b) Reaction of Loan Spreads 
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2
Data Appendix
This appendix provides the classification of loan risk according to the Survey of Terms of Business Lending. The following
information is based on the instructions (FR 2028A), last updated December 11, 2008.
Minimal Risk
Loans in this category have virtually no chance of resulting in a loss. They would have a level of risk similar to a loan
with the following characteristics:
- The customer has been with your institution for many years and has an excellent credit history.
- The customer’s cash flow is steady and well in excess of required debt repayments plus other fixed charges.
- The customer has an AA or higher public debt rating.
- The customer has excellent access to alternative sources of finance at favorable terms.
- The management is of uniformly high quality and has unquestioned character.
- The collateral, if required, is cash or cash equivalent and is equal to or exceeds the value of the loan.
- The guarantor, if required, would achieve approximately this rating if borrowing from your institution.
Low Risk
Loans in this category are very unlikely to result in a loss. They would have a level of risk similar to a loan with the
following characteristics:
- The customer has an excellent credit history.
- The customer’s cash flow is steady and comfortably exceeds required debt repayments plus other fixed charges.
- The customer has a BBB or higher public debt rating.
- The customer has good access to alternative sources of finance at favorable terms.
- The management is of high quality and has unquestioned character.
- The collateral, if required, is sufficiently liquid and has a large enough margin to make very likely the recovery of the
full amount of the loan in the event of default.
- The guarantor, if required, would achieve approximately this rating if borrowing from your institution.
Moderate Risk
Loans in this category have little chance of resulting in a loss. This category should include the average loan, under
average economic conditions, at the typical lender. Loans in this category would have a level of risk similar to a loan with
the following characteristics:
- The customer has a good credit history.
- The customer’s cash flow may be subject to cyclical conditions but is adequate to meet required debt repayments plus
other fixed charges even after a limited period of losses or in the event of a somewhat lower trend in earnings.
- The customer has limited access to the capital markets.
- The customer has some access to alternative sources of finance at reasonable terms.
- The firm has good management in important positions.
- Collateral, which would usually be required, is sufficiently liquid and has a large enough margin to make likely the
recovery of the value of the loan in the event of default.
- The guarantor, if required, would achieve approximately this rating if borrowing from your institution.
Acceptable Risk/Others
Loans in this category have a limited chance of resulting in a loss. They would have a level of risk similar to a loan with
the following characteristics:
- The customer has only a fair credit rating but no recent credit problems.
- The customer’s cash flow is currently adequate to meet required debt repayments, but it may not be sufficient in the
event of significant adverse developments.
- The customer does not have access to the capital markets.
- The customer has some limited access to alternative sources of finance possibly at unfavorable terms.
- Some management weakness exists.
- Collateral, which would generally be required, is sufficient to make likely the recovery of the value of the loan in the
event of default, but liquidating the collateral may be difficult or expensive. - The guarantor, if required, would achieve
this rating or lower if borrowing from your institution.
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Chapter 3
Time-Variation in Macro-Financial
Linkages
3.1 Introduction
The Great Recession in 2008/2009 was triggered by major turbulences on financial mar-
kets. The macroeconomic models commonly used in academic research and in policy
institutions were unable to explain the strong economic downturn following these tur-
moils. Two main shortcomings of the standard approach have been identified: the lack
or insufficient modeling of financial variables in these models and the lack of a time-
varying relationship between the macroeconomy and the financial sector. This has been
expressed by the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Donald L. Kohn in 2009 at the
Federal Reserve Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy where he stated:
”The various mechanisms that have tended to amplify asset price movements and the
feedback among those movements, credit supply, and economic activity were not well
captured by the models used at most central banks.” Moreover, he identified ”[...] the
need for models to take much better account of nonlinearities and tail events [...]”.1
This chapter is based on joint work with Sandra Eickmeier and Massimiliano Marcellino entitled
”Time-Variation in Macro-Financial Linkages”.
1Similarly, the Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank Benoit Coeure argued
in 2012 at an international conference on ”Macroeconomic Modelling in Times of Crisis”: ”Models need
to incorporate at least some of the key aspects of, and key players in, the financial crisis” and he lists,
among others, financial factors and intermediaries.
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Based on a model, which does not suffer from these shortcomings, we address the
following questions. How important is the financial sector as a source of shocks for GDP
growth? Can we detect changes over time? If, yes, has the propagation of financial
shocks to growth or the size of the shocks or both changed over time? How does the
Global Financial Crisis compare to previous crises (is ”this time different”), and why is
the recovery from the Great Recession so weak and slow?
We incorporate a few key financial indicators in an otherwise standard Bayesian
macroeconomic vector autoregressive model (VAR) for the US and estimate that model
over the period 1958Q1-2012Q2. The VAR includes GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation,
house price inflation, the corporate bond spread, stock price inflation and the Federal
Funds rate.2 In order to account for possible time variation in the relationship between
financial indicators and the macroeconomy we estimate the VAR allowing for changes in
the shock volatilities, the autoregressive coefficients and the contemporaneous relations
between the variables. This allows us to capture both gradual, long-lasting changes in
macro-financial linkages, which arise as a consequence of deep structural changes, as well
as asymmetries over the business or the financial cycle related to financial frictions. Based
on our estimated time-varying parameter VAR (TV-VAR), we examine the sum of the
contributions of shocks to each individual financial indicator to GDP growth as a measure
of the overall importance of the financial sector as origin of shocks for the macroeconomy
and then shed light on the underlying sources of time variation. Finally, we compare
financial shock contributions estimated from the TV-VAR with those estimated from a
constant parameter VAR (C-VAR) and a VAR in which we replace the financial variables
with the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) published by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago.
Our main findings are: (i) Over the Great Recession, the explanatory power of fi-
nancial shocks for GDP growth rose to roughly 50 percent, compared to 20 percent in
normal times. House price shocks were very important in explaining the Great Reces-
sion, accounting for about 2/3 of the overall contribution of the financial sector to GDP
growth. House price and credit spread shocks have been larger and the transmission to
growth stronger than previously.
2The house price is, strictly speaking, not a financial variable, but an asset price. The Federal
Funds rate is driven by monetary policy which we will account for as well. For simplicity we label all
variables (including house prices and the Federal Funds rate) included in the VAR ”financial variables”
throughout the paper.
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(ii) The slow and weak recovery from the Global Financial Crisis is due to negative
developments in the housing market, probably due to households being still credit con-
strained. The C-VAR does not generate negative financial shock contributions at the
end of the sample period. A constant parameter model which includes the Chicago Fed’s
NFCI, however, does. This suggests that a model which includes a large number of fi-
nancial variables can also capture the complex dynamic interactions of financial markets
and the macroeconomy, which we pick up by our time-varying parameter model.
(iii) As concerns the pre-Global Financial Crisis period, we detect significantly pos-
itive contributions of credit spread shocks to GDP growth in the mid-1980s, probably
reflecting the process of financial deregulation. Moreover, we find significantly negative
financial shock contributions around two other banking crises, the Bank Capital Squeeze
in the early-1970s and the Savings and Loan crisis in the late-1980s/early-1990s, due
to particularly large credit spread and housing shocks, respectively. The stock market
crashes in 1987 and 2001 did not have significantly negative real effects.
(iv) Finally, the housing sector affects the macroeconomy asymmetrically. Negative
shocks tend to be more important for the macroeconomy than positive shocks, as has
been recently suggested by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2012). Moreover, we find a trend
increase in the transmission and in the size of housing shocks since the early-2000s,
probably due to a rise in housing wealth and extended mortgage lending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we relate our
paper to the literature and discuss our original contributions. In Section 3.3 we present
the data, and in Section 3.4 the methodology. In Section 3.5, we provide results on
the time-varying macro-financial linkages. First, we analyze the overall contribution of
structural financial sector shocks to GDP growth, and then we assess the contributions of
unexpected changes in the individual financial variables. We shed light on the contribu-
tions’ determinants, i.e. changes over time in the impact of shocks to individual financial
indicators to GDP growth and in the volatility of these shocks. We then compare the
outcomes from the TV-VAR with those from the C-VAR and from a time-varying VAR
which includes the NFCI instead of the observable financial variables and carry out
further robustness checks. In Section 3.6 we summarize the main findings and conclude.
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3.2 Related Literature
There is a growing, but still small, empirical literature which looks at the role of fi-
nancial variables for the macroeconomy in a time-varying parameter setup. Time series
applications for the US include Balke (2000), Davig and Haikko (2010), Kaufmann and
Valderrama (2010), Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2012), Hubrich and Tetlow (2012), Nason
and Tallman (2012), Eickmeier, Lemke, and Marcellino (2011b), Ciccarelli, Ortega, and
Valderrama (2012) and Gambetti and Musso (2012). Some of these papers assume that
parameters can differ across states of the economy and use Markov switching, thresh-
old VARs or a dummy variable approach. Others allow parameters to evolve smoothly
over time, in similar ways as we do here. Most papers allow both shock variances and
coefficients to change. Moreover, most studies include a few observed financial variables
whereas others use a composite index formed out of a larger number of financial variables
(a ”financial conditions index” (FCI) or a ”financial stress index”). Most papers focus
on a particular financial shock or a shock to the composite index, whereas only a few
papers consider more than one particular financial shock. An overview of previous work
(including work for countries other than the US) is presented in Figure 3.1.
Results on whether the transmission of financial shocks is time-dependent or not are
mixed. However, what emerges from basically all studies is that the size of financial
shocks is changing over time. This possibly reflects that in financial crisis periods,
financial shocks hit a particularly large number of financial market segments at the same
time or that credit defaults multiply. This finding is also consistent with Stock and
Watson (forth.) who focus on the sources of the Great Recession in the US. They find
that relatively large shocks rather than changes in the transmission can explain the Great
Recession. Their analysis is based on a dynamic factor model with constant parameters,
but they consider 2007 as a break point. Finally, our paper is related to recent empirical
evidence by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) who suggest that financial frictions may
matter more over financial crisis periods than in normal times. The authors show that
a DSGE model with financial frictions delivers better out-of-sample forecasts than a
DSGE model without these features since 2008. By contrast, over most of the rest of
their sample period (starting in 1994) the simple model without financial frictions yields
better forecasts.
Compared to the literature surveyed above our approach has two desirable features.
First, our TV-VAR is relatively flexible compared to some of the specifications used in
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the surveyed literature. The changing autoregressive coefficients capture possible time
variation in the propagation of shocks, while the time-varying innovation covariance ma-
trix picks up changes in shock sizes and simultaneous relations among the variables.
Hence, our model can account for gradual, long-lasting changes in the transmission of
financial shocks to the macroeconomy, due to, for example, financial innovations, glob-
alization or regulatory changes on financial markets. In addition the model can capture
asymmetries in the effects of financial shocks over time, due to agency problems between
lenders and borrowers, which are typically more pronounced in financial crises periods.
Agency problems occur, for instance, when collateralized loans are granted. When asset
prices fall, lending is accordingly also constrained (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, Guerrieri
and Iacoviello 2012). Furthermore, greater information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers in crisis periods can drive up the cost of obtaining external funding (Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).3 Our model can also account for possible changes in the
financial shock transmission due to a changing conduct of monetary policy or the zero
lower bound of nominal interest rates and measures of unconventional monetary policy.
Second, the financial variables we include in our model cover the most relevant fea-
tures of the financial sector, and are closely related to key concepts in DSGE models with
financial frictions.4 House and stock prices capture housing and financial wealth, and
asset price movements can affect the real sector of the economy through wealth effects
(Campbell and Cocco 2007, Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2005). Especially house prices
feature prominently in recent DSGE models including financial frictions via borrowing
constraints (e.g. Iacoviello 2005, Iacoviello and Neri 2010). Rising asset prices raise the
collateral capacity of constrained agents who can borrow and consume more (Iacoviello
and Neri 2010, Campbell and Cocco 2007). Moreover, asset price movements affect fi-
nancial intermediaries’ balance sheets and, as a consequence of higher net worth due
to a rise in asset prices, they increase their lending (Iacoviello 2010). We additionally
include credit spreads, since they capture credit risk and are closely related to the exter-
nal finance premium in models featuring a financial accelerator mechanism (De Graeve
3Moreover, during crisis periods, households’ willingness to hold illiquid funds diminishes which
reduces the availability of external funding that borrowers can draw upon (known as the “borrower’s
balance sheet channel”) (Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 2003). Lenders’ risk aversion and greater
uncertainty are additional amplifying elements during crises. See Hollo, Kremer, and Lo Duca (2012).
4VAR-based FCI papers which aim at assessing the importance of ”financial conditions” for the
macroeconomy include similar variables (e.g. Beaton, Lalonde, and Luu 2009, Goodhart and Hofmann
2001, Gauthier, Graham, and Liu 2004, Swiston 2008, Guichard and Turner 2008, Guichard, Haugh,
and Turner 2009).
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2008). Furthermore, credit spreads give a reasonable description of problems associated
with the financial intermediation process (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 2011). Finally, credit
spreads have been shown to be useful predictors of economic activity, especially over the
Global Financial Crisis (e.g. Faust, Gilchrist, Wright, and Zakrajsek 2012, Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek 2012, Del Negro and Schorfheide 2013).
We identify individual financial shocks and can therefore look at the contribution
of shocks to house prices, credit spreads, stock prices and the Federal Funds rate to
GDP growth. Compared to time-varying parameter approaches which include aggregate
measures of ”financial conditions”, concentrating on a few key financial variables allows
us to gain a better understanding of the underlying mechanism of the overall importance
of the financial sector as a source of shocks for the macroeconomy. Perhaps even more
important, including individual financial variables separately also means that we do not
only allow for time-varying dynamic interactions between financial and macroeconomic
variables, but also explicitly between individual financial variables whereas weights of
individual financial variables in the composite indexes are typically assumed constant
over time. To see whether these shortcomings of using aggregate measures of ”financial
conditions” is outweighed by the ability of such models to account for a larger amount
of information we compare the overall contribution of financial sector shocks to GDP
growth estimated from our baseline TV-VAR with the contribution from a model which
includes the NFCI.
3.3 Data
The model is estimated over the sample period 1958Q1 to 2012Q2 (1958Q1-1973Q1 is our
training sample). The choice of this period is driven by data availability, and the sample
covers several financial crises, which we will explicitly focus on further below. Financial
crisis periods are defined as in Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) to be 1973-1975 (”Bank
Capital Squeeze”), 1982-1984 (”LDC (less developed countries) Debt Crisis”), 1988-1991
(”Savings and Loan Crisis”).5 To those dates we add the years of the two stock market
crashes 1987 and 2001 and the Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009. We note that these
dates encompass the economic recessions as defined by the NBER.
The vector of macroeconomic variables Mt comprises differences of the logarithms of
GDP and the GDP deflator. The vector of financial variables Ft includes a house price
5See Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) for details on characteristics of the individual financial crises.
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index, the S&P 500 (monthly average), the Federal Funds rate and Moody’s BAA-AAA
corporate bond spread.
House and stock prices are converted into real variables by division by the GDP
deflator. They enter in differences of their logarithms. The Federal Funds rate and the
corporate bond spread are not transformed. All series are taken from the Fred database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, except for the house price which is taken from
Robert J. Shiller’s webpage and used in Shiller (2005). The series are shown in Figure
3.2 (panels (a) and (b)).
We assume that the financial variables we include capture developments in the finan-
cial sector that are most relevant for the macroeconomy, in particular during the Great
Recession and the build-up of financial imbalances prior to it. We check below to what
extent including additional or other variables in the model affects the main results. As
the Federal Funds rate is the monetary policy instrument, we will, in the remainder of
the paper, look at financial shock contributions to real economic activity including and
excluding the effects of shocks to the Federal Funds rate (or monetary policy shocks).
3.4 Econometric Methodology
3.4.1 The Time-varying Parameter VAR
The analysis departs from an m-dimensional vector Yt, which includes the macroeco-
nomic variables Mt and the financial indicators Ft, Yt ≡ (Mt,Ft)′. We assume that Yt
follows a time-varying parameter VAR(p) model:
Yt = Ct+B1tYt−1 + . . .+BptYt−p+ut, E(ut) = 0, E(utu′t) =Rt, (3.4.1)
t = 1, ...,T , where for each t, Ct is an m× 1 vector of intercepts, B1t, ...,Bpt are m×m
matrices of autoregressive VAR parameters and ut denotes the m×1 vector of reduced
form residuals, with ut ∼N(0,Rt). Collecting the coefficients in the m×(1+mp) matrix
B′t = [Ct B1t . . .Bpt] and defining the (1+mp×1) vector Xt = [1,Y
′
t−1, . . . ,Y
′
t−p]
′ , the VAR
can be written more compactly as
Yt =B′tXt+ut. (3.4.2)
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An even more compact notation is
Y =XBt+u, (3.4.3)
where Y = [Y1, . . .YT ]′, X = [X1, . . .XT ]′ and u = [u1, . . .uT ]′ are, respectively, T ×m,
T ×(1+mp) and T ×m matrices. The VAR order p is set to 2, following similar previous
work for the US (e.g. Cogley and Sargent 2005, Benati and Surico 2008, Primiceri 2005).
We further define bt = vec(Bt), and assume that bt evolves according to a driftless
random walk:
bt = bt−1 +ηt,
with ηt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Q). Following standard practice, as e.g. in Cogley and Sargent
(2005), we impose a stability constraint on the time-varying parameters to enforce sta-
tionarity of the system. That is, we include an indicator function that discards those
draws for which the roots of the associated VAR polynomial lie inside the unit circle.
Moreover, we have:
ut = A−1t Htt, (3.4.4)
where t are structural shocks, with t ∼ i.i.d. N(0, I). The matrix At is lower triangular,
with ones on the main diagonal and containing in the below diagonal elements the
contemporaneous relations between the variables in the model. The matrix Ht is a
diagonal matrix containing the reduced form stochastic volatilities of the innovations to
the VAR:
At =

1 0 . . . 0
a21,t 1
. . . ...
... . . . . . . 0
a61,t a62,t a63,t a64,t a65,t 1
 and Ht =

h1,t 0 . . . 0
0 h2,t . . . 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 . . . h6,t
 .
Both the contemporaneous relations aij,t and the innovations’ volatilities hi,t are allowed
to drift over time. Following Primiceri (2005) we collect the diagonal elements of Ht in
the vector ht = [h1,t,h2,t,h3,t,h4,t,h5,t,h6,t]′, and assume that
lnht = lnht−1 +vt, vt ∼N(0,Z).
Similarly,
at = at−1 + τt, τt ∼N(0,S),
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with at being constructed by row-wise stacking of the non-zero and non-one elements of
the matrix At, namely, at = [a21,t,a31,t,a32,t, ...,a65,t]′.
The entire system contains 4 sources of uncertainty: the innovations to the law of
motion of the stochastic volatilities (vt) and contemporaneous relations (τt), the innova-
tions to the time-varying parameters bt (ηt), and the structural shocks (t). We assume
that the vector containing all the innovations to the system is distributed according to
t
ηt
τt
vt
∼N(0,V ) with V =

I6 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 Z
 ,
where I6 is a 6× 6 identity matrix, Q and S are positive definite matrices, and Z is a
diagonal matrix. Following Primiceri (2005) we further assume that S is block diagonal,
where each block corresponds to the parameters belonging to separate equations.
We estimate the model using a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.6
The priors of the initial states of autoregressive coefficients, the contemporaneous cor-
relations, the stochastic volatilities and all hyperparameters are assumed to be indepen-
dently distributed. The priors for the initial states of the time-varying parameters p(b0),
the stochastic contemporaneous relations p(a0) and the log of the stochastic volatilities
p(lnh0) are assumed to be normally distributed. The priors of the hyperparameters S,
Q and Z are assumed to be distributed according to independent inverse-Wishart dis-
tributions. To calibrate the priors we use the corresponding OLS quantities calculated
over a training sample which covers the first fifteen years of the data (60 quarters).
We compare in Figure 3.12 of the Appendix prior and posterior distributions of the
hyperparameters. The posterior distributions are sufficiently different from the prior
distributions indicating that there appears to be enough information in the data on the
parameters. Hence, our results are not driven by the choice of the priors. To assess the
convergence properties of the MCMC algorithm, we compute inefficiency factors (IF)
for the draws of states from the posterior distribution. The results, presented in Figure
3.13, show that all values of the IF are well below 20, which is typically regarded as
satisfactory (Primiceri 2005).
6Since the method is nowadays very standard we only give a brief description here and refer the
reader to the excellent treatment in, among others, Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005) or
Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
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3.4.2 Shock Identification
To identify the financial shocks we carry out a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance
matrix of the reduced form VAR residuals. We choose the following ordering: GDP
growth→ GDP deflator inflation→ house price inflation→ credit spread→ stock price
inflation → Federal Funds rate.
By ordering the macro variables (Mt) before the financial variables (Ft) we separate
macroeconomic from financial shocks. The underlying assumption is that macroeconomic
variables react with a delay to financial shocks, possibly because wealth effects and
effects which involve financial intermediaries take time to materialize, whereas financial
variables can move instantaneously in response to macroeconomic shocks. This is a
standard assumption made in structural VAR studies (see, among others, Bernanke,
Boivin, and Eliasz 2005, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999, Beaton, Lalonde,
and Luu 2009, Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto forth., Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013).
Separating macroeconomic and financial shocks is all we need to do when we look
at the overall contribution of financial sector shocks to growth in the next section. We
will, however, then go one step further and try to better understand what shocks from
the financial sector are particularly important and, if we find time variation in the
contributions, try to come up with an explanation. Possible reasons are, as noted,
changes in the transmission and changes in the volatility of the shocks. To tackle these
issues we need to identify the individual financial shocks.
Using contemporaneous zero restrictions to identify individual financial shocks is
certainly prone to critique, especially when applied to quarterly data. On the other
hand, structural (DSGE) models are still not available in a form to derive meaningful
and widely accepted sign restrictions which could be imposed to disentangle the various
financial shocks from each other.7 For this reason we stick to the recursive scheme.
The consideration behind the chosen ordering within the financial block is that house
prices are rather slow moving relative to interest rates, spreads and the stock price.
Ordering house prices before interest rates is also in line with previous empirical work
(e.g. Jarocinski and Smets 2008, Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto forth.). Ordering the
Federal Funds rate after credit spreads is consistent with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012).
7Even for credit supply shocks, which are nowadays frequently identified with sign restrictions in
empirical work, existing DSGE models would not all imply the same identifying restrictions on key
variables (see Eickmeier and Ng 2011 for a discussion).
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We will show below that results are reasonable. Nevertheless, we also consider below
two alternative orderings for the financial variables and show that our main results are
basically unaffected. We nevertheless bear in mind that the estimates only give us a first
idea on the relative importance of each financial shock, while the overall contribution of
the four financial shocks is better identified. A more sophisticated identification of the
various financial shocks is left for future work.
3.5 Time-varying Macro-financial Linkages
3.5.1 The Overall Contribution of Financial Shocks to GDP Growth
We present in Figure 3.3 the sum of the contributions of all financial shocks (i.e. shocks
to the house price, the credit spread, the stock price and the Federal Funds rate) to
GDP growth together with the contribution of all (financial and macro) shocks to GDP
growth.8 We show the median together with the 16th and 84th percentiles.
The first thing to note is that financial sector shocks, over the entire sample period,
explain a large part of movements in GDP growth (panel (a)).
We observe particularly large (first positive and then negative) contributions of fi-
nancial shocks at the beginning of the sample period. These large contributions are
almost entirely due to shocks to the Federal Funds rate, as can be seen from panel (b)
which shows the sum of the contributions of financial shocks excluding the monetary
policy shocks. The large contribution of monetary policy shocks to output growth in
the 1970s is confirmed by a broad literature. Benati and Goodhart (2010), e.g., argue
that real interest rates in the US have been negative between 1971 and the beginning
of the Volcker disinflation in October 1979, partly due to a systematic overestimation
of the output gap (Orphanides 2001, Orphanides 2003). Similarly, Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000) attribute the Great Inflation in the 1970s to excessively accommodative
monetary policy. Based on an estimated DSGE model featuring time variation in the
volatility of the structural innovations, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) show that the
8This is similar to studies constructing Financial Conditions Indices (FCIs) as the contribution of
the sum of unexpected changes in financial variables to GDP growth over time using VARs (Beaton,
Lalonde, and Luu 2009, Goodhart and Hofmann 2001, Gauthier, Graham, and Liu 2004, Swiston
2008, Guichard and Turner 2008, Guichard, Haugh, and Turner 2009). All these studies use, however,
models with constant parameters. Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) or Gauthier, Graham, and Liu (2004)
acknowledge that this assumption may be problematic.
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variance share of GDP growth attributable to monetary policy shocks is largest around
the Volcker period, consistent with our findings.
During three recessions associated with bank-related crises (i.e. the Bank Capi-
tal Squeeze at the beginning of the sample, the Savings and Loan crisis in the late-
1980s/early 1990s and the Great Recession) tight financial conditions depressed eco-
nomic growth. The negative financial shock contributions hit record levels during the
Great Recession. Other negative financial events, such as the stock market crashes in
1987 and 2001, do not seem to have substantially affected GDP growth.
The charts also reveal positive contributions from financial shocks (other than mon-
etary policy shocks) in the mid-1980s. However, during the last two decades positive
financial shocks appear to have not, or only barely, spilled over to the real sector.
Looking at the contribution of financial shocks to growth at the end of the sample
is interesting in the light of a vivid discussion in the literature and among policy mak-
ers about why the recovery after the crisis in the US has been so weak and slow. One
explanation that is provided is that financial markets have not yet fully recovered from
the Global Financial Crisis. This is consistent with the view that economic recoveries
after financial crises are typically slow and weak (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Similarly,
Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012) have shown that recoveries are weaker if they were
preceded by asset price busts. A financial markets-related explanation is also consistent
with Justiniano (2012), who argues that a DSGE model would require continuous adverse
risk premium shocks to explain the struggling US economy. Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin,
Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) argue that ”non-classical” financial variables, such as
measures of liquidity, borrower risk and the capacity and willingness of financial inter-
mediaries to lend, failed to improve after the crisis peak. Consequently, a model, which
includes these variables, would attribute the ongoing negative economic developments in
the US to the financial sector, while a model, which only includes ”classical” financial
variables, would not. Bordo and Haubrich (2012) examine business cycle recoveries in
the US since 1880 and argue that the recent recovery’s weakness can be explained by
negative developments in the housing sector. Those developments are probably due to
households being still highly indebted and having difficulties obtaining credit.9
9See the interview by Todd Clark with Amir Sufi and C. Mayer on ”Housing and the economic
recovery” in summer 2012 at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Similarly, the Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke identified in his speech in November 2012 at the New York Club as one of
the headwinds affecting the recovery tight terms and conditions on mortgage loans, people still being
unable to buy homes despite low mortgages and a substantial overhang of vacant homes.
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From our financial shock contribution analysis, there is a strong rebound over the
quarters after the crisis low. However, financial shocks still appear to drag GDP growth
down (although the estimation uncertainty is quite large), consistent with the view that
negative financial developments are, in large part, responsible for the weak recovery.
We note that our model does not include ”non-classical” financial variables, but instead
generates this result by allowing for time variation in the dynamics of a small set of
”classical” financial variables. We will show below that the weakness of the recovery can
largely be attributed to negative developments in the housing market.
Taking a medium-term perspective, Figure 3.4(a) quantifies the contribution of the
sum of all financial shocks to the forecast error variance of GDP growth at the 5-year
horizon. The importance of financial shocks varies strongly, from around 20 percent
(median estimate) between 1985 and 2005 to more than 60 percent at the beginning
of the sample and about 50 percent during the Great Recession.10 The high share
of variance explained in the 1970s is entirely due to large contributions of shocks to
the Federal Funds rate, as shown in Figure 3.4(b) where we plot contributions of all
financial shocks excluding monetary policy shocks. The variance share explained by
financial shocks tends to increase around all five recession periods (based on the median
estimates) and remains high 1-2 years after the recession. During the Great Recession
the explanatory power of financial shocks for GDP growth variability is significantly
larger than in other recessions. Overall, these findings point to significant time variation
in the propagation mechanism, or in the shocks’ size, or in both.
3.5.2 Contributions of Individual Financial Shocks to GDP Growth
Figure 3.5 shows the contributions of individual financial shocks to GDP growth. Several
findings are worthwhile emphasizing.
First, the significantly positive contributions of all financial shocks in the mid-1980s
found in Figure 3.3 are mainly due to positive credit spread shocks. An explanation is
that regulatory changes in financial markets and the emergence of new financial products
helped reducing financial frictions and led to expanded access to credit markets for
households and firms, thereby boosting economic performance (Justiniano and Primiceri
10The share for the Great Recession is slightly smaller compared to the share explained by financial and
uncertainty shocks found by Stock and Watson (forth.) of roughly 2/3. Their financial and uncertainty
shocks are, however, not uncorrelated with other shocks.
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2008).11 Indeed, the regulatory reforms of the early-1980s mark a transition from very
high and volatile to much smaller risk spreads (see Figure 3.2(b)), which our model
attributes to positive credit spread shocks.
Second, the main drivers of the 2000/2001 recession were disturbances in the stock
market reflecting the burst of the dot.com bubble.
Third, the boom in the mid-2000s was mainly triggered by housing shocks.
Fourth, the main financial drivers of the Great Recession were house price and credit
spread shocks. House price shocks explain about 2/3 and credit spread shocks about
1/3 of the overall financial shock contributions to real economic growth over the crisis
period. The large share of growth explained by house price shocks is unprecedented
in our sample, and in that sense, the latest recession has been different from previous
recessions. The finding is consistent with Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012) who show
that recessions associated with house price busts tend to be longer and deeper than other
recessions, which is clearly the case for the Great Recession. The relatively large part
explained by credit spread shocks is in line with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012).
Fifth, since the end of 2008, there are basically no contributions of shocks to the Fed-
eral Funds rate, which is potentially due to the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates
the Federal Reserve hit at the end of 2008. Unconventional monetary policy measures
launched in 2009/2010 are probably captured by credit spread shocks which made large
positive contributions around this time. Indeed, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011) show, using an event study approach and a regression analysis, that QE1 has
substantially reduced corporate bond spreads. Moreover, at the end of the sample, our
model suggests that house price shocks still drag GDP growth down, which explains the
overall negative contributions of financial shocks found in Figure 3.3. This finding is in
line with Claessens and Kose (2013) who show for a large number of countries that the
economy typically starts recovering from recessions before house prices have bottomed
out.
In Figure 3.6 we present the time-varying forecast error variance shares of GDP
growth explained by each financial shock. The explanatory power of house price shocks
soured during the last 15 years, from below 5 percent to about 40 percent of the variation
in GDP growth in the years after the Global Financial Crisis. Although the uncertainty
11One example is the passing of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA) in 1980. The DIDMCA increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 and established
the complete phase-out of interest rate ceilings on deposits, known as Regulation Q. Another example
is the securitization of mortgage loans, which picked up pace in the early-1980s (Estrella 2002).
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surrounding these estimates is relatively large, the variance share explained by the house
price shock in the most recent years exceeds significantly that in previous decades.12
Credit spread shocks are quite important during recession periods with largest values of
about 20 percent in the first two and the last recessions of the sample. The variance
shares explained by credit spread shocks are quite precisely estimated. Accordingly,
the importance of credit spread shocks is significantly larger during most recessions than
during boom periods. Variance shares explained by stock price shocks are relatively high
around the two major stock market crashes in our sample (1987 and 2001) and during
the build-up of the dot.com bubble in the 1990s. In these periods the explanatory power
of stock price shocks is at roughly 10 percent compared to virtually nothing in other
times. During the recent financial crisis, the stock market seems to have played basically
no role. We have already commented on the high variance share explained by shocks
to the Federal Funds rate at the beginning of the sample. Much smaller peaks are,
again, visible around 2001 and 2008/2009. These latter peaks are consistent with the
view that the Federal Reserve pursued a ”mop up” strategy after the burst of the stock
price and the housing and credit bubbles, respectively, which has become a consensus
on what central banks should do in response to negative financial market developments
(e.g. Issing 2009). In general, the contribution of monetary policy shocks has been very
low in the last two decades, consistent with other structural VAR (or FAVAR) studies
(e.g. Jarocinski and Smets 2008, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013).
3.5.3 Stochastic Volatility or Changing Dynamics?
So far, our analysis has shown non-negligible time variation in the relation between the
financial sector as a whole and the real economy, but also between specific key segments
of the financial sector and the real economy. In the following we will proceed to analyze
whether we can attribute the revealed time variation to changes in the size of financial
shocks or to changes in the transmission mechanism of financial shocks to GDP growth
or to both.
12The average forecast error variance shares explained by house price shocks before the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis are broadly in line with those of Jarocinski and Smets (2008). They find housing demand
shocks to explain between 6 and 10 percent in the medium run. Their estimates are based on a constant
parameter VAR estimated over 1987-2007.
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Shock Volatilities
We start by presenting in Figure 3.7 the time-varying standard deviations of the orthogo-
nalized financial shocks. There is a substantial and significant amount of time variation.
Moreover, it is striking how similar Figures 3.6 and 3.7 are in shapes. This suggests
that much of the time variation in the variance decomposition of GDP growth is due to
changing shock volatilities. This finding is in line with basically all previous time series
studies reviewed in Section 2, and strongly supports our strategy to take time variation
in the shock volatilities into account. We note, in addition, that, although we have used
a recursive identification scheme, our estimated volatility of the shocks to the Federal
Funds rate is remarkably similar to the one obtained by Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)
from an estimated DSGE model.
The Role of Changing Dynamics
In Figure 3.8 we present median impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial
shocks obtained from the TV-VAR for horizons up to 5 years and all points in time. The
impulse responses are constructed such that the initial shock is of the same size, i.e. the
impact effect on asset prices, credit spreads and the Federal Funds rate is 1 percent and
1 percentage point, respectively, at each point in time. This allows us to isolate changes
in the transmission from changes in the size of the shocks.
Signs and shapes of the impulse responses look reasonable. Unexpected increases
of house prices and stock prices have positive temporary effects on GDP growth. The
effects of stock price and credit spread shocks on GDP growth are more short lived than
those of other financial (especially house price) shocks. The relatively persistent output
growth effects of house price shocks might be explained by wealth effects being larger
for housing wealth than for financial wealth as found, e.g., by Case, Quigley, and Shiller
(2005), Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2013) and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011).
Positive shocks to the Federal Funds rate (reflecting a monetary policy tightening), by
contrast, lead to temporarily contractionary real effects.
Conceptually in line with Gali and Gambetti (2009), we plot in Figure 3.9 impulse
responses averaged over selected periods of time, and in Figure 3.10 we show differences
between these periods.13 We first compare in panels (a) financial crises, as defined in
13Specifically, for each draw from the Gibbs Sampler, we average the impulse responses over each
of the selected periods, and then compute the quantiles over the draws. Similar, for the differences
109
the data section, and non-crisis periods to evaluate asymmetries in the transmission of
financial shocks over the financial cycle. Panels (a) of Figures 3.9 and 3.10 suggest that
during the two stock market crashes and the 1988-1991 crisis, the transmission of the
financial shocks did not differ significantly from the transmission in normal times. By
contrast, we find significant differences in the propagation of all shocks but house price
shocks in the 1973-1975 crisis, of credit spread shocks in the 1982-1984 crisis, and of
credit spread and house price shocks in the Global Financial Crisis. Hence, there seem
to be differences in the transmission in normal periods compared to periods of financial
turbulence. These differences, however, are not systematic in terms of significance and
sign across crisis periods. Over the Global Financial Crisis period, the real effects of
credit spread and house price shocks have, however, clearly been stronger than in normal
times, which could be due to the specific nature of the latest crisis or to monetary policy
having hit the zero lower bound and having undertaken unconventional measures.14
In panels (b) of Figures 3.9 and 3.10 we provide impulse responses and differences
between them for each decade (the 1970s until the 2000s) averaged only over non-crisis
years to test for gradual changes in the transmission. The real short-term effects of
house price shocks are significantly lower in the 1990s and the 2000s compared to the two
previous decades. At the same time though, the effects of house price shocks became more
persistent between the beginning of the sample and the last decade. As can be seen from
Figure 3.8, the impact of house price shocks on GDP growth gradually decreased over
the last two decades, potentially due to the increasing usage of mortgage securitization
making the economy more resilient to house price shocks. However, starting at the end
of the 1990s until the beginning of the disruptions in the housing market, the impact of
the house price shock on GDP growth continuously increased to levels seen in the 1980s.
This finding is not surprising given that housing wealth relative to GDP has strongly
increased from 1.5 in the mid-1990s to 2.3 in 2005 (Iacoviello 2010). Another reason for
the increased effect of housing shocks on output growth in the second half of the 2000s
could be that an increase in house prices may have been triggered by the extension of
subprime mortgage lending (which may have been picked up by our house price shock)
between the selected periods, again for each draw from the Gibbs Sampler, we average the impulse
responses over each of the periods, take the difference between the averages of the selected periods, and
then calculate the quantiles over the draws.
14We can also not exclude that our finding is due to the simple fact that the duration of the Global
Financial Crisis has been longer than that of previous crises and that our model, which allows for
smoothly time-varying parameters, can only detect those parameter changes that occur for sustained
periods of time.
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which allowed households to borrow at easy terms in order to buy houses (e.g. Mian
and Sufi 2009). Moreover, financial intermediaries could increase their lending as a
consequence of higher net worth due to rising house prices. The decline in house prices
since 2006 then led to a reversal of these developments with similar (negative) effects on
GDP growth. These explanations are in line with Iacoviello and Neri (2010) who argue
that housing preference shocks have larger effects on GDP when collateral effects are
taken into account.15 They are also consistent with Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) who
emphasize the high comovement of house prices and (mortgage and other) credit in a
time series model for the US. We finally note that the time-varying pattern we obtain
for house price shocks is in line with Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2013) who find larger
housing wealth effects between 1975 and 2012 than between 1982 and 1999.
The short-term (negative) effects of credit spread shocks remained unchanged. The
effects of stock price shocks have become significantly larger in the 1990s and 2000s
compared to the 1970s and the 1980s, consistent with financial wealth having become
more important over the course of the stock market rallies in the 1990s. Finally, we
find that the negative effects of policy interest rate shocks on growth have weakened
over time, in line with much of the previous empirical literature (see the overview of
this literature in Table 4 of Eickmeier, Lemke, and Marcellino (2011a)). We find a
short-run output puzzle (as well as a price puzzle (not shown in the paper)) at the
beginning of the sample which then disappears. This is consistent with the notion that
the Federal Reserve violated the Taylor principle before the era of Paul Volcker as a
chairman (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) and with the TV-VAR evidence by Korobilis
(2012).
Finally, in order to better understand the underlying sources of the time variation
in the impulse responses we show in Figure 3.14 in the Appendix the evolution of the
autoregressive parameters (i.e. the elements of Bt summed over the two lags) and of the
contemporaneous relations associated with the financial shocks (i.e. the corresponding
15They estimate their DSGE model with a housing market over two sample periods, 1965-1982 and
1999-2006. They argue that financial reforms led to several developments in the credit market which
enhanced the ability of households to borrow and thereby reduced the fraction of credit constraint
households. They find that the effects of housing preference shocks on economic activity have increased
between the two samples. These results are not directly comparable to ours, because they have included
years prior to the 1970s in their first subsample and they look at a housing preference shock (whereas
we look at a more broadly defined shock to the house price) and at effects on the components of GDP,
not GDP. They find that short-run responses of residential and business investment have declined, but
that responses have become more persistent over time, which is what we find for GDP. By contrast,
they find the opposite for consumption.
111
elements of At). There is time-variation in both autoregressive and contemporaneous
relations. Time variation in the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix is more
significant than in the autoregressive parameters.
Overall, our results suggest significant changes in the transmission of financial shocks
to the real economy over time, which supports our strategy of not only accounting for
time variation in the shock volatility but also in the autoregressive and the contempo-
raneous correlation parameters. This finding is quite new. Most previous time series
studies featuring time-varying parameters do no find evidence for time variation in the
transmission.16
3.6 Alternative Models and Robustness Analysis
In this section we compare the main outcomes of our baseline TV-VAR with the results
from a constant parameter VAR (C-VAR), and from a TV-VAR in which we replace
house and stock price inflation and the credit spread by the NFCI. We also check for
robustness with respect to the ordering of financial variables for shock identification,
and to the inclusion of the growth rate of the volume of credit or of the oil prices in our
baseline model.
3.6.1 Comparison with a C-VAR
The C-VAR contains the same variables as the TV-VAR and is estimated over the same
sample period.17 18 Figure 3.11 shows the overall contributions of financial sector shocks
while Figure 3.12 presents the contributions of financial sector shocks excluding monetary
16It is worth noting that Benati and Surico (2008) demonstrate that changes in the structural mone-
tary policy rule may well be identified as changes in the shock variances in TV-VARs (see also Benati
and Goodhart 2010 for a discussion of this issue). In this light, our finding of significant time variation
in the propagation mechanism is even more striking.
17We estimate the constant parameter VAR using Bayesian methods, assuming an independent
Normal-Wishart prior along the lines of Koop and Korobilis (2010). To calibrate the prior hyper-
parameters in this exercise we use the corresponding OLS quantities estimated over a training sample
of 60 quarters. Our choice to use this specific prior distribution, and to calibrate the prior hyperpa-
rameters using a training sample of this specific length, is motivated by the desire to keep the C-VAR
conceptually as close as possible to the TV-VAR.
18Given the well known structural breaks associated with the conduct of monetary policy in the late
1970s/early 1980s, we have also estimated the C-VAR starting in 1985. Since impulse responses and
historical decomposition results are very similar for the two C-VARs after 1985 we present only results
from the C-VAR estimated over the entire sample period.
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policy shocks. Panel (a) plots GDP growth (black line) together with the median overall
contributions estimated from the benchmark TV-VAR (red line), and the C-VAR (green
line). Panel (b) of Figure 3.11 presents the median overall contributions implied by the
C-VAR alongside the 16th and 84th percentiles.
The contributions estimated from the C-VAR and the TV-VAR are, over most of
the sample period, remarkably similar. Indeed, during the second half of the 1980s and
throughout the 1990s the two series nearly coincide.
We observe notable differences over mainly three periods: 1975-1980, 2002-2006 and
the post-crisis period. During 1975-1980, the contribution of financial shocks implied
by the TV-VAR is first larger, and then smaller than the contribution implied by the
C-VAR. The differences are entirely due to large shocks to the Federal Funds rate found
in the TV-VAR, but not in the C-VAR. Over the 2002-2006 period, the financial sector
shock contributions implied by the C-VAR exceed those implied by the TV-VAR. Hence,
over this boom period, the C-VAR seems to attribute a larger fraction of GDP growth to
financial shocks than the TV-VAR. This points towards asymmetries in the transmission
mechanism of financial shocks to the real economy, which the C-VAR, in contrast to the
TV-VAR, is unable to capture. Since mid-2009 the contributions of financial shocks
estimated from the C-VAR are significantly positive. They turn negative again only at
the very end of the sample period. This confirms that time variation in the parameters
of our baseline model is needed to attribute the weak economic recovery to negative
financial sector developments.
In the Appendix (Figures 3.15 and 3.16) we show results for individual financial
shocks obtained from the C-VAR. House price shocks make relatively strong positive
contributions in the mid-2000s, which the TV-VAR does not find. The result from our
baseline TV-VAR is in line with Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2012) who find that nega-
tive house price shocks, leading to borrowing constraints becoming binding, have larger
(negative) effects on economic activity than positive house price shocks which lead to a
relaxation of collateral constraints. It is also in line with Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2013)
who find that positive housing wealth effects from house price increases are significantly
smaller than negative ones from house price declines.19 We finally note that impulse
response functions obtained from the C-VAR are very similar to those obtained from the
TV-VAR averaged over the entire sample period (see Figure 3.15 in the Appendix).
19Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2013 argue that ”painful regret due to loss of home value has different
psychological consequences than does the pleasant elation due to increase in home value, which frees up
new opportunities to consume home equity.” See also Genesove and Mayer (2001).
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3.6.2 Comparison with a TV-VAR that includes a Financial Conditions In-
dex
As another exercise we assess the benefit of exploiting lots of financial time series when
examining financial sector shock contributions. For that purpose we replace house price
inflation, stock price inflation and credit spreads with the NFCI published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (see Figure 3.2 (c)). The NFCI is constructed as the first latent
factor extracted from an unbalanced panel of 100 financial indicators, covering money
markets, debt and equity markets and the banking system.20 Importantly, the NFCI also
captures ”non-classical” financial segments. For details on the series and the construction
of the index, see Brave and Butters (2011).
Although the Federal Funds rate enters the large dataset (as deviations from overnight
repo rates) from which the NFCI is constructed we still include it as an additional variable
in the TV-VAR. This helps us to disentangle monetary policy from other financial shocks.
Consistent with the identification scheme used in our baseline model we order the NFCI
before the Federal Funds rate and behind GDP growth and GDP deflator inflation. The
NFCI is only published since 1973. We therefore estimate the model over 1973-2012 and
use 1973-1984 as our training sample.2122
Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3.11 show the sum of the contributions of all financial
sector shocks to GDP growth (i.e. shocks to the NFCI and the Federal Funds rate),
and panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3.12 show the contributions of all financial sector
shocks excluding shocks to the Federal Funds rate (i.e. only shocks to the NFCI). The
evolution of the financial sector shock contributions from the baseline TV-VAR and the
TV-VAR which includes the NFCI are quite similar. The NFCI model suggests slightly
less negative financial shock contributions over recession periods, but tracks the Great
Recession also fairly well. Moreover, no significant positive contributions of financial
shocks to GDP growth are found, which is similar to the finding from the baseline TV-
20The set comprises indicators covering interest rate spreads, implied volatility and trading volumes,
equity and bond price measures (capturing volatility and risk premiums, real estate prices, asset-backed
security), survey-based measures of credit availability as well as accounting-based measures for com-
mercial banks and shadow banks.
21For comparability, we re-estimated the baseline TV-VAR also over this shorter sample period, but
results for 1985-2012 from that model remain very similar to those from the baseline TV-VAR estimated
over the long sample period.
22The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago also publishes an adjusted NFCI (which is the NFCI after
removal of macroeconomic influences). We use the unadjusted FCI because macroeconomic influences
are already taken care of in the VAR.
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VAR since the 1990s. In contrast to the baseline results, the NFCI model suggests
that financial shocks have contributed negatively in the late-1980s. This is probably
because stock market developments are given a relatively large, time-constant weight in
the NFCI: the second largest negative loading is associated with the S&P 500 index, and
the 12th largest positive loading with stock market volatility (see Table A1 in Brave and
Butters 2011). By contrast, Figure 3.5 (obtained from our baseline model) shows that
negative contributions from the stock market during this period are fully compensated
by positive contributions from other financial shocks, and especially shocks to credit
spreads.
A final point worthwhile stressing is that, although the NFCI itself points towards
above average financial developments over the post-2008/2009 recession period (see panel
(c) in Figure 1), the contributions of shocks to the NFCI to GDP growth are negative
over this period confirming the finding from our baseline model. As an additional check
we re-estimate a constant parameter VAR with GDP growth, inflation, the NFCI and
the Federal Funds rate. We find that financial conditions, again, make strong negative
contributions at the end of the sample similar to the ones obtained from our baseline TV-
VAR and the alternative TV-VAR presented in this section. Hence, negative financial
shock contributions after the Great Recession can be detected either by considering a
large number of financial variables including ”non-classical” ones, in line with Hatzius,
Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010), or by allowing for time variation in
the parameters in a VAR with a few standard key financial variables.
3.6.3 Further Robustness Checks
Changing the ordering of the variables for shock identification In this section
we carry out several robustness checks. First, we consider two alternative orderings
for the financial variables in the baseline TV-VAR. One is: house price inflation →
Federal Funds rate → credit spread → stock price inflation. This ordering implies
that the Federal Funds rate responds with a delay to shocks to credit spreads and the
stock market, which may be seen as a plausible assumption, given that monetary policy
decisions are typically taken every six weeks (Swiston 2008). The other ordering we
consider is: house price inflation → stock price inflation → credit spread → Federal
Funds rate, i.e. we switch the ordering between stock price inflation and the credit
spread.
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Figures 3.17-3.24 in the Appendix show that our main results are basically unaffected.
The only difference which is worthwhile mentioning is that when we switch the ordering
between credit spreads and stock price inflation, stock price shocks replace credit spread
shocks as second largest financial contributor to the Great Recession (Figure 3.21). This
is not surprising given the high negative correlation between stock price inflation and
credit spreads (and between the residuals of the corresponding equations) over the past
few years (Figures 3.2(b) and 3.14(b)). On the one hand, the time-varying volatility of
stock price shocks looks less plausible with this alternative ordering compared to the
baseline ordering (Figure 3.23). Peaks are not anymore visible around the stock market
crashes. On the other hand, stock market wealth has dropped by 50 percent between
2007Q3 and 2009Q1 (see Hubrich and Tetlow 2012) so that negative stock market wealth
effects cannot be excluded. We leave it for future research to adopt a more sophisticated
identification scheme to better disentangle stock price and credit spread shocks.
Including credit in the model As another robustness check, we introduce real total
credit growth, taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts, in our baseline
TV-VAR.23 This is in order to assess whether the main results obtained so far are
influenced by the fact that we omit a measure of the volume of credit and only use credit
spreads to capture the credit market. One could argue that only a physical cut-back in
credit supply has major effects on the economy.24 We order credit growth after house
price inflation and before credit spreads and otherwise adopt the same ordering as in the
baseline model. Hence, the sum of the contributions of credit growth and credit spread
shocks can be seen as the overall contribution from the credit market. Detailed results
are available upon request, here we only summarize the main findings.
The overall contribution of financial shocks (which now includes the contribution
of credit growth shocks) is almost identical to the baseline one. Thus, in the baseline
model, other shocks seem to have picked up credit growth shock contributions. There is
not much time variation in the transmission or in the volatility of the shocks, and the
contribution of credit growth shocks to the forecast error variance of GDP growth is very
small, never exceeding 5 percent (median estimate), with the exception of peaks in the
23Using business credit or corporate bonds, which are even more closely linked to the corporate bond
spreads, instead of total credit yields very similar results.
24Helbling, Huidrom, Kose, and Otrok (2011), for example, argue that it is important to take into
account the volume of credit to assess the role of credit supply shocks.
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transmission and variance contribution around the S&L crisis and around the housing
and credit boom in the mid-2000s.
Including the oil price in the model As a final check on the robustness of our
findings, we include the growth rate of the real price of oil in our baseline model. It has
been argued that the large increase in oil prices in the run-up to the Global Financial
Crisis has been one contributor to the subsequent strong downturn in economic activity
(Hamilton 2009) and the increase in economic volatility (Clark 2009). We wish to test
whether including the oil price reduces the contribution of financial shocks over that
period or whether other variables have instead already captured exogenous oil price
fluctuations. Again, detailed results are available upon request.
We use as a measure of the oil price the US refiners’ acquisition cost for imported
crude oil, as reported by the Energy Information Administration. That measure is
available from 1974Q1 onwards, and we backdate it using the US producer price index
of crude oil. We deflate the oil price by the US consumer price index. We order oil price
inflation in the macroeconomic block, as previous studies have shown that most of the
oil price movements are due to global demand shocks (Hamilton 2009, Kilian 2009). We
do not attempt to formerly identify specific types of oil shocks, since this is not the focus
here.
Our main results are basically unaffected by this change to the model. Most im-
portantly, the contribution of financial shocks over the Great Recession period is not
diminished by the inclusion of the oil price. Hence, shocks to GDP growth and inflation
have captured oil price shocks in our baseline model.
3.7 Conclusions
We have analyzed the macro-financial linkages in the US based on a Bayesian VAR with
time-varying parameters estimated over 1958-2012. The model includes GDP growth and
inflation as well as a few key financial indicators (credit spreads, the Federal Funds rate,
house and stock prices). It has thus two important features which many of the standard
macro models used in academic research and central banks are, so far, still lacking:
financial variables and time variation in the relationship between the macroeconomy
and the financial sector. We have examined the contributions of financial shocks to
GDP growth and shed light on possible changes in the volatility of financial shocks and
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their impact on GDP growth. We have also compared the outcome of the time-varying
parameter model with that of a constant parameter VAR and a time-varying parameter
VAR where the financial indicators are replaced with the Fed of Chicago’s NFCI.
Our main findings are: (i) Over the Great Recession period, the explanatory power
of financial shocks for GDP growth rose to roughly 50 percent, compared to 20 percent
in normal times. House price shocks were very important in explaining the Great Re-
cession, accounting for about 2/3 of the overall contribution of the financial sector to
GDP growth. The size of house price and credit spread shocks has been larger and the
transmission to growth stronger than previously.
(ii) The slow and weak recovery from the Global Financial Crisis is due to negative
developments in the housing market, probably due to households being still credit con-
straint. The C-VAR does not generate negative financial shock contributions at the end
of the sample period. However, a constant parameter model which includes the Fed of
Chicago’s NFCI, does. This suggests that a model which includes a large number of fi-
nancial variables can also capture the complex dynamic interactions of financial markets
and the macroeconomy, which we pick up by our time-varying parameter model.
(iii) As concerns the pre-Global Financial Crisis period, we detect significantly pos-
itive contributions of credit spread shocks to GDP growth in the mid-1980s, reflecting
the process of financial deregulation. Moreover, we find significantly negative financial
shock contributions around two other banking crises, the Bank Capital Squeeze in the
early-1970s and the Savings and Loan crisis in the late-1980s/early-1990s, due to par-
ticularly large credit spread shocks and credit spread and housing shocks, respectively.
Other financial events, such as the stock market crashes in 1987 and 2001, did not have
significantly negative real effects.
(iv) Finally, the housing sector affects the macroeconomy asymmetrically, with nega-
tive shocks being more important for the macroeconomy than positive shocks. Moreover,
we find a trend increase in the transmission and in the size of housing shocks since the
early-2000s, probably due to a rise in housing wealth and extended mortgage lending.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Overview of Empirical Literature on Time-varying Macro-financial Linkages
 
Study Model Varying params Time variation Financial shocks Identification Period Country/ies Results
Balke VAR Coefficients Threshold Credit GIRFs 1960-1997 US Stronger impact in low credit 
(2000) (4 variables) growth regime.
Calza/Sousa VAR Coefficients Threshold Credit GIRFs 1981-2002 EA Stronger impact in low credit 
(2006) (4 variables) growth regime.
Hollo et al. VAR Coefficients, Threshold Systemic financial Recursive 1987-2011 EA Shock size bigger in stress 
(2012) (2 variables) shock vola stress indicator periods, transmission only 
in stress periods.
Davig/Hakkio VAR Coefficients, Markov Financial stress Recursive 1990-2010 US Stronger and more persistent real
(2010) (2 variables) shock vola switching index effect and larger shock size in
distressed compared to normal regime.
Kaufmann/ VAR Coefficients, Markov Credit, GIRFs 1980-2004 US, EA Changes in the shock size and 
Valderrama (5 variables) shock vola switching equity price transmission.
(2010)
Hubrich/Tetlow VAR Coefficients, Markov Financial stress Recursive 1988-2011 US Shock volatility and coefficients
(2012) (5 variables) shock vola switching index change. The shock size is bigger 
in financial stress periods.
Nason/Tallman VAR Shock vola Markov Credit supply Recursive 1890-2010 US Changes in shock vola, financial 
(2012) (7 variables) switching and demand crisis regime (which includes 
the major wars).
Guerrieri/ VAR Coefficients Dummy House price Recursive 1975-2011 US Decreases in house prices affect
Iacoviello (2 variables) variable consumption more than increases.
(2012) approach
Eickmeier FAVAR Coefficients, Smooth US financial Recursive 1971-2009 9 advanced Gradual increase of the transmission  
et al. (2011) (10 latent and shock vola conditions index countries over time, shock size bigger in 
observed factors) financial crises.
Gambetti/Musso VAR Coefficients, Smooth Credit supply Sign 1980-2010 US, UK, EA Changes in shock volas, increases 
(2012) (5 variables) shock vola restrictions in the transmission in recent years.
Ciccarelli Panel VAR Coefficients Smooth US and Spanish GIRFs 1980-2011 10 advanced No changes in the transmission.
et al. (2012) (7 variables stock price, countries
per country) Swedish credit
Notes: In the VAR applications, which look at shocks to a financial conditions or a financial stress index, the index is counted as
one variable. The indexes are, however, typically formed of a large number of financial variables.
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Figure 3.2: Time Series Plots
(a) Macroeconomic series
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Figure 3.3: Overall contribution of financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR (median
and 1 standard deviation percentiles)
(a) Including shocks to the Federal Funds rate
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Notes: Historical contributions are computed for period 0 as the shock estimate at period 0 times the contemporaneous
impulse response function (IRFs), for period 1 as the shock estimate at period 0 times the IRF at horizon 1 plus the
shock estimate at period 1 times the contemporaneous IRF etc. Thus, the forecast horizon is 0 for the first observation,
1 for the second, . . . and T-1 for the last observation. Red lines: historical contribution of financial sector shocks and
16th and 84th percentiles. Black line: contribution of all shocks (which broadly corresponds to deviations of GDP growth
from its deterministic component). Grey shaded areas indicate recession dates according to the NBER recession dating
committee.
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Figure 3.4: Forecast error variance shares at the 5-year horizon of GDP growth ex-
plained by shocks to all financial variables (median estimates and 1 standard deviation
percentiles)
(a) Including shocks to the Federal Funds rate
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Figure 3.5: Contributions of individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR
(median estimates)
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
 
 
House Prices Credit Spread Stock Prices Federal Funds Rate
Notes: See Figure 2
129
Figure 3.6: Forecast error variance shares of GDP growth at the 5-year horizon explained
by individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR (median estimates and 1
standard deviation percentiles)
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Figure 3.7: Standard deviations of structural shocks estimated from the TV-VAR (me-
dian estimates and 1 standard deviation percentiles)
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Figure 3.8: Impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks estimated from
the TV-VAR (median estimates)
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Figure 3.9: Impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks estimated from the
TV-VAR on average over selected periods (median estimates and 1 standard deviation
percentiles)
(a) Financial crisis vs. non-crisis periods
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(b) Non-crisis periods
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Figure 3.10: Differences of impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks
estimated from the TV-VAR on average over selected periods (median estimates and 1
standard deviation percentiles)
(a) Financial crisis vs. non-crisis periods
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Figure 3.11: Historical Decomposition - TVP-VAR vs. Constant VAR vs. TVP-FCI-
VAR
(a) Median estimates
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(b) TV-VAR with FCI
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Notes: Black: all shocks, Panel (a): red: derived from TV-VAR; green: C-VAR; blue: TV-FCI-VAR (starting in 1984Q3),
Panels (b) and (c): solid red: median; dashed red: 16th and 84th percentiles. See also notes to Figure 2 for more
information.
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3.10 Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure 3.12: Prior (blue) and posterior (black) distributions
(a) Elements of Z
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Figure 3.13: Results of test for convergence of the hyperparameters and the states
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Figure 3.14: Parameter evolution
(a) Autoregressive parameters summed over lags (elements of Bt)
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Figure 3.15: Impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks estimated from
the C-VAR (median estimates and 1 standard deviation percentiles) and from the TV-
VAR on av-erage over the entire period (median estimates)
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Figure 3.16: Contributions of individual financial shocks from the C-VAR (median esti-
mates)
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Figure 3.17: Contributions of individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR
where the ordering in the financial block is: house price inflation → Federal Funds rate
→ credit spread → stock price inflation (median estimates)
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Figure 3.18: Forecast error variance shares of GDP growth at the 5-year horizon ex-
plained by individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR where the ordering
in the financial block is: house price inflation → Federal Funds rate → credit spread →
stock price inflation (median estimates and 1 standard deviation percentiles)
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Figure 3.19: Standard deviations of structural shocks estimated from the TV-VAR where
the ordering in the financial block is: house price inflation→ Federal Funds rate→ credit
spread → stock price inflation (median estimates and 1 standard deviation percentiles)
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Figure 3.20: Figure A.9: Impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks
estimated from the TV-VAR where the ordering in the financial block is: house price
inflation→ Federal Funds rate→ credit spread→ stock price inflation (median estimates
and 1 standard deviation percentiles)
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Figure 3.21: Contributions of individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR
where the ordering in the financial block is: house price inflation→ stock price inflation
→ credit spread → Federal Funds rate(median estimates)
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Figure 3.22: Forecast error variance shares of GDP growth at the 5-year horizon ex-
plained by individual financial shocks estimated from the TV-VAR where the ordering
in the financial block is: house price inflation → stock price inflation → credit spread
→ Federal Funds rate(median estimates)
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Figure 3.23: Standard deviations of structural shocks estimated from the TV-VAR where
the ordering in the financial block is: house price inflation → stock price inflation →
credit spread → Federal Funds rate(median estimates)
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Figure 3.24: Impulse responses of GDP growth to unit financial shocks estimated from
the TV-VAR where the ordering in the financial block is: house price inflation → stock
price inflation → credit spread → Federal Funds rate(median estimates)
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Chapter 4
Financial Frictions and Business
Cycle Volatility
4.1 Introduction
Financial markets have undergone revolutionary structural changes over the last decades.1
Although it has long been reckoned that these changes might have altered the dynamics
of the economy, little is known about their overall effects on the economy.2 An apparently
improved efficacy of financial markets, often associated with deregulation and financial
innovations, has led many to ascribe part of the reduced macroeconomic volatility in the
last decades to a better working financial system (e.g. Boivin and Giannoni 2006). The
main punchline is that changes in the structure of financial markets - due to financial
innovations and deregulation - allowed consumers and firms to better cushion themselves
from macroeconomic shocks; thereby contributing to a more stable economy. The strong
belief in the merits of these structural changes has been expressed very clearly by Alan
Greenspan: ”[...]the growing array of derivatives and the related application of more so-
phisticated methods for measuring and managing risks had been key factors underlying
the remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had recently shrugged off severe
shocks to the economy and the financial system.”3
1Sherman (2009) provides a concise outline of the major regulatory changes over the past three
decades.
2The first detailed treatment of the interplay between evolutions in financial markets and real activity
go back even until Gurley and Shaw (1955)
3Speech given in 2005 at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on
Bank Structure
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Until recently, most observers would have agreed that financial innovations and dereg-
ulation - by reducing financial frictions - contributed to a more stable economy. Indeed,
there are empirical and theoretical arguments supporting this view (among others Cec-
chetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause 2006, Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2006 and Camp-
bell and Hercowitz 2006). This view, however, was shaken by the 2008-2009 Financial
Crises. Instead, what seems to be the general theme today is that deregulations and fi-
nancial innovations increased the vulnerability of the economy to shocks. This changing
belief shows how little is known about the effects of the deregulation process, on the one
hand, and the emergence of new financial products, on the other hand. The aim of this
paper is to enhance our understanding of whether and how these changes affected the
behavior of key macroeconomic variables over time, and whether the perceived benefits
- or disadvantages - of the financial innovation and deregulation process find support in
the data.
The analysis in this paper proceeds in two steps. In the first step I estimate a time-
varying Bayesian VAR (TVP-VAR) featuring stochastic volatilities along the lines of
Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005). The TVP-VAR includes the standard
set of macroeconomic variables: GDP growth, inflation and the Federal Funds rate. I
augment the small scale VAR with two financial variables linking the real economy with
the banking industry: Growth in total business lending and the loan spread. Based
on sign restrictions I identify demand, supply and monetary policy shocks to uncover
potential changes in the transmission of these shocks via the banking system. The
analysis based on the TVP-VAR yields the following main results:
• There has been a strong reduction in the correlations of GDP growth with lending
and the loan spread, respectively. The bulk of the reduction in the correlations
is concentrated in the early 1980s, thus coinciding with the onset of the ’Great
Moderation’.
• The changes in the unconditional correlations can be largely attributed to monetary
policy and non-monetary demand shocks. The correlation of GDP growth with
lending conditional on the monetary policy shock shows a sign switch from positive
values over the 1970s to negative values from the early 1980s onwards. This time
variation in the conditional correlation reflects a sizable change in the response of
loans to expansionary monetary policy shocks: Over the ’Great Inflation’, loans
tend to increase in tandem with GDP, but they tend to move in opposite directions
over the ’Great Moderation’.
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The reduction in the correlation between real activity and the banking variables is
in principle consistent with the idea of a reduction in financial frictions: Financial in-
novations and deregulation, via a reduction in financial frictions, dampened business
cycle volatility by allowing firms to draw on external financing in economic downturns;
consequently there is a reduced comovement between real and financial variables. Using
a different methodological approach, Den Haan and Sterk (2011) and Lozej (2010) also
document a lower comovement between real and financial variables over the ’Great Mod-
eration’ compared to the ’Great Inflation’. The approach taken here, however, allows to
uncover a novel result: The largest part of the reduction takes place sharply in the early
1980s, coinciding with the onset of the ’Great Moderation’.
The TVP-VAR, by its very nature, does not allow to uncover the deep structural
sources of these changes. Specifically, without a fully structural model, it is not possible
to give a definite answer on whether the changes in the correlations and impulse responses
are the result of a reduction in financial frictions, or whether other structural changes
alone can explain the observed time variation. Therefore, in the second step of the
analysis, I go one step further by linking the stylized facts from the TVP-VAR to the
parameters of a DGSE model featuring a financial accelerator mechanism a` la Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). I estimate key parameters of the model by matching the
model impulse responses with those obtained from the TVP-VAR using a procedure
along the lines of Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010). The main findings from
the estimation of the DSGE model can be summarized as follows:
• Consistent with the ’Bad Luck’ hypothesis of the ’Great Inflation’, unusually large
shocks in the 1970s compared to later periods are crucial to explain the recent
macroeconomic performance of the US.
• The ’Great Moderation’ is characterized by a more aggressive monetary policy
response to inflation compared to the ’Great Inflation’. This finding confirms that
the ’Great Inflation’ can be explained, at least partly, by ’Bad Policy’ (e.g. Judd
and Rudebusch 1999, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 2000 and Cogley and Sargent
2005).
• Most importantly, the key parameter governing the importance of the financial
accelerator mechanism, and thus the degree of financial frictions, also exhibits a
substantial amount of time variation. The elasticity of the external finance pre-
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mium with respect to firm leverage is estimated at 0.16 in 1979s. The corresponding
estimate for the year 1997 is significantly smaller and estimated at 0.10.
The results from the estimation of the DSGE model show that the two most prominent
explanations for the ’Great Moderation’, i.e. a reduction in shock sizes and a change in
the conduct of monetary policy, are not sufficient to rationalize the time variation in the
impulse responses. Instead, viewed through the lens of a fully structural model, what is
necessary to explain the time variation is a reduction in the degree of financial frictions.
The results summarized above provide evidence in support of a reduction in financial
frictions over the past decades. The question still open is whether this reduction is due
to market driven financial innovations, or due to some regulatory changes. Although
the present analysis is not designed to give a final answer to this question, a careful
investigation of the timing of the changes in the correlations and impulse responses might
at least give an indication. As stated above, the bulk of movement in the correlations
and impulse responses is concentrated in the early 1980s. And, as will be explained in
more detail below, if the changing financial structure is behind the observed pattern
in correlations and impulse responses over time, then the regulatory changes of the
early 1980s are likely to be the reason for these changes. By contrast, market driven
innovations and the regulatory changes of the 1990s did - if at all - only marginally
contribute to the stability of the economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the TVP-VAR and
the approach to the identification of shocks. In Section 4.3 I present the evidence on
time variation from the TVP-VAR. Section 4.4 discusses the estimation of the DSGE
model and presents the estimation results obtained for selected periods of the sample.
In Section 4.5 I discuss and interpret the results in light of outside evidence. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 A Time-varying Parameter VAR
The analysis departs from a m-dimensional vector Yt, which includes output growth,
inflation, growth in commercial and industrial loans, the loan spread (defined as the
bank prime lending rate less the Federal Funds rate) and the Federal Funds rate. All
variables have been transformed to non-annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates by
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taking log-first differences of the level variables, except of the loan spread and the Federal
Funds rate which enter in levels. The sample period extends from 1951Q3 to 2008Q2.4
I assume that Yt follows a time varying parameter VAR(p) model:
Yt =B′tXt+ut, E(ut) = 0, E(utu′t) = Σt, (4.2.1)
with B′t a (m× 1 +mp) coefficient matrix and Xt a (1 +mp× 1) vector containing a
constant and two lags of Yt. I further define bt = vec(Bt), and assume that bt evolves
according to a driftless random walk:
bt = bt−1 +ηt, ηt ∼N(0,Q),
Q being a positive definite matrix. Following standard practice, as e.g. in Cogley and
Sargent (2005), I impose a stability constraint on the time-varying parameters to enforce
stationarity of the system. That is, I include an indicator function that rejects those
draws for which the roots of the associated VAR polynomial lie inside the unit circle.
Moreover, we have:
Σt = A−1t HtA−1
′
t . (4.2.2)
The matrix At is lower triangular, with ones on the main diagonal and containing in
the below diagonal elements the contemporaneous relations aij,t between the variables
in the model. The matrix Ht is a diagonal matrix containing the reduced form stochastic
volatilities hi,t of the innovations to the VAR.
Both the contemporaneous relations aij,t and the innovations’ volatilities hi,t are
allowed to drift over time. Following Primiceri (2005) we collect the diagonal elements
of Ht in the vector ht = [h1,t,h2,t,h3,t,h4,t,h5,t,h6,t]′, and assume that
lnht = lnht−1 +vt, vt ∼N(0,Z),
Z being a diagonal matrix. Similarly,
at = at−1 + τt, τt ∼N(0,S),
4Unconventional monetary policy and a binding zero lower bound after mid-2008 impedes the use
standard identification restrictions on monetary policy shocks. I therefore do not extend the sample to
the most recent periods.
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with at being constructed by row-wise stacking of the non-zero and non-one elements of
the matrix At, namely, at = [a21,t,a31,t,a32,t, ...,a54,t]′, and S being a positive definite,
block diagonal matrix.
I estimate the model using a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algorithm as ex-
plained in Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005) or Benati (2008). The MCMC
algorithm simulates the joints posterior distribution by sequentially drawing from the
conditional distributions, which all have familiar form (see e.g. Cogley and Sargent 2005,
Primiceri 2005 or Benati 2008). After a sufficiently long period of ”burn-in draws”, which
I set to 75,000, the sequence of draws from the conditional densities converges in distri-
bution to the desired joint distribution. In order to reduce the autocorrelation in the
simulated draws I draw 25,000 values from the target distribution keeping only every
10th draw to ascertain randomness.
4.2.2 Identification of Structural Shocks
I identify aggregate supply, aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks using sign
restrictions in the spirit of Faust (1998), Canova and de Nicolo (2003) and Uhlig (2005).
I implement the sign restrictions following the procedure suggested by Rubio-Ramı´rez,
Waggoner, and Zha (2010) (see also Benati and Mumtaz 2007). Specifically, let Σt =
PtDtP
′
t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the time-varying reduced form
variance-covariance matrix of the VAR. Further, let Aˆ0t ≡ PtD1/2t , and Ω be a 5× 5
random matrix drawn from an independent standard normal distribution. The QR
decomposition of Ω delivers Ω =QR. The time-varying impact matrix of the structural
shocks is then computed as A¯t0 = Aˆ0tQ′. If the impulse responses generated by the
impact matrix A¯t0 satisfy the sign restrictions, I keep the matrix, otherwise I discard it.
I keep drawing from the random matrix Ω until I obtain an impact matrix which satisfies
all sign restrictions simultaneously. This procedure is repeated for each draw from the
posterior distribution and for each point in time t.
I use standard identification restrictions which can be derived from the most com-
monly used DSGE models, and also from the structural DSGE model laid out in Section
4.4. Specifically, contractionary monetary policy shocks increase the Federal Funds rate
and reduce prices and output. The loan spread increases in tandem with the monetary
policy rate. Aggregate demand shocks are the only shocks which move output, prices,
the loan spread and the Federal Funds rate in the same direction. Finally, aggregate
supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions, and the Federal Funds rate
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in the same direction as prices. All sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the first
four quarters after the shock. The identifying restrictions are summarized in Table 4.1.
A few explanatory notes concerning the restrictions on the banking variables are in
order: The positive reaction of the loan spread after aggregate demand and monetary
policy shocks is derived from the financial accelerator model used in Section 4.4. In
this DSGE model with financial frictions, the external finance premium - the theoretical
counterpart to the empirical loan spread - increases after contractionary monetary pol-
icy shocks and expansionary non-monetary demand shocks (e.g. government spending
shocks). Next, note that I do not restrict the loan volume to follow any pre-specified
scheme. There are two reasons for this choice: First, in order to test the hypothesis of
a reduction in financial frictions, I want to be as least restrictive on the loan volume
as possible. Leaving the loan response unrestricted, I let the data speak freely concern-
ing any changes in the dynamic interrelation between loans and other macroeconomic
variables. Second, given that the restrictions I impose are sufficient to disentangle the
macroeconomic shocks, restrictions on the response of loans are simply not needed.
Finally, the VAR contains five variables, hence there are two additional shocks which
drive the dynamics of the system. I do not try to identify all structural shocks. The sign
restrictions imposed are sufficient to uniquely identify supply, demand and monetary
policy shocks. The two unidentified shocks will pick up all other shocks hitting the
economy (e.g. house price or financial shocks), to the extent that these shocks are not
already captured by the identified shocks. As such, leaving two of the shocks unrestricted
acts as a buffer mechanism and minimizes concerns due to potential omitted variables
biases (see Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa 2007 for a similar discussion).5
5In order to make sure that the unrestricted shocks do not lead to the same behavior of the variables
as the three identified shocks, I impose the additional requirement that the remaining two shocks do
not have the same properties as the three identified shocks. Strictly speaking, the unrestricted shocks
are therefore not unrestricted but restricted not to be aggregate supply, aggregate demand or monetary
policy shocks.
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4.3 Evidence from the TVP-VAR
4.3.1 Unconditional Moments
I start by presenting some unconditional second moments in Figure 4.1.6 Panel (a) and
(b) of Figure 4.1 present the medians of the posterior distribution of the unconditional
GDP growth-lending correlation and GDP growth-loan spread correlation. Alongside the
correlations I also plot the unconditional volatility of GDP growth. The time-varying
variance-covariance matrix of the variables in the VAR, from which I derive the volatility
and correlations, is computed using a second-moment counterpart of the Beverage-Nelson
trend as shown in Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010).7 I focus on the volatility and
correlations of GDP growth because this variable is generally used as reference indicator
for studying structural changes in the economy (see e.g. Gali and Gambetti 2009).
Concerning the volatility of GDP, its evolution over time is similar to the one pre-
sented elsewhere (e.g. Gali and Gambetti 2009 or Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent 2010).
The volatility is highly elevated in the 1970s, i.e. during the time of the ’Great Inflation’.
Starting in the early 1980s - coinciding with the beginning of the Volcker disinflation
period - the GDP growth volatility falls dramatically. After a short time period, the
volatility is more than 3 times smaller compared to its peak values at the beginning of
the 1980s.
Moving to the time-varying unconditional correlations, panel (a) presents the corre-
lation between GDP growth and lending. The figure depicts a pronounced downward
trend in the correlation. Between 1967 and 1980, the correlation of GDP growth with
lending averaged slightly below 0.3. There are two spikes in the correlation occurring
around 1975 and 1980, coinciding with the two large recessions during the ’Great Infla-
tion’. From the year 1980 onwards this correlation then sharply drops within a couple of
quarters to values below 0.15, remaining at these lower values from then on. A similar
picture can be observed for the correlation of GDP growth with the loan spread in panel
(b), although the changes are less pronounced. Over the ’Great Inflation’, the GDP
6All results are based on a sample of 500 draws, randomly selected from the 2500 draws generated
by the MCMC algorithm described above.
7For this, let zt+1 = µt+Φtzt+z,t be the companion form of the VAR, then the variance-covariance
matrix of zt+1 is given by var(zt+1) =
∑∞
h=0(Φht )var(z,t)(Φht )′. The infinite sum represents the solution
to a discrete-time Lyapunov equation which can be solved using the Matlab function dlyap.m or
a ’doubling algorithm’ as explained e.g. in Anderson and Moore (1979)[pp. 158-160] or Anderson,
McGrattan, Hansen, and Sargent (1996).
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growth-loan spread correlation takes large negative values around -0.45 but experiences
a strong reduction (in absolute terms) to values around -0.23 in the early 1980s. Mirror
imaging the GDP growth-lending correlation, there are pronounced spikes around the
years 1975 and 1980. The GDP growth-loan spread correlation shows a pronounced drop
occurring in the second half of the 1990s. The reduction in the correlation initiated in
the second half of the 1990s continues until the end of the sample. At the end of the
sample period the unconditional correlation between GDP growth and the loan spread
is around -0.5 and thus close to the large negative values of the 1970s.
The results for the unconditional correlations provide first evidence for fundamental
changes in the relation between the real economy and the banking system. The reduc-
tion in the correlation between GDP growth and lending is consistent with the finding
reported in Den Haan and Sterk (2011) and provides a first indication in favor of a reduc-
tion in financial frictions. The approach taken here, however, allows to uncover a novel
result: The largest part of the reduction takes place sharply in the early 1980s, coincid-
ing with the pronounced drop in the volatility of GDP growth. However, the analysis so
far does not allow to distinguish whether this pattern is the result of a structural change
in the economy or whether some shocks, inducing a specific correlation, have merely
become more or less important over time. I therefore now turn to the inspection of the
conditional correlations and the impulse response analysis.
4.3.2 Structural Evidence
Conditional Correlations
Figure 4.2 presents the correlations between the main variables conditional on the three
identified shocks. The correlation of GDP growth with lending and the loan spread,
conditional on supply (red dotted line), demand (blue dashed lines) and monetary policy
shocks (black solid line), are shown in panel (a) and (b) of Figure 4.2, respectively.
Starting with the conditional correlation between GDP growth and lending in panel
(a) of Figure 4.2 it is readily apparent that supply and demand shocks are not the main
drivers of the observed changes in the unconditional correlation uncovered in the previous
section. Both conditional correlations fluctuate around their average values without any
tendency to increase or decrease substantially. By contrast, the correlation conditional
on the monetary policy shock exhibits a pattern which fits well the time variation in
the unconditional correlation. With a few exceptions the correlation conditional on the
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monetary policy shock takes on positive values over the entire 1970s. In the early 1980s
the correlation experiences a substantial drop from its positive peak in 1981 of nearly
0.60 to around -0.40 in 1986. From then on, this conditional correlation remains negative,
hovering around values of -0.35. Hence, the observed drop in the unconditional GDP
growth-lending correlation can be attributed entirely to a changing comovement induced
by monetary policy shocks.
The conditional correlation of GDP growth with the loan spread shown in panel (b)
of Figure 4.2 tell a similar story. The correlation conditional on supply shocks exhibits
large fluctuations around its average value of roughly 0. Consequently, this conditional
correlation often switches signs from positive to negative values and back, without clear
pattern over time which could explain the time variation in the corresponding uncon-
ditional correlation. The correlations conditional on the demand and monetary policy
shocks show a similar evolution over time: a marked increase in the early 1980s, a period
of a rather low comovement between 1984 and around 1998, followed by a pronounced
drop at the end of the sample period. For the correlation conditional on the demand
shock the reduction observed at the end of the sample is so pronounced that the corre-
lation exceeds (in absolute terms) the one observed in the 1970s.
The analysis of the conditional correlations has shown some substantial time variation
in the comovement between the real economy and the banking variables. Furthermore,
the time variation in the conditional correlations indicates that ’Bad Luck’ alone, re-
flecting exceptionally large shocks, cannot be the only underlying reason for the elevated
macroeconomic volatility of the 1970s. Instead, the results point towards the existence
of some ’true’ structural changes in the economy. Obviously, the time variation in the
conditional correlations must be driven by similar changes in the dynamic comovement
between the variables. In the next section I will therefor briefly discuss the impulse
responses to the identified shocks.
Impulse Response Analysis
The analysis of the conditional correlations has revealed that much of the changes in
the comovement between the real economy and the banking sector can be attributed to
monetary policy and demand shocks. In the following I will therefore only present the
impulse responses of the variables to these two shocks.
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5 show the medians of the posterior distribution of the impulse
responses of all variables to a one standard deviation monetary policy and demand
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shock, respectively. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.6 present the median impulse responses
together with the one standard deviation probability bands at each point in time for
three selected horizons. The impulse responses of GDP growth, inflation and lending
have been accumulated and are shown in levels.8
As expected, the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks reveal a considerable
amount of time variation (Figure 4.3). We observe a positive reaction of GDP, which
is large and displays substantial persistence in the 1970s. The magnitude of the effect,
however, decreases dramatically with the beginning of the 1980s and remains subdued
from then on. A similar pattern over time is also visible in the response of loans.
However, different from the GDP response, the loan response switches signs at medium
and longer horizons. This pattern is even more visible in Figure 4.4. The plot shows that
on impact the loan response is negative throughout the entire sample period. During
the 1970s the medium and long run responses of loans turn positive while they remain
negative for the period after the early 1980s. The sign switch in the impulse responses
at medium/longer horizons materializes within a few quarters and coincides with the
more muted response of output to the monetary policy shock. Hence, the observed sign
switch in the correlation conditional on monetary policy shocks between GDP growth
and lending uncovered above is the result of a substantial change in the behavior of loans
in response to monetary policy shocks.
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show that over the 1970s, a one standard deviation demand
shock triggers a pronounced increase in the short and medium run in GDP and Prices.
Mirror imaging the effects after monetary policy shocks, in the early 1980s this pattern
changes to a much more muted price and output response. The most striking changes
are however observable in the response of lending. During the entire 1970s, loans do
hardly change at all in the short and medium run. Based on the median estimate the
response of loans to a demand shock in the 1970s is, if anything, to slightly decrease
in the medium run. Comparable to the behavior of loans following a monetary policy
shock, at the beginning of the 1980s this pattern changes. Based on the median estimate,
the response of loans switches signs and becomes positive in the medium term, with the
positive effect gradually increasing until the most recent period.
Finally, note that the substantially larger impact effects of monetary policy and
demand shocks on GDP and Prices during the 1970s indicate that at least part of the
8Note that the impulse response functions are subject to a good amount of econometric uncertainty.
Unfortunately, this is a common feature of the very highly parameterized TVP-VARs. For the remainder
of the discussion I will therefore concentrate on the median estimates of the impulse responses.
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’Great Inflation’ can be attributed to larger shocks. Hence, the results from the impulse
response analysis are consistent with the ’Bad Luck’ hypothesis of the ’Great Inflation’,
and are in line with a series of work using a similar methodological framework, e.g. Benati
and Mumtaz (2007) and Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2007). However, changing shock
sizes alone cannot explain the time variation in the conditional correlations and the
changing comovement of the impulse responses of the variables. Instead, these results
point toward ’true’ structural changes in the economy, which will be examined more
formally in the next section.
4.4 Evidence from a DSGE Model with Financial Frictions
The preceding analysis has revealed a number of results supporting the view that struc-
tural changes in the banking industry affected the dynamics of the US economy. However,
only a fully structural model allows to reveal whether the observed changes in the im-
pulse responses are consistent with a reduction in financial frictions over the last decades.
Therefor, in order to move beyond the stylized facts produced by the TVP-VAR, I use
a standard DSGE model featuring financial frictions to investigate whether the time
variation in the VAR impulse responses can be mapped into changes in some structural
parameters of the model. In doing so, I estimate a number of key parameters of the
model for specific periods by matching the impulse responses from the TVP-VAR with
the impulse responses from the DSGE model. To estimate the model, I use a variant of
the Bayesian impulse response matching approach introduced by Christiano, Trabandt,
and Walentin (2010).
The Model
I use a version of the canonical New Keynesian DSGE model as presented in Smets and
Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). To introduce a non-trivial role for financial market friction, I extended the
model with the financial accelerator mechanism along the lines of Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). Since the model is well known, I present only the log-linearized
version of the model that is estimated. The presentation of the model closely follows
De Graeve (2008).
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From the household sector optimization conditions it is possible to derive the follow-
ing equation describing the evolution of aggregate consumption Ct:
Ct =
h
1 +hCt−1 +
1
1 +hEtCt+1 +
σc−1
(1 +λw)(1 +h)
σc(Lt−EtLt+1)− 1−h1 +hσc (rt−Etpit+1).
This consumption equation stems from a utility function non-separable in consumption
Ct and labor Lt, featuring external habit persistence h. The parameter σc captures the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, rt−Etpit+1 is the ex-post real
interest rate, and λw represents the equilibrium wage markup which derives from the
households monopoly power over the supply of its labor.
Household labor supply is differentiated and households act as price setters in the
labor market. I assume that the wage setting process is subject to Calvo-style wage
setting rigidities. Specifically, in each period t the probability that the household can
change its nominal wage is constant and given by 1− ξw. The remaining wages which
are not adjusted are partially indexed to past inflation. The degree of partial wage
indexation is governed by the parameter γw. When γw = 0 there is no indexation and
wages which are not adjusted remain constant; with γw = 1 indexation to past inflation
is perfect. These assumptions give rise to the following equation describing the dynamics
of nominal wages wt:
wt =
β
1 +βEtwt+1 +
1
1 +βwt−1 +
β
1 +βEtpit+1−
1 +βγw
1 +β pit+
γw
1 +βpit−1
− (1−βξw)(1− ξw)1 +β(1 + (1 +λw)σl/λw)ξw (wt−σlLt−
σc
1−h(Ct−hCt−1))
with β denoting the household’s discount factor and σl the inverse of the household’s
elasticity of labor supply to the wage rate.
The final consumption good is produced in a perfectly competitive market by com-
bining the output of intermediate good firms. A Cobb-Douglas production function
augmented with variable capital utilization costs relates total supply to labor Lt and
capital services Kt:
Yt = αKt−1 +
α
ψ
rkt + (1−α)Lt
with α denoting the capital share in the production process, ψ is the elasticity of the
capital utilization cost function to capital, and rkt represents the real rental rate of capital.
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Aggregated labor demand is given by the following standard labor demand function,
which is decreasing in wages and increasing in the rental rate of capital:
Lt =−wt+
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
rkt +Kt−1.
Each intermediate good producer has monopoly power in the goods market and acts
as a price setter. Similar to the labor market, firms are subject to Calvo-style rigidities
in adjusting their prices. In each period, the probability that the firm can change its
price is constant and given by 1−ξp. The remaining prices are partially indexed to past
inflation. The degree of partial price indexation is governed by the parameter γp. This
setup generates the following New Keynesian Phillips curve extended to include price
indexation:
pit =
β
1 +βγp
Etpit+1 +
γp
1 +βγp
pit−1 +
1
1 +βγp
(1−βξp)(1− ξp)
ξp
(αrkt + (1−α)wt)
Capital producers work in a perfectly competitive market. Increasing the supply of
capital by changing the flow of investment (It) is costly.
The evolution of the capital stock is standard and given by:
Kt = (1− τ)Kt−1 + τIt−1,
with τ denoting the depreciation rate of capital.
The investment trajectory derived from the capital producer’s optimization condi-
tion implies that the current period investment decision depends on past and future
investment, and on the value of already installed capital qt
It =
1
1 +β It−1 +
β
1 +βEtIt+1 +
1
φ(1 +β)qt
where φ is the parameter governing the cost of adjusting investments.
Entrepreneurs buy the entire capital stock from the capital producers at a given
price qt and use this capital in production at time t+1. The corresponding q−equation
is given by
EtR
k
t+1 =
(1− τ)
R
k
Etqt+1 +
(Rk−1 + τ)
R
k
Etr
k
t+1− qt;
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where Rk denotes the steady state return to capital.
In order to buy the capital stock kt valued at qt, entrepreneurs can draw on internal
net worth nt. However, I assume that entrepreneurs net worth is not sufficient to buy
the entire capital stock. Consequently, entrepreneurs must turn to banks to finance the
residual part of QtKt−Nt with bank loans Lt. Hence, in each period entrepreneurs
borrow one period loans lt according to:(
K
N
−1
)
lt =
K
N
(qt+kt)−nt,
where KN denotes the steady state capital-to-net worth ratio.
So far, the model presented is basically identical to a standard DSGE model without
financial friction. However, following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the pres-
ence of financial frictions - reflecting a costly-state verification problem between firms
and banks - imply that entrepreneurs face an external finance premium st that drives a
wedge between the expected return on capital and the risk free rate:
st ≡ EtRkt+1− (rt−Etpit+1) =−Et(nt+1− qt−kt+1).
The key parameter governing the importance of the costly-state verification problem is
given by  which measures the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect
to firm leverage.
Entrepreneurial net worth nt accumulates according to
nt+1 = γR
k
(
K
N
(Rkt −Et−1Rkt ) +Et−1Rkt +nt
)
where γ denotes the entrepreneurial survival rate.
The standard goods market equilibrium stipulates that
Yt = cyCt+ τkyIt+ gt
where cy and ky denote the steady state ratio of consumption and capital to output, and
gt is an exogenous AR(1) shock process 
g
t = ρg
g
t−1 +u
g
t representing a demand shock
(potentially initiated by a government spending shock).
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The model is closed by a standard Taylor-rule monetary policy reaction function:
rt = ρrt−1 + (1−ρ)(rpipit+ ryYt) + r∆Y (Yt−Yt−1)− r.
The parameter ρ represents the smoothing parameter, rpi and ry are the reaction parame-
ters to inflation and the output gap, respectively. The parameter r∆Y can be interpreted
as a speed limit. Finally, r represents an exogenous i.i.d policy shock.
Impulse Response Matching
In order to investigate the quantitative implications of the DSGE model values must
be assigned to the structural parameters of the model. The parameters of the models
are split into two groups. The first group consists of parameters which I assume to be
constant over time and which are calibrated at fixed values. The second group consists
of parameters which are allowed to change over time. To obtain values for the time-
varying parameters the model impulse responses are matched with the VAR impulse
responses at different times. I focus on two different periods, the fourth quarters of 1979
and 1997, representing respectively the ’Great Inflation’ and the ’Great Moderation’.
The procedure used to match the DSGE and VAR impulse responses is a close variant
of the limited information Bayesian impulse response matching approach of Christiano,
Trabandt, and Walentin (2010).
Specifically, denote the vectors containing the VAR impulse responses to the mon-
etary policy and demand shock with φˆmp and φˆd. Each vector contains the dynamic
responses of the five variables for a horizon of 28 quarters. The dimension of each
vector is thus (140× 1). Denote the vector stacking both impulse response vectors as
φˆ= (φˆ′mp φˆ′d)′ which has dimension (280×1). Given that the number of observations T
in φˆ is large, classical asymptotic sampling theory states that:
√
T (φˆ−φ(θ0)) a∼N(0,W (θ0, ζ)),
where θ0 represents the true values of the parameters that are estimated, φ(θ0) the re-
spective model impulse responses and ζ contains the true values of the shock parameters
that are in the model which are however not formally included in the empirical analy-
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sis (see Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin 2010). The asymptotic distribution of the
vector φˆ can be expressed in the following way:
φˆ
a∼N
(
φ(θ0),
W (θ0, ζ)
T
)
.
The next step of the analysis consists in choosing a value of θ that produces model
impulse responses as close as possible to the VAR impulse responses. For this, I treat
φˆ as data and define the approximate likelihood of the data as a function of the model
parameters θ:
f(φˆ|θ) =
( 1
2pi
)T
2
∣∣∣∣∣W (θ0, ζ)T
∣∣∣∣∣
− 12
× exp
−12
(
φˆ−φ(θ)
)′(W (θ0, ζ)
T
)−1 (
φˆ−φ(θ)
) .
The value of W (θ0,ζ)/T in the likelihood function is treated as fixed. Following Hofmann,
Peersman, and Straub (2012) I assume W (θ0,ζ)/T to be diagonal. The elements on the
diagonal consist of the variances of the posterior distribution of the impulse responses for
each horizon. Specified in this way, the weighting matrix W (θ0,ζ)/T attaches less weight
to those impulse responses which are estimated less precisely.
Treating the function f(φˆ|θ) as the likelihood of the empirical impulse responses φˆ
and applying Bayes Theorem, it follows that the Bayesian posterior of the parameters
of the model θ conditional on the empirical impulse responses φˆ is given by
f(θ|φˆ) = f(φˆ|θ)p(θ)
f(φˆ)
.
The marginal data density is given by f(φˆ) and the priors on θ are denoted by p(θ). The
mode of the posterior distribution of θ can be computed by simply maximizing the value
of the numerator of the posterior of θ, since the denominator is not a function of θ.
The main difference between the approach take here and the method described in
Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) is that the Bayesian TVP-VAR does not
produce a point estimate which could be used as single data vector φˆ. Instead, the TVP-
VAR produces 500 different impulse responses which all satisfy the sign restrictions. As
an alternative, I follow Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub (2012) who propose to compute
the posterior mode for each of the 500 impulse responses and to report the resulting
posterior distribution of the modes.
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Results
Table 4.2 reports the values of the parameters which are treated as fixed. The parameters
are taken from the existing literature and are pretty standard. See, for instance, Smets
and Wouters (2007), De Graeve (2008) and Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (forth.). I also
experimented with allowing for time variation in some of the calibrated parameters.
Although some parameters exhibit significant time variation (especially the price and
wage indexation parameters), the main results presented in this section were not affected.
In order to keep the number of results small and the section focused on the main point,
I present only the results from the exercise with time variation in the monetary policy
rule, the shock processes and the financial frictions parameter.
Table 4.3 presents the priors of the parameters which are used to match the empirical
impulse responses. I report the prior density with the corresponding mean and standard
deviation, and the admissible parameter range. The priors are specified in a way which
is consistent with the previous literature (see De Graeve 2008, Gilchrist, Ortiz, and
Zakrajsek 2009 and Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub 2012). I allow for time variation
in the shock processes, i.e. in the standard deviation of the monetary policy and the
demand shock, and the autoregressive parameter of the demand shock. This takes into
account that time variation in the shock sizes is a crucial feature of the last decades.
Furthermore, in order to account for the changing conduct of monetary policy (see
e.g. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 2000), I allow for time variation in the monetary policy
rule. Following Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) and Hofmann, Peersman,
and Straub (2012), I restrict the inflation reaction parameter to be strictly greater than
one. This rules out the possibility of indeterminate solutions of the model. Finally,
to account for the hypothesis that structural changes in the banking industry reduced
financial frictions, I allow the elasticity of the external finance premium to firm leverage
() to be time-varying. The higher the parameter , the more reactive the external finance
premium to variations in the balance sheet of borrowers. Observing a reduction in this
parameter over time can therefore be interpreted as a reduction in financial frictions.
In Figure 7 I present the distribution of the model implied impulse responses for
the two periods. Alongside the model impulse responses, I also plot the corresponding
VAR impulse responses. Comparing the model and the VAR impulse responses shows
that the DSGE model is quite successful in reproducing the evidence from the VAR.
There are only two exceptions. First, the loan response in 1979 shows that the DSGE
model is not flexible enough to reproduce the positive reaction of loans to the monetary
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policy shock at shorter horizons. However, after around 8 to 10 quarters the model
implied loan response turns positive and the probability bands overlap with those from
the VAR. Second, the model impulse response of the loan spread in 1997 is more muted
following the demand shock. In all other cases, the probability bands of the model
impulse responses overlap with those from the TVP-VAR, nearly at all horizons. This
is reassuring and suggests that the DSGE model is a reasonable approximation to the
data.
In the last two columns of Table 4.3 I summarize the results from the impulse response
matching procedure concerning the estimated parameters. Comparing the distributions
of the stochastic shock processes, a clear story emerges. Both, monetary policy and de-
mand shocks are estimated to be significantly larger over the ’Great Inflation’ compared
to the ’Great Moderation’. Based on the median estimate, the size of the monetary policy
shock (demand shock) drops from a value of 0.45 (1.00) in 1979 to only 0.045 (0.21) in
1997. Hence, the results from the impulse response matching exercise document clearly
what is now common wisdom: While the ’Great Moderation’ can be characterized as a
period in which the economy was hit by relatively small shocks, the ’Great Inflation’ is,
at least partly, triggered by unusually large shocks. The results for the shock processes
therefor support a large literature suggesting that ’Bad Luck’, in the sense of a series
of relatively large shocks hitting the economy, contributed to the very volatile behavior
of the US economy in the 1970s (see e.g. Benati and Mumtaz 2007, Justiniano and
Primiceri 2008 and Canova and Gambetti 2009).
Concerning the monetary policy rule, we observe that there is significant movement
in the reaction parameters to inflation and the output gap. First, the reaction to the
output gap is significantly larger in the 1970s compared to later periods. A tentative
explanation for this results is that the VAR impulse responses capture the systematic
overestimation of the output gap in the 1970s (see Orphanides 2001). The model seems
to interpret this as stronger reaction to the output gap. Second, in 1979 the inflation
reaction parameter is estimated to be around 1.12, which is significantly smaller than
the corresponding value of 1.48 in 1997. The pattern of time variation in the inflation
reaction parameter supports the second main hypothesis towards explaining the ’Great
Inflation’, i.e. ’Bad Policy’. According to e.g. Judd and Rudebusch (1999) and Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000), erratic monetary policy, by reacting too little to inflation,
contributed to the very volatile nature of the economy in the 1970s.
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Most importantly for the present analysis, the parameter representing the degree of
financial friction - the elasticity of the external finance premium to firm leverage - also
changes significantly over time. In 1979 the median value of the parameter is given by
0.16, compared to a significantly smaller value of 0.10 in 1997. These values are both
within the parameter range reported in De Graeve (2008); the value in 1979 however at
the very upper end. The value of 0.10 in 1997 is close to the median value reported in
De Graeve (2008) and somewhat larger than the estimates in Christensen and Dib (2008)
and Meier and Mu¨ller (2006). Note that in both periods the amount of information in the
likelihood function about this parameter is substantial: In 1997, the size of the posterior
one standard deviation probability band is only around half the size of the corresponding
prior probability band; in 1979 it is even only one-fifth.9
The results from the model estimation show that the time variation in the VAR im-
pulse responses are mapped into a more muted structural response of the banking system
to changes in the balance sheet of borrowers in the DSGE model. This indicates that
the time variation uncovered by the TVP-VAR is indeed consistent with a reduction in
financial frictions over the last decades. Furthermore, the evidence presented in this sec-
tion also shows that the most prominent explanations for the recent US macroeconomic
history alone are not sufficient to explain the time variation in the impulse responses:
Although the model ascribes part of the movement in the impulse responses to changes
in shock sizes and changes in the conduct of monetary policy, it also pushes for a reduc-
tion in financial frictions in order to explain the changing behavior of the macroeconomy
over time.
4.5 A Narrative Account of the Observed Changes
The estimation of the DSGE model suggests that the reduction in financial frictions,
potentially caused by structural changes in the financial industry, is an important element
in the list of structural changes experienced by the U.S. economy. The question remaining
is whether the observed changes can be linked to historical events related to financial
markets. The two most important changes which come to mind are regulatory changes
and the process of market induced financial innovation over the last decades.
9The prior one standard deviation bounds implied by a beta distribution with mean 0.05 and standard
deviation 0.025 are given by [0.026;0.074].
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In Figure 8 I plot the effective Federal Funds rate together with the interest rate
ceilings imposed by Regulation Q on the four most important deposit accounts. The
plot makes clear that the 1970s is a period during which banks were heavily constrained
in their interest rate decisions. Most strikingly, the periods in which the Federal Funds
rate strongly exceeds the ceilings on deposit rates (1974/1975 and in the late 1970s/early
1980s) coincide well with the stylized facts uncovered by the VAR analysis: Around
1974/75 as well as in the late 1970s/early 1980s the correlation of lending and the
loan spread with economic activity soured to their record heights. These periods also
exhibit the strongest transmission of demand and monetary policy shocks to lending, and,
although to a lower extend, to prices and output. Although for some deposit accounts
(large time deposits) interest rate ceilings were removed already in 1973, small saving
and deposit accounts remained constrained and it is possible that these constraints were
partly responsible for the increasing comovement of the banking variables with economic
activity.10
If binding interest rate constraints contributed to the strong comovement and shock
transmission, why do we observe the changes in these statistics in the early 1980s al-
though Regulation Q was active until 1986? An possible explanation is the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act (GSGDIA) of 1982. Faced with large outflows of
savings balances from banks to money market funds, the GSGDIA authorized banks to
offer two ceiling free accounts: the Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA) and the
Super NOW account. These two accounts proved to be very popular, attracting more
that $400 billion to banks within the first year (see Morris and Walter 1998). The flexi-
bility brought by this regulatory changes has very likely alleviated some problems causes
by the binding interest rate ceiling on savings and deposits account.
The second landmark decision in the deregulation process is the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980. Besides increasing
deposit insurance from $40.000 to $100.000 and providing for the gradual phase-out of
Regulation Q, the DIDMCA implemented a uniform reserve requirement for all deposi-
tory institutions to ensure the Federal Reserve’s ability to conduct monetary policy. The
uniform reserve requirement was a reaction to a wave of withdrawals of member banks
from the Federal Reserve System (for a discussion see FDIC 1997 and the literature
therein).
10In fact, the impact of the binding constraints was felt most by smaller banks that depended more
heavily on small retailed deposits as opposed to larger banks which were able to partly offset the
Regulation Q constraints via large-denomination CDs (DeYoung 2007).
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The above discussion suggests that the stylized facts revealed above can be linked
relatively well to the financial deregulation process of the early 1980s. By contrast,
relating the sharp and permanent changes in the shock transmission and correlations to
the introduction of new financial products is more difficult. The effects of new financial
products are likely felt only gradually with the dissemination of the innovation in the
economy. This is visualized in Figure 9, plotting the percentage of loans securitized
relative to total loans outstanding for different loan categories.11 The figure shows
that securitization of business loans started to grow rapidly only from the mid 1990s
onwards. In 1989 only a mere 0.1% of all outstanding commercial and industrial loans
were securitized. Hence, securitization in the business loan segment alone can hardly be
one of the underlying forces responsible for the structural changes at the beginning of
the 1980s. Still, securitization of other loan categories had potentially positive spillovers
to business lending. One candidate for this explanation is securitization of single-familiy
home mortgages. Indeed, the share of securitized home mortgages started to grow fast
from around 1981 onwards. However, the observed changes in the correlations and
in the shock propagation via the banking sector have been very quick and sharpe. The
increasing use of mortgage securitzation, by contrast, appears to be a much more gradual
phenomenon. Hence, for this hypothesis to be more convincing, the transition to a ”high
securitizing financial system” should have been more instantaneous.
4.6 Conclusion
The emergence of new and more sophisticated financial product and the deregulation
of the financial industry over the past decades has often been associated with a more
robust financial system. Furthermore, many argued that these financial innovations had
beneficial effects for the real economy by reducing the extent of financial frictions in
the economy. The 2008-2009 financial crisis has fundamentally changed the perception
about these developments. In this paper, I have explored to what extend aggregate data
informs us about the contribution of changes in the financial system to the stability of
the economy.
11Securitization is of course not the only financial market innovation appearing over the last decades.
Still, without doubt it is the most important and most often discussed product. Furthermore, the
general consensus seems to be that among all new financial products loan securitization is by far the
most influential for macroeconomic dynamics.
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The analysis presented herein provides three new results. First, a time-varying
Bayesian VAR featuring stochastic volatility shows that the interaction between the
real economy and the banking system has undergone substantial changes over the last
decades. Most importantly, the bulk of the changes materializes sharply in the early
1980s, thus coinciding with the onset of the ’Great Moderation’. Second, the estima-
tion of a DSGE model featuring financial frictions shows that the time variation in the
dynamic interrelation between the banking industry and the real economy is indeed
compatible with a reduction in financial frictions: The key parameter governing the im-
portance of financial frictions turns out to be substantially larger in the 1970s compared
to the 1990s. Third, a careful examination of the exact timing of the changes indicates
the following: If the changing financial structure is supposed to be the driving force
behind the time variation in relation between the real economy and the financial sector,
then the regulatory changes of the early 1980s are more likely to be the roots of these
changes than the market driven financial innovations of the last decades.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Sign Restrictions
Output Prices Loans loan spread FFR
Monetary Policy ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
Demand ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Supply ↑ ↓ ↓
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Table 4.2: Calibrated Parameters
h habit formation 0.50
β discount factor 0.99
σc inverse of ela. of substitution 2
σl inverse of ela. of labor supply w.r.t. real wage 2
λw wage markup 0.6
γw partial indexation of wages 0.4
γp partial indexation of prices 0.4
ξp Calvo prices 0.75
ξw Calvo wages 0.75
α capital share in production 0.3
τ capital depreciation rate 0.025
ψ ela. of capital util. cost 0.3
φ investment adjustment cost parameter 2.5
γ entrepreneurial survival rate 0.977
K
N steady state ratio of capital to net worth 2
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Table 4.3: Priors and Posterior Estimates
Parameters Prior Posterior
1979 1997
Density Mean Median Median
[Bounds] (Std. dev) [16%,84%] [16%,84%]
 Ela. of EFP to Leverage Beta 0.05 0.167 0.102
[0,0.5] (0.025) [0.163,0.173] [0.091,0.118]
ρ Taylor smoothing Beta 0.8 0.881 0.894
[0,1] (0.10) [0.866,0.914] [0.884,0.927]
rpi Taylor inflation Gamma 1.50 1.128 1.480
[1.01,4] (0.20) [1.075,1.185] [1.336,1.526]
ry Taylor output Gamma 0.10 0.334 0.119
[0,2] (0.075) [0.282,0.343] [0.028,0.247]
r∆Y Taylor ∆output Gamma 0.075 0.225 0.109
[0,1] (0.05) [0.088,0.390] [0.023,0.251]
ρg Autocorr. demand shock Beta 0.80 0.806 0.78
[0,1] (0.10) [0.794,0.831] [0.718,0.844]
σg Std. dev demand shock Uniform 0.00 1.001 0.215
[0,10] (10) [0.675,1.231] [0.125,0.241]
σr Std. dev mon. policy shock Uniform 0.00 0.454 0.045
[0,10] (10) [0.388,0.588] [0.035,0.052]
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4.9 Figures
Figure 4.1: Unconditional Moments
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(b) ρ(∆Y ;LS): blue; σ(∆Y ): black
Notes: This figure shows the unconditional time-varying standard deviation of GDP growth (black solid line) together
with the unconditional time-varying correlation between GDP growth and lending (Panel (a)), and the unconditional
time-varying correlation between GDP growth and the loan spread (Panel (b))
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Figure 4.2: Conditional Correlations
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Notes: This figure shows the time-varying correlation between GDP growth and lending (Panel (a)) and the time-varying
correlation between GDP growth and the loan spread (Panel (b)) conditional on monetary policy shocks (black), demand
shocks (blue) and supply shocks (red)
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Response Functions to Monetary Policy Shocks
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Response Functions to Monetary Policy Shocks - Selected Horizons
1980 2000
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
GDP
Im
pa
ct
 E
ffe
ct
1980 2000
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Prices
1980 2000
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Loans
1980 2000
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
Spread
1980 2000
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
FFR
1980 2000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
GDP
Ef
fe
ct
 a
fte
r 4
 Q
ua
rte
rs
1980 2000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Prices
1980 2000
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Loans
1980 2000
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
Spread
1980 2000
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
FFR
1980 2000
0
1
2
3
4
GDP
Ef
fe
ct
 a
fte
r 2
8 
Q
ua
rte
rs
1980 2000
-1
0
1
2
3
Prices
1980 2000
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Loans
1980 2000
-0.08
-0.07
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
Spread
1980 2000
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
FFR
181
Figure 4.5: Impulse Response Functions to Demand Shocks
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Figure 4.6: Impulse Response Functions to Demand Shocks - Selected Horizons
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Figure 4.7: DSGE and VAR Impulse Response Functions
Notes: This figure shows the one standard deviation probability bands of the impulse responses of the TVP-VAR (gray
shaded area)to monetary policy and demand shocks together with the one standard deviation probability bands of the
impulse responses of the DGSE model (blue shaded area) for the estimated parameters reported in Table 3
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Figure 4.8: Binding Deposit Rates
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This Figure shows the effective Federal Funds Rate alongside the regulatory deposit rate ceilings for different
classes of deposit accounts for the period 1959 to 1987. The data on the deposit rate ceiling is taken from
the dataset accompanying Mertens (2008)
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Figure 4.9: Securitization of Loans
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This Figure shows for different loan categories the percentage of loans securitized relative to total loans
outstanding for the period 1976 to 2009. The data on loan securitization is taken from the dataset accom-
panying Loutskina (2011).
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